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PART OF
EUROPE
IN THE YEAR 1700
Dominions of Charles II of Spain shown thus
SCALE of MILES
100 0 200 400
M = MONTFERRAT
G = GUIPUZCOA
GREAT BRITAIN
BRANDENBURG
Berlin
POLAND
HANOVER
Wolfenbuttel
SAXONY
Cologne
R. Elbe
R. Rhine
PALATINATE
Landau
Strassburg
Ulm
Augsburg
Mindelheim
Ratisbon
R. Danube
Vienna
HUNGARY
Paris
R. Seine
R. Loire
FRANCE
SWITZERLAND
SAVOY
MILAN
VENICE
TURKISH EMPIRE
Orange
R. Rhone
PAPAL STATES
TUSCANY
Genoa
Toulon
PYRENEES
Vigo
Burgos
R. Ebro
R. Douro
Brilmiega
Madrid
R. Tagus
PORTUGAL
SPAIN
Barcelona
Minorca
Majorca
CORSICA
SARDINIA
Rome
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THE

CONDUCT OF THE ALLIES.

BY

JONATHAN SWIFT

EDITED WITH INTRODUCTION
AND NOTES

BY

C. B. WHEELER, M.A.

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CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

1672 Louis XIV attacks the United Provinces.

1678 War ended by the Treaty of Nimeguen.

1686 (July) League of Augsburg is formed to check French aggression.

1688 (Sept.) Louis invades the Empire.
(Nov.) William of Orange lands in England and three months later is proclaimed king.

1689 The League of Augsburg develops into a general Alliance against Louis.

1697 War ended by the Treaty of Ryswick.

1698 (Oct.) First Partition Treaty.

1700 (June) Second Partition Treaty.
(Nov.) Death of Charles II of Spain, and proclamation of Philip of Anjou as Philip V of Spain.

1701 (Feb.) Louis seizes the Dutch Barrier Towns.
Dutch and English recognize Philip as king of Spain.
(Sept.) Grand Alliance formed between the Empire, Holland, and England.
Louis recognizes the Pretender as king of England.

1702 (Jan.) The king of Prussia, the Elector of Hanover, the Elector Palatine, and the king of Denmark join the Grand Alliance.
(Mar.) Death of William III, and accession of Anne; Marlborough and Godolphin become her chief ministers.
(May) War declared against France and Spain.

1703 (May) The king of Portugal joins the Grand Alliance.
(Sept.) The Archduke Charles crowned as Charles III of Spain.
(Oct.) The duke of Savoy joins the Grand Alliance.

1704 (May) Harley and St. John join the ministry.
(July) Capture of Gibraltar by Sir George Rooke.
(August) Battle of Höchstädt or Blenheim.

1705 (May) Death of the Emperor Leopold I, and election of his son Joseph I.
(Sept.) Peterborough takes Barcelona.

1706 (May) Battle of Ramillies.
(June) The Allies' temporary occupation of Madrid.
(July) Louis's first negotiations for peace.
(Sept.) Eugene defeats the French at Turin.
(Dec.) The Whigs begin to join the ministry.

1707 (Mar.) French evacuate northern Italy.
(Apr.) Allies defeated at Almanza.
(July) Failure of the attack on Toulon.
(Dec.) Both Houses vote against 'a peace without Spain'.

1708 (Feb.) Harley and St. John dismissed from office.
(July) Battle of Oudenarde.

1709 (May) Abortive peace conference at the Hague.
(Aug.) Marlborough applies to be made Captain General for life.
(Sept.) Battle of Malplaquet.
(Oct.) Barrier Treaty between England and Holland.

1710 (Feb.) Trial of Dr. Sacheverell.
(June) Abortive peace conference at Gertruydenberg.
(Aug.) Godolphin, Sunderland, and the other Whigs dismissed from office; Harley and St. John recalled.
(Sept.) The Allies enter Madrid for the second time.
(Nov.) Duchess of Marlborough dismissed.
(Dec.) Capitulation of General Stanhope at Brihuega.

1711 (April) Death of the Emperor Joseph I, leaving his brother Charles III of Spain as his probable successor.
(May) Hill's disastrous expedition to Quebec.
(July) Prior's secret mission to France.
(Oct.) Charles III's election to the Empire.
(Nov.) The Dutch agree to discuss a peace.
House of Lords votes for 'no peace without Spain'.
The *Conduct of the Allies* published.
(Dec.) Lords 'swamped' by the creation of twelve peers.
Marlborough charged with peculation and dismissed.

1712 (Jan.) Peace conference opened at Utrecht.

1713 (Mar.) Treaty of Utrecht signed.

INTRODUCTION

In the midst of the fourth great attempt that has been made since the Middle Ages on the part of one nation to subjugate the rest of Western Europe it may be a relief, as it will certainly prove not uninstructive, to turn for a while to the consideration of the second of those attempts in point of time, the one which was the outcome of the overweening pride and ambition of Louis XIV of France. The master of a country at that time the richest and most powerful in the world, having for his servants the most able councillors and the greatest generals of the day, himself not lacking in shrewdness, foresight, and industry, however much these qualities were tainted by his bigotry and insincerity, Louis may well have dreamt of schemes of conquest, no less extensive than those which Philip II of Spain had cherished before him, or those which at a later day led Napoleon I and Wilhelm II to plunge Europe into the horrors of war. Well was it for the Europe of his day that he was encountered by a champion who made it the work of his life to curb the power of France; the grandson of an English king, and himself an English king, though his heart ever remained with the land of his birth, there are few of her sovereigns to whom England has more cause to be grateful than she has to William the Dutchman, Prince of Orange.

To an Englishman, however, it is humiliating to reflect that in the early stages of this war of aggression upon the liberties of Europe Louis found in this country not merely a friend, but an ally. We may blush to recall that in 1672, under the most affable and most dissolute

of our kings, an English fleet acted in concert with a French army in an unprovoked attack on the United Provinces. This attack was only foiled by the heroic resource of opening the dykes and flooding the country, the Dutch being resolved, in the memorable words of the Prince of Orange, rather to die in the last ditch than submit to the foreign invader. But Charles II's action was far from popular with his subjects, most of whom were fully alive to the menace of the French arms, and this country was on the point of declaring war against Louis, and had already voted supplies and raised an army, when the Peace of Nimeguen (1678) gave a temporary respite to the Dutch. The terms they obtained were honourable; but Louis made his advantage out of the treaty at the expense of their ally Spain, from whom he took Franche-Comté and several towns in the Spanish Netherlands.

For the next seven years the French monarchy stood at its highest; Louis was all-powerful among his own people and feared by his neighbours. By the help of Vauban he greatly increased the fortifications of his country, and by many minor aggressions, some legal—or at least under cover of law—and others forcible, he pushed forward his frontier in the east and secured a firm vantage-ground in northern Italy. Alarmed at these evidences of the ever-growing power of France, the German princes in 1686 united in the League of Augsburg to secure the inviolability of their own dominions, and to insist on the maintenance of the settlements agreed on at Westphalia and Nimeguen. This soon developed into a great alliance in which were united the Emperor, the King of Spain, the States General, the Elector of Saxony, the Elector Palatine and a number of minor princes. To them were afterwards added the Duke of Savoy and the Elector of Bavaria.

The League was at first purely defensive, and for two years no steps were taken on either side; but Louis, like other aggressors, was fully alive to the advantage of getting in the first blow, and in the autumn of 1688 he opened the campaign by dispatching an army to the Rhine. Here he made one of the two great blunders of his life, for, by directing his energies against the Germans instead of the Dutch, he left William of Orange free to set sail for England and take part in that bloodless Revolution of 1688 which altered the whole course of English history. Had Louis been guided by wiser counsels, had he marched against the man who was the very mainspring of the combination formed against him, and had his arms proved as successful in Holland as on the Rhine, the subsequent destiny of every nation in Europe might have been different.

But thanks to his error the Allies were reinforced by the English arms; and in the early part of 1689 General Churchill, whose name was destined within the next twenty years to prove a word of terror to the French, gained his first victory over their armies at Walcourt near the Sambre. Into the details of the ensuing campaigns there is no need to enter here: the French naval victory off Beachy Head, the capture of Mons by Louis in spite of William's heroic efforts to relieve it, the destruction of the French fleet off Cap La Hogue, the French capture of Namur, the defeat of William at Steenkerke, and again at Neerwinden, his recovery of Namur—all these incidents, however interesting in themselves, must be passed over with the bare mention, if we are to secure the right focus for an Englishman's point of view at the time when Swift's pamphlet appeared. Suffice it that in 1697, when the Duke of Savoy had been detached from the League, the rest of the Allies were as ready as the French to come to terms, and the

Peace of Ryswick gave a second respite to the exhausted combatants. By this Louis recognized William as King of England, and Anne as his successor; he ceded all the towns which had been taken in the Spanish Netherlands since the Treaty of Nimeguen, and consented to the occupation of each of the Barrier Towns along that frontier by a Dutch garrison; he restored Luxemburg to the King of Spain and Lorraine to its Duke; on the side of Germany he surrendered all that had been taken since the Treaty of Nimeguen, with the exception of Strassburg, and accepted the Rhine as the eastern boundary of his dominions.

If any of the politicians of the day looked on these surrenders as proof that Louis had renounced his schemes of aggrandizement, they knew but little of that monarch; the lust of dominion is not so soon stamped out in a breast where it has once taken root. The justice of the Allies' claims was admitted, not in the least because the *Grand Monarque* despaired of obtaining his ends by war, but because a new fact had appeared on the horizon, which, he hoped, would enable him to attain them more cheaply and more easily by diplomacy. This was the certainty that the days of Charles II of Spain were numbered, and that his death would raise an extraordinarily difficult question of succession. The King himself had no descendants; he had however two sisters and one male first cousin, each of whom had male descendants, so that, under the ordinary laws of inheritance, there would have been no difficulty about fixing on the rightful heir. But the ordinary laws of inheritance did not apply. The elder sister, Maria Theresa, had married Louis XIV and had expressly renounced all claim to the throne of Spain for herself and her descendants; this renunciation had been duly confirmed by the Spanish Cortes. The younger sister,

THE SPANISH SUCCESSION



Margaret Theresa, had married her cousin the Emperor Leopold, and their only child Maria Antonia had executed a similar renunciation on her marriage with the Elector of Bavaria ; though of this renunciation the Cortes had taken no notice. The question of the validity of these renunciations was endlessly debated among the partisans of the rival houses ; for if either of them could be shown to be invalid, the problem was solved. In the event of both being upheld, the Emperor Leopold appeared as a third claimant in his own right, as being first cousin to Charles II. As it was clear that the addition of the vast dominions of Spain either to France or to the Empire would wholly upset the Balance of Power, both the Dauphin and the Emperor were willing to waive their own personal claims in favour of their younger sons. There were thus three claimants in the field, Philip Duke of Anjou, Joseph Ferdinand the Electoral Prince of Bavaria, and the Archduke Charles the Emperor's younger son by a second marriage.

Had it been in William's power to do so, he would have insisted on the devolution of the whole of the Spanish dominions to the Electoral Prince, as being the only settlement which would not imperil the liberties of Europe ; but neither the English nor the Dutch had eyes for the dangers which his keen vision foresaw, and, as the only safeguard he could contrive, he entered into a secret treaty with Louis in 1698—known as the First Partition Treaty—by which it was agreed that on the death of Charles II the Spanish dominions should be divided among the three claimants. Into the details of the division it is needless to enter, for the treaty was rendered ineffectual by the death of the Electoral Prince in the following year. Hereupon a Second Partition Treaty was made (1700) between William, the United Provinces, and Louis, in which it was agreed that on the

death of Charles II, Spain with the Spanish Indies and the Spanish Netherlands should go to the Archduke Charles, and Philip should have the Sicilies, the Basque province of Guipuzcoa, and Lorraine; the Duke of Lorraine to be compensated for the loss of his territory by the gift of the Milanese, or Duchy of Milan, which before the war formed part of the Spanish dominions. The Emperor, exasperated at his son's exclusion from Italy, refused to have any part in the arrangement.

Though this treaty was intended to remain secret, the report that an agreement had been made for the partition of the Spanish dominions soon reached Spain, where it roused the people to a fury of resentment and drove the wretched King to crown his hapless reign by one more act of supreme unwisdom; he made a will bequeathing the whole of his territories to Philip. After a short hesitation, whether real or simulated it is hard to say, Louis accepted the princely legacy for his grandson, and proudly proclaimed that the Pyrenees had ceased to exist.

The Partition Treaties found little favour with the English people. Thinking only of the immediate acquisition of territory by Philip under the treaty, they looked with indifference on the possibility of an agreement between two Bourbon princes, the one on the throne of France, the other on that of Spain. Unable to enter into William's broad view of foreign policy, they considered the last war as one in which they had been involved by the King's Dutch sympathies. In fact, so deep was the suspicion with which they regarded all William's acts, that the will of Charles II, under which Philip inherited the whole of the Spanish dominions, was, as William complained, less unpopular than the Partition Treaties which assigned less than half those dominions to the Bourbon prince. This attitude was clearly shown by

the impeachment in 1701 of the ministers responsible for the treaties.

Early in the same year, shortly after Philip of Anjou had been crowned as Philip V of Spain, Louis showed that the acquisition of the Spanish dominions was but a part of the larger scheme of conquest which he cherished, and that the peace of Europe would not be secured even by the acquiescence of the other Powers in the late king's will. The Elector of Bavaria, now a firm friend and ally of the French, had been installed as governor of the Spanish Netherlands. By his treacherous connivance Louis was enabled to seize the Barrier Towns[1] occupied by the Dutch and to make prisoners of the fifteen thousand troops who garrisoned them. To secure the release of these the States General were compelled to acknowledge Philip as King of Spain, an example which, at their earnest entreaties and compelled by the clamours of his own Parliament and people, William was obliged to follow two months later. England indeed was sick of the war, weary of standing armies and the taxes necessary for their maintenance, and eager to take advantage of her insular position to detach herself from continental quarrels.

Fortunately for the country this apathy found no reflection in the sovereign. Fully aware of the ever-growing menace of French aggression, William, having extorted a grudging permission from his Parliament, hastened to the Hague, and on September 7, 1701, succeeded in building a new bulwark against Louis in the shape of the GRAND ALLIANCE[2] between England,

[1] These were Nieuport, Oudenarde, Ath, Mons, Charleroi, Namur, and Luxemburg.

[2] This name is also unfortunately sometimes given to the earlier alliance which sprang out of the League of Augsburg; see above, p. xii.

the Emperor, and the States General. To these powers were joined in the following year the King of Prussia, the Elector of Hanover, the Elector Palatine, the King of Denmark, and several smaller princes; and in 1703 the King of Portugal and the Duke of Savoy, both of whom were won over from the French side. The objects of the league were four:

(1) to compensate the Emperor for the loss of Spain,

(2) to recover the Spanish territory recently lost in Italy,

(3) to drive the French from the Netherlands,

(4) to prevent the union of France and Spain under the same government.

A few days after this alliance was signed Louis committed the second colossal blunder of his reign. As by the former he had opened the way for England to join the forces allied against him, so now by a single act he broke through the apathy of the English people and stung them, Whig and Tory alike, to clamour for war. He paid a farewell visit to James II, then on his death-bed at St. Germain, and promised to recognize the Pretender as King of England. That so astute a monarch can have been misled by any considerations of sentiment seems unlikely; but Louis knew that nothing he could do would so gratify the exiled monarch to whom he had displayed such princely generosity, and, acting probably under an impulse fanned by Madame de Maintenon, he took a step fatal to his own designs without considering the consequences of his action. Despite the warnings of his council, who saw that it was of the last importance to keep England neutral for the few months that William had yet to live, Louis seems to have fancied that he might extend with impunity the same recognition to the Pretender as to his father. But England, which had acquiesced in Philip's accession to

the throne of Spain, which had not been moved by Louis's sudden alliances with Portugal and Savoy, which had viewed with surly indifference the treachery of the Elector of Bavaria, now leapt to arms and demanded that the insolence of this disturber of the peace of Europe should once for all be chastised. Before the allied forces could take the field the great heart which had stirred them to action was still; but the work was done. The master builder had succeeded in erecting the bulwark, and it was left for other hands to defend it. For William's death caused no delay in the outbreak of war; and in 1702 the struggle was maintained in four separate campaigns, in Italy, in Flanders, on the Danube, and in Spain.

To trace the history of the war in detail for the next nine years would require far more space than can here be commanded; all that can be attempted is a short summary of the chief results attained. The Imperial forces were throughout under the command of Prince Eugene of Savoy, who had been refused a commission by Louis XIV and had accordingly entered the service of the Emperor, in which he rapidly distinguished himself against the Turks and in the war against France which was ended by the Peace of Ryswick. He was one of the greatest generals of his age, and raised the reputation of the Austrian troops to a point which it never reached before or since. He was wounded thirteen times on the field of battle, and in all his campaigns he made himself idolized by his soldiers. He paid several visits to England, where he was acclaimed as a hero by the mob, which, to do it justice, has never failed to detect heroism in any foreign personage whom it regarded as useful to the country's interests. Burnet speaks of the high esteem in which the Prince was held by both parties, and Steele credited him with 'Wisdom

and Valour in as high Perfection as Man can enjoy it'; Swift could only see that he was 'plaguy yellow and literally ugly beside', and in his *History of the Four Last Years of the Queen* he does not hesitate to accuse the Prince of a design to procure the assassination of the Lord Treasurer as the only means of ensuring the continuance of the war.

The States General had sufficient confidence in William's recommendation to entrust their forces to the leadership of Marlborough, but his authority over them was little more than nominal. Time and again his plans were thwarted by the timidity and opposition of the Dutch deputies, and his grandest schemes were only realized when his Allies failed to fathom their General's designs. In Spain the conduct of the Allied armies was entrusted to Henri de Ruvigny, a Huguenot exile who had left France after the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 and had entered the service of William, gaining the title of Earl of Galway seven years later. Though disparaged by Stanhope and Macaulay, in their anxiety to make him a foil for the brilliant but unstable Earl of Peterborough, who shared with him the conduct of the war in Spain, Galway seems to have been a thoroughly capable commander, his ill success being due mainly to the apathy of the German and Dutch allies, the hostility of the majority of the people of Spain, and the superior skill of the generals sent against him.[1]

On the other side Louis had many generals who were among the foremost in Europe; Turenne and

[1] Stanhope and Macaulay's portraits of the two generals are based mainly on the *Memoirs of Captain Carleton* (1728), which they accepted as the genuine work of an officer who had served in Spain. Colonel Parnell has however shown good ground for believing that the *Memoirs* were written by Swift, whose admiration for Peterborough naturally led him to disparage Galway.

Luxembourg were dead, but Vendôme, the Duke of Berwick, the Elector of Bavaria, Tallard, all these were soldiers with a genius for war, men whom any monarch might be proud to have in his service. Fortunately for the Allies, however, Louis not only allowed his personal preferences to weigh in the selection of his commanders, but he was always ready to supersede the most capable of them if he had failed on any particular occasion. No fewer than five of his marshals were forced to retire in the course of the war.

The earlier campaigns proved on the whole advantageous to the French, who penetrated through the Black Forest and even menaced Vienna, though they retired before the Allies in Flanders. In the beginning of 1704 Marlborough projected the great campaign of that year with which his name will always be associated. Deluding the enemy and hoodwinking the Dutch, he effected a junction with Prince Eugene on the Danube and in the battle known to the Germans as Höchstädt, but more familiar in England as Blenheim (Blindheim), inflicted a defeat on the French such as the armies of Louis had never known till then. The immediate practical effect was the occupation of Bavaria by the Allies, but even more important was the moral effect produced by the surrender of 14,000 of Louis's invincible troops.

In the same year an attempt of the Allies to invade Spain from the Portuguese frontier was foiled by the Duke of Berwick, the only success of the campaign being the capture by Admiral Rooke of Gibraltar, which has ever since remained in English hands. In 1705, however, the Archduke, who had two years before been proclaimed King of Spain under the title of Charles III, landed in Catalonia, the north-eastern portion of Spain being in favour of his claim, while the rest of the country

supported Philip V. He was accompanied by Peterborough at the head of 5,000 English and Dutch troops; and after the capture of Barcelona, which was held in the French interest, and a series of victories in Catalonia and Valencia, he entered Madrid in triumph in the course of the following year, his rival retreating before him to Burgos. But Charles's triumph was not for long. Two months later the French re-entered Madrid and reinstated Philip on the throne, their conquest being crowned by the victory at Almanza (Feb. 1707) in which the Earl of Galway at the head of 5,000 British, 8,000 Portuguese, and 3,000 other troops, mostly Dutch and German, was defeated by Berwick, with the loss of more than half his forces.

Meantime Marlborough, though hampered by Dutch deputies and Imperial generals, had inflicted a crushing defeat on Marshal Villeroy at Ramillies in Brabant (May 1706), and Eugene by a great victory at Turin in September of the same year had gained the whole of northern Italy for the Allies. The campaign of 1707 brought losses and gains to both sides; but in the following year the victory of Marlborough and Eugene at Oudenarde, and the capture of Lille, the strongest of the frontier towns, brought Louis to his knees. His country was indeed in sore straits. The losses in men and money had been enormous, all trade was ruined, and famine and a bitter winter completed the misery of the wretched inhabitants. Accordingly in 1709 the Marquis de Torcy was sent to the Hague to offer the surrender of all the main points for which the Allies had fought: the French king was prepared to withdraw all support from Philip's claim to the throne of Spain, to surrender ten Flemish fortresses as a barrier to the Dutch, to give up all territory gained from the Empire since the Treaty of Westphalia seventy years before,

to recognize the Hanoverian succession in England, to banish the Pretender, and to dismantle the fortifications of Dunkirk, which, as providing a harbour for the French privateers, had long been a thorn in the side of English commerce. His only demand was the throne of the Sicilies for his grandson in exchange for that of Spain.

Even to Marlborough, who had most to gain from the continuance of the war, the terms seemed reasonable, though it is not easy to know how far his opinion was influenced by the offer of an enormous bribe by Louis if negotiations could be completed. But neither the Whigs who were then in power, nor the Allies, were willing to listen to reason. The Emperor resented any partition of the Spanish dominions, and the Dutch, on principle, never accepted any terms so long as it seemed possible that better could be obtained by holding out. As a result M. de Torcy was told that Louis must 'employ his own troops, in conjunction with those of the allies, to drive his grandson out of Spain'. The envoy replied in a noble speech, thanking the plenipotentiaries for giving him the happiest day of his life; he had in obedience to his master's wishes offered concessions of which he could not himself approve; and he would gladly bear back an answer which, he well knew, would convince not only the king but the whole country of the necessity of carrying on the war at any sacrifice.

Torcy had not misread his master or his countrymen. On receipt of the terms offered by the Allies, Louis replied that if he was forced to continue the war, he would wage it against his natural enemies, and not against his grandson; a storm of indignation broke out in France; a new spirit was roused throughout the nation, and those who before thought they had sacrificed their all now found that they had yet more to give. But, ignorant of the fact that Torcy had, so far as he could,

repudiated the terms, the English people, on hearing of the outburst of patriotism in France, took it as but another example of French 'faithlessness' and were the more encouraged to continue the war. Indeed, for the great battle of the coming campaign both armies needed all the courage with which mutual hostility could provide them; the horrible slaughter at Malplaquet (Sept. 1709), in which the defeated French lost 12,000 men and the victorious Allies more than 20,000, led on both sides to a desire for a resumption of negotiations.

Before these could take place, the Dutch, ever awake to their own advantage, had concluded with Great Britain a special treaty for their own protection. This was the famous BARRIER TREATY signed on behalf of Queen Anne by Lord Townshend in October 1909. Marlborough, who had gone over with Townshend as a plenipotentiary to discuss the treaty, was so opposed to signing it that Godolphin empowered the other plenipotentiary to act alone. The provisions of this treaty may well recall to posterity the lines of Canning written more than a century later—lines much oftener aptly cited than quoted correctly—

> In matters of commerce, the fault of the Dutch
> Is offering too little and asking too much.

By this exceedingly one-sided treaty Queen Anne agreed to use all her efforts to regain those parts of the Spanish Netherlands which were in French hands, not that they might be restored to Charles III, as titular King of Spain, but that they might be handed over to the States General. The Dutch were given leave to garrison any towns in the Spanish Netherlands they might think necessary for their own protection; and for the maintenance of such garrisons a million livres was to be settled on them from the Netherland

towns, which amount Great Britain was to 'assist to find'. The Scheldt was to remain closed, as under the Treaty of Münster (1648), and all import duties at Flanders ports were to be maintained at the same level as those on the Scheldt. The sole concession made to Great Britain was the recognition by the States General of the Hanoverian succession, an entirely valueless provision, for in their own interests the Dutch were bound to oppose the return of the Stuarts to the English throne.

It is hardly to be wondered at that when, some two years later, the terms of the treaty leaked out in this country, there was a loud outcry against those who had framed it. This fire was carefully fanned by Swift, whose *Remarks on the Barrier Treaty* (Feb. 1712) is no less trenchantly written than the *Conduct of the Allies*, though its aim was directed upon a single object instead of being spread over the whole field of continental alliance. The House of Commons demanded that the Barrier Treaty should be laid on the table of the House; and after a resolution had been carried declaring Townshend 'an enemy to the Queen and kingdom', a Representation was drawn up in March 1712 by the Chairman of the Committee, Sir Thomas Hanmer, in which he received much help from Swift. It is given at length in the *History of the Four Last Years*, and forms a weighty indictment of the selfish, niggardly, and cowardly policy which the other Allies, and especially the Dutch, had displayed towards Great Britain.

But this is anticipating matters: we must return to the events which followed the battle of Malplaquet. As has been said, the appalling and useless carnage on that terrible field brought about fresh negotiations for peace. These took place at Gertruydenberg, a village ten miles

south-east of Dordrecht. The terms on which the Allies were willing to discuss peace were much the same as those offered at the Hague in the previous year; and Louis, as before, was ready to accept them all with the exception of the clause demanding that he should send troops to eject his grandson from the throne of Spain. But, though the French envoys refused to accept these hard conditions, they were signed by the British and Dutch representatives and sent over to England as though they had been the agreed basis of a treaty. Whatever was the motive for this useless and misleading action, it can hardly have been an honourable one, and Swift gives a scathing description of the episode in his pamphlet.

The campaigns of 1710 and 1711 were not marked by any decisive advantage either to the Allies or to their opponents; on both sides there were successes, and both sides suffered severely. A short-lived triumph of the Allies in Spain, where Charles III's army once more occupied Madrid, was nullified by General Stanhope's capitulation at Brihuega, and the gradual withdrawal of the rest of the allied troops to Catalonia, which alone remained faithful to the Austrian cause.

An event at least as important as any battle in turning men's minds towards peace was the death in April 1711 of the Emperor Joseph, who had succeeded his father Leopold in 1705. The probability of the election to the Imperial throne of the prince for whom, under the title of Charles III of Spain, the Allies had been fighting for ten years, changed the whole position of affairs. The war had been embarked on to preserve the balance of power, to prevent, that is, the kingdoms of France and Spain from falling into the hands of the same family; to carry it to a successful close would now far more seriously impair the balance of power by uniting the

dominions of Spain and the Empire in the hands of the same person.

Accordingly, three months after Joseph's death, Harley and St. John, who had replaced Marlborough and Godolphin as the Queen's chief advisers, determined to secure peace at the earliest opportunity, and in defiance of their compact with the other Allies, by which all separate negotiation with the enemy was prohibited, they dispatched Matthew Prior to France in July 1711 to interview M. de Torcy and discuss preliminaries. On his return to England with two French officials the blundering of an over-zealous custom-house officer led to his arrest; and though an order was sent post haste from London for his immediate release, the news spread like wildfire that an emissary of the government had been to France to interview the French king. The tale of course lost nothing in the telling; as people did not know what to believe, they were as ready then as nowadays to believe anything that supported their convictions. This was a situation which Swift's love of mischief as well as his desire to help his party rendered irresistible to him, and he determined to 'give the fools something to talk of'; he accordingly wrote an entirely fictitious account of the whole proceeding under the title, *A New Journey to Paris*, published September 11, 1711. This 'formal grave lie', as its author calls it in the *Journal to Stella*, was so artfully written that those who took it for the truth found many weighty arguments in it for peace, while those who read it for fiction were inclined to believe that it had no basis in fact. Over two thousand copies of this diverting pamphlet were sold in a fortnight.

Prior on his return brought with him the concessions which Louis was prepared to make in the preliminaries of peace. As among these was the offer of a guarantee

that the crowns of France and Spain should never be united on the head of the same prince, the Queen was prepared to waive the unreasonable demand that Louis should fight against his own grandson, and sent the Earl of Strafford to Holland in October of the same year (1711) to communicate the terms to the States General. A loud protest was raised, not only by the Dutch, but by the Imperial ministers, against what they believed to be an abandonment of their interests, and a protracted interchange of stiff diplomatic messages took place, till at length towards the end of November the Dutch envoys, with a very bad grace, agreed that a congress should be held at Utrecht in the beginning of the following year to arrange the articles of the treaty. When this was known in London every effort was made by the war party to frustrate the negotiation and to raise a popular clamour against the peace. The Baron de Bothmar, the envoy of the Elector of Hanover, printed and distributed a memorial directly disapproving of the Queen's action; Prince Eugene was begged to come to London and make his protest; and the House of Lords, on the motion of the Earl of Nottingham, carried a motion against any peace which should leave Spain in Bourbon hands. A week later Mr. Robert Walpole brought forward the same motion in the Commons; but it was lost by a large majority.

To put an end to this deadlock Harley had recourse to the last weapon by which a recalcitrant House of Lords can be brought to its knees, the creation of a sufficient number of peers to swamp the opposition's majority. Twelve peers were accordingly created in a batch at the end of December—an unfortunate number, as it gave the Earl of Wharton an opportunity of asking them, in derision, 'whether they voted individually or by their foreman.' To add as little as possible to the

existing peerage, it was arranged that two of the new baronies should be conferred on the eldest sons of peers of Great Britain, and two others on peers of Scotland or Ireland. The same course, it may be noted, was adopted in the memorable struggle over the Reform Bill in 1831–2, when Earl Grey created sixteen peers as a first instalment and obtained the King's consent to the creation of as many more as should be necessary.

Having thus secured a majority in both Houses, the ministry were able to devote all their attention to the discussions at Utrecht. Before the sittings began their chief political opponent had been swept from the board. On December 30 the Duke of Marlborough was dismissed from all his offices, and the Duke of Ormond installed as Captain General in his place. But, though the peace conference was actually sitting, the Allies and the French by common consent took the field for the campaign of 1712. The negotiations indeed seemed likely to be protracted long enough to enable one side or the other to gain some material advantage. The Dutch were determined to have no peace, so long as they could have English troops to fight for them. The Emperor, more bellicose if less prudent, was resolved to have no peace, even if his troops had to take the field alone. So that of the three chief Allies England alone was sincerely anxious to come to terms. It would be tedious to recount the shifts and expedients by which the other two powers delayed the progress of the negotiations. At last after a session of fifteen months the peace was signed on March 31 (O.S.), 1713. This left the Emperor alone in the field, and Eugene soon found that his forces alone were no match for the French. In the following year therefore a separate peace was made at Rastatt between Louis and Charles, and the long war came to an end.

If the object of the war was to preserve the balance of

power in Europe, that object may be said to have been secured by the disruption of the Spanish dominions. Philip was allowed to retain Spain and the Indies under a guarantee that in no circumstances should the thrones of France and Spain be occupied by the same person; but he was deprived of the other territories which had belonged to his predecessor. The Two Sicilies were divided, Sicily proper being given to the Duke of Savoy, with the title of king, and Naples, together with the Milanese and the Spanish Netherlands, to the Emperor; Sardinia was given, also with the title of king, to the Elector of Hanover; Gibraltar and Minorca were to remain in English hands. From France England also received Newfoundland, Acadie (Nova Scotia), and the Hudson's Bay Territory. Louis further agreed to recognize the House of Hanover as heirs to the English throne, to banish the Pretender from his dominions, and to demolish the fortifications of Dunkirk. The Dutch were given a strong line of barrier fortresses, including Nieuport, Ypres, Charleroi, Namur, and Luxemburg; Lille and Tournai, however, which had been wrested from the French, were to be restored. The King of Prussia was given the province of Upper Gueldres on the north of the Rhine, in exchange for which he renounced all claim to the Orange principality and the domains of that family in Franche-Comté. England also secured a valuable commercial treaty with France, whose envoy acted throughout as representative also of Spain. In this treaty the chief item, which a humaner age can only regard with shame, was the *asiento*, the exclusive right to carry slaves to the Spanish West Indies. There was a long struggle between the Dutch and the English envoys before the latter could secure the monopoly of this choice morsel; but in the end English cupidity prevailed.

It was said at the time of the Peace, and has often been repeated, that to leave a Bourbon prince on the throne of Spain was to risk a close alliance between that country and France. But as Swift says below, p. 68, 'Grandfathers in private Families are not observed to have great Influence on their Grandsons, and I believe they have much less among Princes. However, when the Authority of a Parent is gone, is it likely that *Philip* will be directed by a Brother, against his own Interest, and that of his subjects?' Swift's prescience was justified. Within a few years of the Peace the diversity of interests became apparent, and a new treaty was made (1718) between the late Allies and France to secure Europe against the designs of Philip. It should, however, be said that the fears of those who counted on an agreement between the two branches of the Bourbon family were not groundless. The secret Family Compact of 1733, renewed in 1743 and 1761, and directed on the one hand against the Austrian ascendency in Italy and on the other against the commercial supremacy of England, showed that consanguinity is not necessarily, as Swift seemed to think, a bar to alliance.

A second danger, to which Swift does not advert, though it certainly presented itself to the minds of his contemporaries, was the possibility of Philip's becoming heir to the throne of Louis, in which case there was every probability of his repudiating his guarantee and uniting the kingdoms of France and Spain in his own person. Indeed, within a few years of the Treaty of Utrecht there was only a sickly infant left between Philip and the crown of France. The chief barriers against this danger lay in the exhausted condition of France, which would probably make her unwilling to embark on another war for many years to come, and the character of the Spanish people, who would almost

certainly resent any attempt to make their country an apanage of France. To Philip, King of Spain, they had manifested a devoted and almost inexplicable loyalty, which it was highly unlikely they would feel for Philip, King of France. That there was a risk cannot be denied, but the only alternative policy, the transfer of Spain to the Emperor, would have been a certain and immediate evil; and as this transfer could only have been effected at the cost of yet more sacrifices of men and treasure, there can be little doubt that the 'lovers of peace' in England were acting in the interests not only of their own country but of Europe.

But if the Peace itself can be justified, nothing can be said in defence of the personal motives by which those who brought it about were actuated, of the clandestine negotiations by which, in defiance of all treaties, they led up to it, of the treachery by which they secured the downfall of Marlborough, or of the shameless abandonment of the heroic Catalans, who had throughout supported Charles III and still continued unaided a desperate struggle against Philip, till at length, eighteen months after the Treaty of Utrecht, their principal stronghold, Barcelona, was taken by storm by the Duke of Berwick, and thenceforth Catalonia became an integral part of Philip's dominions.

. . . . . .

Up to this point, concerned with greater issues, we have made no mention of the political parties in England, but, if Swift's pamphlet is to be properly understood, it is necessary to give a short sketch of the political history of the time, and to view its leading men in the clearer perspective which the lapse of two centuries has given us. The spectacle is far from exhilarating. Not only had party-loyalty almost entirely superseded true patriotism—as Macaulay says, it was a time when

faction was almost a madness—but that party-loyalty was itself based on sordid views of self-interest and broke on the slightest strain when self-interest seemed to conflict with it. If Swift was right in the contentions he advanced in the *Conduct of the Allies*, it is melancholy to have to admit that his views were based far less on his desire for the welfare of England than on his eagerness to support Harley and St. John in their policy, and that this eagerness sprang from the knowledge that only through Harley and St. John could Jonathan Swift gain the ends he had in view. In this respect he was but typical of his age, for it is probable that political morality was never at a lower ebb in this country than in the early years of the eighteenth century.

On Anne's accession one of her first acts was to dismiss the few remaining Whig ministers of William and to replace them by Tories. The nominal head of the ministry was Godolphin, the Lord Treasurer; but the supreme direction of affairs was in the hands of the Earl of Marlborough—as he then was—whose influence over the Queen, exercised through his wife, was almost boundless. Deeply though William had distrusted Marlborough, he recognized that he alone was capable of conducting the war, and with his dying breath he commended the Earl to Anne as the fittest person to lead her armies and guide her counsels. Nor was the Queen slow to follow this advice; within three days of her accession Marlborough was appointed Captain General of the forces at home and abroad. Of his ability whether in the field or in the Council chamber there could be no question; he was the foremost general of his age, and in all his counsels he was ever guided by the dry light of reason; at once vigorous and careful, cool and enterprising, he laid his plans with masterly intellect and carried them out with ruthless

precision. But save for the one weak spot in his heart, his affection for his beautiful but overbearing wife, his conduct was uniformly guided by two ruling principles, his passion for war and his astounding avarice. 'He is perhaps', says Green, 'the only instance of a man of real greatness who loved money for money's sake.' These two passions indeed went hand in hand, for the longer the war lasted the richer did Marlborough become; so that from the date of his appointment it is beside the point to call him a Tory, and his opponents High Tories on the one hand or Whigs on the other; the old lines of cleavage had vanished for the time. As Swift says in his *History of the Four Last Years of the Queen*, 'By this time likewise, all disputes about those principles, which used originally to divide Whig and Tory, were wholly dropped; and those fantastical words, ought in justice to have been so too, provided we could have found out more convenient names, whereby to distinguish lovers of peace from lovers of war.'

It was then as a lover of war that Marlborough secured the dismissal of some of the Tory lovers of peace in 1704 and their replacement by two men, Robert Harley and Henry St. John, who were afterwards to become the friends of Swift; the former, in Macaulay's estimation, was 'a solemn trifler', the latter 'a brilliant knave'; but both were the objects of Swift's unswerving devotion long after the friendship between themselves had turned to bitter hostility. The ministry of the following year was again a war ministry, some of the prominent Whigs being included in the government as supporters of the war. By their admission Marlborough greatly weakened his hold on the Queen, who was at heart a convinced Tory, and who was moreover growing weary of the overbearing demeanour of the Duchess. The Whigs who were in office too were set upon

replacing the Tory members of the government by persons of their own party, and in 1708 they succeeded in making Marlborough put pressure on the Queen to dismiss Harley and St. John and the other Tories—a step to which he was the more easily brought because he had discovered that those two had been endeavouring by backstairs means to supplant the Duchess in the royal favour. The vacant places in the government were then filled by Whigs, so that Marlborough and Godolphin alone remained of the Tory ministers with whom Anne had begun her reign.

But though the Whigs had apparently succeeded in what is the dearest wish of every party politician, the defeat of the opposite party, the Queen had never reconciled herself to the domination of a faction which she detested; and it needed but the foolish action of an unintelligent clergyman, and the still more foolish persecution to which he was subjected, to enable her to get rid of the burden. In 1710 a High Church divine, Dr. Sacheverell, preached a dull and silly sermon at St. Paul's in which he assailed the Act of Settlement, denounced the government, and upheld the doctrine of non-resistance. The sermon, like much else that is preached from pulpit and platform, would no doubt have failed of effect by its own inanity if Godolphin had not been stung by the special vituperation directed against himself, and insisted in spite of the wiser protests of Marlborough and Somers that Sacheverell should be impeached before the Lords. In an evil hour for the ministry this was done, and the Lords directed the sermon to be burnt and its author to be suspended for three years. This judgement caused such an outbreak of hostility to the government throughout the country that the Queen summoned up courage to quarrel with the Duchess, and dismissing Godolphin and Sunderland

and the other Whigs, once more summoned Harley and St. John to assume control of the administration (1710).

This, it was apparent, could be but a prelude to the fall of Marlborough himself. Not only were the two new ministers ardent advocates of a peace, wherein they did but reflect the feeling of a large part of the country, but they were actuated even more strongly by a desire to avenge themselves on Marlborough for their dismissal three years before. Among his late allies the Whigs, too, the great man had but few friends. In August 1709 he had requested the Queen to confer on him the title of Captain General for life, and it was mainly the support of the Whig members of the government which gave her the courage to refuse. But his bitterest opponents were certainly the two 'lovers of peace' whom the Queen had recalled to her Council; and to secure his downfall no device which cunning could suggest or treachery execute was left unattempted. A weekly paper, the *Examiner*, was started to abuse him, a host of anonymous pamphleteers were engaged to revile the war and its chief supporter, to malign the Allies, and to proclaim the speedy and inevitable bankruptcy of the nation, burdened with the unparalleled weight of a debt of fifty millions, and only to be saved from ruin by the immediate conclusion of a secure and lasting peace.

But the nation hardly needed such violent urgings. It was weary of the war; it had fed full of glory and learnt the unsatisfying nature of the banquet; it was appalled at the slaughter of its sons, and groaning under the weight of its taxes. The politicians of the Coffee-houses might remember the precise reasons which had led to the formation of the Grand Alliance ten years before, and might estimate how far the ends of the Allies had been attained; but probably the bulk of the

people had not been much concerned about the balance of power, and, having taken vengeance on the French for the insult of 1701, they were quite ready to regard it as having been washed out by the rivers of blood that had flowed at Malplaquet, and wished for nothing more than a speedy peace and a remission of taxation.

It was then to ears more than half converted that Swift preached in his famous pamphlet—a fact which does not detract from the masterly way in which he has presented his case, though it may explain the enormous success the pamphlet had on its appearance, people of any political party being prone to buy the literature which reflects their own opinions rather than that which presents a new and possibly opposite point of view. The success of the pamphlet as tested by its sales was indeed remarkable. Seven editions appeared hot on each other's heels in the space of two months; before the last of them came out eleven thousand copies had been sold. But the facts are too interesting for a summary. The following extracts from the *Journal to Stella* will record its progress in greater detail.

'Oct. 30th [1711]. I was today in the city concerting some things with a printer, and am to be tomorrow all day busy with Mr. Secretary about the same. I won't tell you now; but the ministers reckon it will do abundance of good, and open the eyes of the nation, who are half bewitched against a peace.'

'Nov. 10th. Why, if you must have it out, something is to be published of great moment, and three or four great people are to see there are no mistakes in point of fact: but 'tis so troublesome to send it among them, and get their corrections, that I am weary as a dog.'

'24th. I have finished my pamphlet today, which has cost me so much time and trouble; it will be published in three or four days, when the parliament begins sitting.'

'26th. My large pamphlet will be published tomorrow, copies are sent to the great men this night.'

'27th. The pamphlet is published; Lord Treasurer had it by him on the table, and was asking me about the mottoes in the title page; he gave me one of them himself.'

'28th. The pamphlet begins to make a noise: I was asked by several whether I had seen it, and they advised me to read it, for it was something very extraordinary.'

'29th. My printer came this morning to tell me he must immediately print a second edition, and Lord Treasurer made one or two small additions; they must work day and night to have it out on Saturday; they sold a thousand in two days.'

'30th. This morning . . . I did some business with Lord Treasurer, and have been all this afternoon with the printer, adding something to the second edition. I dined with the printer; the pamphlet makes a world of noise, and will do a great deal of good: it tells abundance of most important facts which were not at all known.'

'Dec. 1st. The printer has not sent me the second edition; I know not the reason, for it certainly came out today; perhaps they are glutted with it already. I found a letter from Lord Harley on my table, to tell me that his father [the Lord Treasurer] desires I should make two small alterations.'

'2nd. The printer called early this morning, told me the second edition went off yesterday in five hours, and he must have a third ready tomorrow, for they might have sold half another: his men are all at work with it though it be Sunday. . . .' '[The Secretary] tells me the Dutch envoy designs to complain of that pamphlet. The noise it makes is extraordinary. It is fit it should answer the pains I have been at about it. I suppose it will be printed in Ireland. Some lay it to Prior, others to Mr. Secretary St. John, but I am always the first they lay everything to.'

'3rd. I was this morning with Lord Treasurer about something he would have altered in the pamphlet; but it can't be till the fourth edition, which I believe will be soon; for I dined with the printer, and he tells me they

have sold off half the third.... The Whigs are resolved to bring that pamphlet into the House of Lords to have it condemned, so I hear. But the printer will stand to it, and not own the author; he must say "he had it from the penny post".'

'4th. They have sold off above half the third edition, and answers are coming out.... I have made some alterations in every edition, and it has cost me more trouble, for the time, since the printing than before. 'Tis sent over to Ireland, and I suppose you will have it reprinted.'

'5th. They are now printing the fourth edition, which is reckoned very extraordinary, considering 'tis a dear twelvepenny book, and not bought up in numbers to give away, as the Whigs do, but purely upon its own strength.'

'6th. The printer ... is going to print the pamphlet in small, a fifth edition, to be taken off by friends and sent into the country.'

'13th. I forgot to tell you that the printer told me yesterday, that Morphew, the publisher, was sent for by that Lord Chief Justice [Parker] who was a manager against Sacheverell; he showed him two or three papers and pamphlets; among the rest mine of *The Conduct of the Allies*, threatened him, asked who was the author, and has bound him over to appear next term. He would not have the impudence to do this, if he did not foresee what was coming at Court.'[1]

'18th. I dined in the city, and was with the printer, who has now a fifth edition of the *Conduct*, &c.; it is in small and sold for sixpence; they have printed as many as three editions [i.e. three times the number usually printed in an edition], because they are to be sent in numbers into the country by great men, &c. who subscribe for hundreds. It has been sent a fortnight ago to Ireland: I suppose you will print it there. The Tory Lords and Commons in Parliament argue all from it: and all agree, that never any thing of that kind was of so great consequence, or made so many converts.'

[1] Swift was in a very pessimistic mood at the time, and confidently expected the downfall of Harley and St. John.

'Jan. 8th 1711–12. Well, ay, the pamphlet; but there are some additions to the fourth edition; the fifth edition was of four thousand, in a smaller print, sold for sixpence.'

'28th. The sixth edition of three thousand of the *Conduct of the Allies* is sold, and the printer talks of a seventh; eleven thousand of them have been sold; which is a prodigious run.'

'Feb. 4th. The House of Commons have this day made many severe votes about our being abused by our Allies. Those who spoke, drew all their arguments from my book, and their votes confirm all I writ; the Court had a majority of a hundred and fifty; all agree, that it was my book that spirited them to these resolutions.'

'8th. So, they say Presto [Swift's name for himself in his correspondence with Stella] writ *The Conduct*, &c.? Do they like it? I don't care whether they do or no; but the Resolutions printed t'other day in the votes are almost quotations from it; and would never have passed, if that book had not been written. . . . Why really three editions of *The Conduct*, &c. is very much for Ireland; it is a sign you have some honest among you.'

'14th. A Whig member took out the *Conduct of the Allies* and read the passage about the succession [see below, p. 30] with great resentment; but none seconded him.'

Such was the history recorded from day to day of the most effective pamphlet ever penned by England's greatest pamphleteer. It was probably, as its author deemed, the main factor which saved the ministry at that juncture and brought about the peace; for though a large section of the community were heartily sick of the war, the government's majority in the Commons was very unstable and in the Lords they were, when the pamphlet was published, actually in a minority. In every legislative assembly there is always a small percentage capable of conversion, and to these Swift's irresistible logic must have appealed. But the main

object of a political pamphlet is not to make converts; it is rather designed to furnish members of a party with arguments whereby they may talk down their opponents. A politician who is reduced to silence is of very little use to his party; and it was by supplying ammunition which enabled his friends to silence the enemies' guns, that Swift rendered such valuable service to the 'lovers of peace'.

Dr. Johnson's opinion of the pamphlet as recorded by Boswell (*sub anno* 1768) is not high; he characterized it as 'a performance of very little ability. . . . No, sir, Swift has told what he had to tell distinctly enough, but that is all. He had to count ten, and he has counted it right.' We must not forget that this was called forth by some one's venturing to praise the pamphlet, which to the argumentative great man was quite sufficient ground for opposition. That it was his fixed opinion is proved more clearly by a passage from his *Life of Swift*, where he says, 'Surely whoever surveys this wonder-working pamphlet with cool perusal, will confess that its efficacy was supplied by the passions of its readers; that it operates by the mere weight of facts, with very little assistance from the hand that produced them'. By parity of reasoning it would be easy to decry a naval victory as having been won by 'the mere weight' of the projectiles, and to allow no merit to the selection of the point of attack or to the accurate aim of the man behind the gun. The forcible presentation of facts is not such an easy matter as the novice would be led to suppose from Dr. Johnson's criticism.

Swift's style is consonant with his own definition of what style should be, 'the use of proper words in proper places'; the words chosen are those which seem best fitted to express what the writer wished to say, and

they are so placed as best to convey his meaning. The result is a style which is at once lucid and vigorous. His grammar is not always, when judged by later standards, unimpeachable, but his meaning is never for a moment in doubt. It would have been easy to draw attention to each violation of syntax as it occurred; a plan which will not commend itself to any one who has seen it attempted in Thomas Sheridan's edition of Swift. One reader, at least, who has been exasperated by Sheridan's solemn foot-note corrections of obvious solecisms, has wafted many a grateful thought to Dr. Johnson for the expression of his opinion of that editor:—'Why, sir, Sherry is dull, naturally dull; but it must have taken him a great deal of pains to become what we now see him. Such an excess of stupidity, sir, is not in Nature.'

To avoid this particular form of 'dullness' then, it may be well once for all to warn the reader of certain peculiarities of diction which are at variance with the King's (or Queen's) English as enunciated by Lindley Murray and other authorities. Swift generally omits 'of' after a verbal noun preceded by 'the', and inserts 'of' where there is no 'the'; thus he writes 'the seizing the Spanish Netherlands', where we should say 'the seizing of the Spanish Netherlands'; and 'by beginning of it', where we should say, 'by beginning it'. Similarly he writes 'without Spain being restored', where we should say 'without Spain's being restored'. He speaks of 'the two first' and 'the two last', where the more logical form is 'the first two' and 'the last two'; and again of 'the least of two evils'. His English is in places redundant, as when he writes 'there were few but who . . . had', and again 'further and additional forces'. But these are merely excrescences on a style of singular strength and clearness. It is not to be expected that

a political tract, thrown off in haste, should compare with such a masterpiece of style as *Gulliver's Travels*—not that the latter is free from grammatical lapses—but the directness, the force, and the reasoning power of the writer are as evident in this pamphlet as in any of his other works. The occasional flashes of irony too are such as would stamp its authorship, though of these the author, mindful of the general dullness of his public, has been sparing. The variations in spelling are probably due to the printer rather than the author, if we may judge by the occasional appearance of an apostrophe in place of an 'e', a usage against which Swift inveighs in his *Proposal for correcting . . . the English Tongue*, written between the first and the seventh edition of the *Conduct of the Allies*; and it is impossible that an author should have changed, in one place 'Mony' to 'Money', and in another 'Money' to 'Mony', as is done in several of the later editions of the pamphlet.

But such minutiae of criticism may well be ignored when we consider the pamphlet as a whole. That it is one-sided, goes without saying. What success would a political tract have which made any pretence of being otherwise? But as in this case Swift's party seem to have been in the right, the reader of to-day need have no reservation in admiring the skilful manner in which England's greatest pamphleteer has marshalled the arguments for a peace; and possibly he will venture to disagree with the learned Archdeacon Coxe, who in his *Life of Marlborough* speaks of that peace as having 'stained the annals of this deluded and devoted country', a verdict which may serve to remind us that biographers are as often blinded by their admiration as politicians are by party feeling. When the end for which a war has been embarked on is achieved, when the conquered enemy have renounced their dreams of dominion

and are prepared to submit to the terms imposed by the nations they wantonly assailed, then—though not till then—will wisdom, justice, and mercy join in demanding a firm and lasting peace.

That Swift was born in Dublin and that he became Dean of St. Patrick's Cathedral in that city are probably the groundwork of the erroneous belief that he was an Irishman. He was in fact descended from a Yorkshire family on his father's side, and his mother came from Leicester, so that on both sides his parentage was English. He was born on November 30, 1667, seven months after his father's death; and, his mother being in very straitened circumstances, his education at school and afterwards at Trinity College, Dublin, was paid for by his uncle. At the age of 24 he entered the family of the statesman Sir William Temple as secretary, where he made himself exceedingly useful to the great man and was more than once sent on important political business. Here too he first met Esther Johnson ('Stella') whose subsequent destiny was so mysteriously linked with his own. On Temple's death (in January 1699) Swift found himself without employment. He had, however, taken orders four years before and was, after fruitless applications in various quarters, given three small livings near Trim. He settled at one of them, Laracor, but spent the greater part of his time in Dublin or London.

So far he had taken no part in politics on his own account; but in 1701, when the House of Commons was discussing the impeachment of the lords responsible for the Partition Treaties, Swift wrote a pamphlet 'On the Dissensions in Athens and Rome', the general trend of which was to deprecate the action of the Tory party.

As a consequence he was warmly welcomed by the Whigs, who held out many promises of preferment, and formed with Addison a friendship which subsequently outlived the change in Swift's political views. We may readily believe, with Sir Leslie Stephen, that Swift, when he sided with the Whigs, had not found himself, but accepted his politics unthinkingly as a kind of legacy from Sir William Temple. It is certainly true that Swift was a strong churchman, and that he soon found that the church in Ireland was not likely to get much from the Whigs; but his applications were not alone on behalf of the church; he was bent on getting preferment for himself, and here he proved no more successful than when he pleaded for the Irish Church.

There is indeed no need to discriminate too nicely between the two motives. Devotion to one's own order is only a second-hand selfishness. If the Irish Church was enriched, not only would Swift get his share of the increase, but the prestige which in this bad world attaches to a growing income would also fall to him, and the Dissenters of all kinds, whom he detested, would appear yet more contemptible from the added wealth of the Episcopal Church. But however pure Swift's motives were, it is certain that his discovery that he could no longer hold Whig sentiments coincided with the discovery that it was hopeless to expect preferment from the Whig party. Having for nine years pestered the one party for a lucrative post, he now—when they had fallen—pesters the other for three, and grudgingly receives at last a deanery when he had clamoured for a bishopric.

In October 1710 Swift first met Harley and was welcomed by him with effusion; what was more, the first-fruits,[1] for which Swift had striven so long, were

[1] The first year's stipend of a benefice and a tenth of that of the

within a month granted to the Irish Church. So now began the three greatest years of Swift's life, the time when he felt he was really playing the part for which his talents had fitted him. He was hand-and-glove with Harley and St. John, he knew—and patronized—all the great people of the day whom he cared to know, he was courted and caressed, he was successful and—so far as was possible to such a nature as his—he was happy. By a most fortunate chance we have the minutest account of the greater part of those years given by Swift himself in the famous *Journal to Stella*, a work in which we see another side of Swift's strangely complex character, ferocious, tender, mean, generous, arrogant, considerate, great, little—is there any end to the contradictions in the nature of this extraordinary man? He was one to be loved and hated, to be pitied and feared, and that perchance by the same people at the same time.

The gift of the first-fruits won Swift entirely to the Tory party, and he at once began to assail Godolphin and Wharton and the other Whigs. He took over the *Examiner* from its fourteenth number and wrote the papers each week for over seven months. The first of these from his pen (Nov. 2, 1710) is a short statement of the case he afterwards presented at length in the *Conduct of the Allies*; every argument, and almost every phrase, in the paper being also used in the pamphlet.

Whatever Swift's deserts in the political field, he had seriously injured his chance of ecclesiastical preferment by his *Tale of a Tub* (1704), a satire in which, while upholding the Church of England, he pours ridicule on the two extremes of dissent, the Roman Church and the Nonconformists. The Queen however was a great deal

following years, which since the Reformation had been paid to the Crown, were surrendered by Anne in 1703 to augment poor livings in the English Church, the fund so formed being termed Queen Anne's Bounty. The Irish Church got the same grant in 1710.

too dull to draw such nice distinctions, and is said to have regarded the work as an attack on religion in general; in fact a far clearer critic than Queen Anne might remark that a good many of Swift's guns could not be fired without demolishing the fortress they were supposed to defend. However, at last there came an end to the long waiting, and in April 1713 the warrant was signed for Swift's appointment to the Deanery of St. Patrick's. Even before this Harley and St. John (now the Earl of Oxford and Viscount Bolingbroke respectively) had begun to quarrel; and finding it impossible to reconcile them Swift had withdrawn from political life ten weeks before Harley resigned in July 1714, on the eve of the death of Queen Anne.

These two events of course put an end to all Swift's hopes, and he retired in despondency to what he looked on as exile in Ireland. Six years' residence there brought home to him the injustice with which the English government was administering Irish affairs, and he assumed a new and nobler rôle as the champion of the oppressed. In 1720 he published his proposal for the Use of Irish manufactures, and four years later the famous *Drapier Letters* directed against Wood's copper coinage. In 1727 appeared what may perhaps be called the greatest, as it is certainly the most popular, of his works, *Gulliver's Travels*; it is indeed a book in which every age from childhood upwards can take delight. During these years he paid several visits to England, where he enjoyed the society of Gay, Pope, and Arbuthnot, but he took no part in political life. The same period was clouded by the death in January 1728 of Stella, who had for many years drawn out the deepest and tenderest side of Swift's nature, and whose loss left a gap in his life which nothing could ever fill. Whether they were ever married is still a much disputed question,

the evidence for which on either side cannot here be given; even if they were, they never lived together as man and wife, or even met except in the presence of some third person. But from the time of her death Swift was a broken man. The gloom which had always from time to time preyed upon him intensified, and the morbid hatred with which he regarded humanity in the abstract became bitterer and more continuous. Mean towards his friends and equals, he was singularly generous towards his dependants and is said to have given away a third of his income in charity. About the year 1738 his brain began to give way, and four years later guardians had to be appointed for him by the court of chancery; his long intervals of lucidity afforded no relief to the mental and physical torment which oppressed him, and at length on October 19, 1745, he left a world of which he had long been weary, and was laid in the grave, where—to use his own words—'savage indignation could torture his heart no more'.

R. Schelde
Ostend
Bruges
ANTWERP
Dunkirk
Nieuport
PAYS DE WAES
GHENT
Ypres
R. Schelde
Oudenarde
BRUSSELS
Neerwinden
Ath
Steenkirk
Ramilies
Lille
Tournai
LIEGE
Charleroi
Namur
R. Maas or Meuse
Mons
Douai
R. Sambre
Bouchain
Malplaquet
Walcourt
LUXEMBURG
THE SPANISH NETHERLANDS
to illustrate the Wars against
LOUIS XIV.
SCALE OF MILES
0 10 20 30 40 50
Luxemburg
H. S. Hatton,
Oxford.

THE CONDUCT OF THE ALLIES

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

The first edition, published November 27, 1711, is dated, on a principle unfortunately not wholly unknown to-day, as of the following year. The next four editions are dated accurately 1711; the sixth and seventh are dated 1712.

Editions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 are small quartos of 96 pages, printed largely from the same type-setting and sold for a shilling. Edition 6 follows edition 2 closely in all except two places, ignoring the changes in the intermediate editions.

Editions 5 and 7 are small octavos of 48 pages printed in smaller type than the other editions and sold for sixpence. These two are largely from the same type-setting.

Verbal differences between the various editions are indicated in the foot-notes; variations in spelling and in the use of capital letters have been ignored, also in punctuation except where the sense is affected. In these three points the seventh edition has been followed in detail except in a few misprints which are given in the foot-notes.

THE CONDUCT OF THE ALLIES, AND OF THE Late Ministry, IN Beginning and Carrying on THE Present War.

——— Partem tibi Gallia noſtri
Eripuit: pártem duris Hiſpania bellis:
Pars jacet Heſperia: totoq; exercitus orbe
Te vincente perit. Terris fudiſſe cruorem
Quid juvat Arctois, Rhodano, Rhenoq; ſubactis?
Odimus accipitrem quia ſemper vivit in armis.
——— Victrix Provincia plorat.

The Seventh Edition, Corrected.

LONDON,

Printed for *John Morphew*, near *Stationers-Hall*: 1712.

THE PREFACE

I cannot sufficiently admire the Industry of a sort of Men, wholly out of Favour with the Prince and People, and openly professing a separate Interest from the Bulk of the Landed Men, who yet are able to raise, at this Juncture, so great a Clamour against a Peace, without offering one single Reason, but what we find in their Ballads. *I lay it down for a Maxim, That no reasonable Person, whether* Whig *or* Tory (*since it is necessary to use those foolish Terms*) *can be of Opinion for continuing the War, upon the Foot it now is, unless he be a Gainer by it, or hopes it may occasion some new Turn of Affairs at home, to the Advantage of his Party; or lastly, unless he be very ignorant of the Kingdom's Condition, and by what means we have been reduced to it. Upon the two first Cases, where Interest is concerned, I have nothing to say: But as to the last, I think it highly necessary, that the Publick should be freely and impartially told what Circumstances they are in, after what manner they have been treated by those whom they trusted so many Years with the disposal of their Blood and Treasure, and what the Consequences of this Management are like to be upon themselves and their Posterity.*

Those who, either by Writing or Discourse, have undertaken to defend the Proceedings of the Late Ministry, in the Management of the War, and of the Treaty at Gertruydenburg, *have spent time in celebrating the Conduct and Valour of our Leaders and their Troops, in summing up the Victories they have gained, and the Towns they have taken. Then they tell us what high Articles were insisted on by our Ministers and those of the Confederates, and what Pains both were at in persuading*

7. Person] Man *ed. 1.*

France *to accept them. But nothing of this can give the least Satisfaction to the just Complaints of the Kingdom. As to the War, our Grievances are, That a greater Load has been laid on Us than was either just or necessary, or than we have been able to bear; that the grossest Impositions have been submitted to for the Advancement of private Wealth and Power, or in order to forward the more dangerous Designs of a* Faction, *to both which a Peace would have put an End; And that the Part of the War which was chiefly our Province, which would have been most beneficial to us, and destructive to the Enemy, was wholly neglected. As to a Peace, We complain of being deluded by a* Mock Treaty; *in which those who Negociated, took care to make such Demands, as they knew were impossible to be complied with, and therefore might securely press every Article as if they were in earnest.*

These are some of the Points I design to treat of in the following Discourse; with several others which I thought it necessary, at this time, for the Kingdom to be informed of. I think I am not mistaken in those Facts I mention; at least not in any Circumstance so material, as to weaken the Consequences I draw from them.

After Ten Years War with perpetual Success, to tell us it is yet impossible to have a good Peace, is very surprising, and seems so different from what hath ever happened in the World before, that a Man of any Party may be allowed suspecting, we have either been ill used, or have not made the most of our Victories, and might therefore desire to know where the Difficulty lay: Then it is natural to enquire into our present Condition; how long we shall be able to go on at this Rate; what the Consequences may be upon the present and future Ages; and whether a Peace, without that impracticable Point which some People do so much insist on, be really ruinous in it self, or equally so with the Continuance of the War.

THE
CONDUCT
OF THE
ALLIES, &c.

THE Motives that may engage a wise Prince or State in a War, I take to be one or more of these: Either to check the overgrown Power of some ambitious Neighbour; to recover what hath been unjustly taken from Them; to revenge some Injury They have received; (which all Political Casuists allow); to assist some Ally in a just Quarrel; or lastly, to defend Themselves when They are Invaded. In all these Cases, the Writers upon Politicks admit a War to be justly undertaken. The last is what hath been usually called *pro aris & focis*; where no Expence or Endeavour can be too great, because all we have is at stake, and consequently, our utmost Force to be exerted; and the Dispute is soon determined, either in Safety or utter Destruction. But in the other four, I believe it will be found, that no Monarch or Commonwealth did ever engage beyond a certain Degree; never proceeding so far as to exhaust the Strength and Substance of their Country by Anticipations and Loans, which in a few Years must put them in a worse Condition than any they could reasonably apprehend from those Evils, for the preventing of which they first entred into the War: Because this would be to run into real infallible Ruin, only in hopes to remove what might perhaps but appear so by a probable Speculation.

And, as a War should be undertaken upon a just and prudent Motive, so it is still more obvious, that a Prince

ought maturely to consider the Condition he is in when he enters on it; Whether his Coffers be full, his Revenues clear of Debts, his People numerous and rich by a long Peace and free Trade, not overpressed with many burthensom Taxes; No violent Faction ready to dispute his just Prerogative, and thereby weaken his Authority at home, and lessen his Reputation abroad. For, if the contrary of all this happen to be his Case, he will hardly be persuaded to disturb the World's Quiet and his own, while there is any other way left of preserving the latter with Honour and Safety.

Supposing the War to have commenced upon a just Motive; the next Thing to be consider'd is, When a Prince ought, in Prudence, to receive the Overtures of a Peace: Which I take to be, either when the Enemy is ready to yield the Point originally contended for, or when that Point is found impossible to be ever obtained; or when contending any longer, though with Probability of gaining that Point at last, would put such a Prince and his People in a worse Condition than the present Loss of it. All which Considerations are of much greater Force, where a War is managed by an Alliance of many Confederates, which in the variety of Interests, among the several Parties. is liable to so many unforeseen Accidents.

In a Confederate War it ought to be considered, which Party has the deepest share in the Quarrel; For though each may have their particular Reasons, yet one or two among them will probably be more concerned than the rest, and therefore ought to bear the greatest part of the Burthen, in proportion to their Strength. For Example: Two Princes may be Competitors for a Kingdom, and it will be your Interest to take the part of him who will probably allow you good Conditions of Trade, rather than of the other, who possibly may not.

However, that Prince whose Cause you espouse, though never so vigorously, is the Principal in that War, and You, properly speaking, are but a Second. Or a Commonwealth may lie in danger to be over-run by a powerful Neighbour, which, in time, may produce very bad Consequences upon your Trade and Liberty: 'Tis therefore necessary, as well as prudent, to lend them Assistance, and help them to win a strong secure Frontier; but, as They must in course be the first and greatest Sufferers, so in Justice, they ought to bear the greatest Weight. If a House be on Fire, it behoves all in the Neighbourhood to run with Buckets to quench it; but the Owner is sure to be undone first; and it is not impossible that those at next Door may escape, by a Shower from Heaven, or the stilness of the Weather, or some other favourable Accident.

But, if an Ally, who is not so immediately concerned in the good or ill Fortune of the War, be so generous, as to contribute more than the Principal Party, and even more in proportion to his Abilities, he ought at least to have his Share in what is conquered from the Enemy: Or, if his Romantick Disposition transports him so far, as to expect little or nothing of this, he might however hope, that the Principals would make it up in Dignity and Respect; and he would surely think it monstrous to find them intermedling in his Domestick Affairs, prescribing what Servants he should keep or dismiss, pressing him perpetually with the most unreasonable Demands, and at every turn threatning to break the Alliance, if he will not comply.

From these Reflections upon War in general, I descend to consider those Wars, wherein *England* hath been engaged since the Conquest. In the Civil-Wars of the *Barons*, as well as those between the Houses of *York* and *Lancaster*, great Destruction was made of the

Nobility and Gentry, new Families raised, and old ones extinguished, but the Money spent on both sides was employed and circulated at Home; no Publick Debts contracted; and a very few Years of Peace quickly set all right again.

The like may be affirmed even of that unnatural Rebellion against King *Charles* I. the Usurpers maintained great Armies in constant Pay, had almost continual War with *Spain* or *Holland*, but managing it by their Fleets, they encreased very much the Riches of the Kingdom, instead of exhausting them.

Our Foreign Wars were generally against *Scotland* or *France*; the first being upon our own Continent, carried no Money out of the Kingdom, and were seldom of long continuance. During our first Wars with *France*, we possessed great Dominions in that Country, where we preserved some Footing till the Reign of Queen *Mary*; and though some of our latter Princes made very chargeable Expeditions thither, a Subsidy, and two or three Fifteenths, cleared all the Debt. Beside, our Victories were then of some Use as well as Glory; for we were so prudent to Fight, and so happy to Conquer, only for our selves.

The *Dutch* Wars, in the Reign of King *Charles* II. though begun and carried on under a very corrupt Administration, and much to the Dishonour of the Crown, did indeed keep the King needy and poor, by discontinuing or discontenting his Parliament, when he most needed their Assistance; but neither left any Debt upon the Nation, nor carried any Mony out of it.

At the *Revolution*, a general War broke out in *Europe*, wherein many Princes joined in an Alliance

2. sides *om. eds. 2, 3, 4, 6.*

against *France*, to check the ambitious Designs of that Monarch; and here the *Emperor*, the *Dutch*, and *England*, were Principals. About this time the Custom first began among us of borrowing Millions upon Funds of Interest: It was pretended, that the War could not possibly last above one or two Campaigns; and that the Debts contracted might be easily paid in a few Years, by a gentle Tax, without burthening the Subject. But the true Reason for embracing this Expedient, was the Security of a new Prince, not firmly settled on the Throne: People were tempted to lend, by great Præmiums and large Interest, and it concerned them nearly to preserve that Government, which they trusted with their Mony. The Person said to have been Author of so detestable a Project, is still living, and lives to see some of its fatal Consequences, whereof his Grand-Children will not see an end. And this pernicious Counsel closed very well with the Posture of Affairs at that time: For, a Set of Upstarts, who had little or no part in the *Revolution*, but valued themselves by their Noise and pretended Zeal, when the Work was over, were got into Credit at Court, by the Merit of becoming Undertakers and Projectors of Loans and Funds: These, finding that the Gentlemen of Estates were not willing to come into their Measures, fell upon those new Schemes of raising Mony, in order to create a Monied-Interest, that might in time vie with the Landed, and of which they hoped to be at the Head.

The Ground of the first War, for ten Years after the *Revolution*, as to the Part we had in it, was, to make *France* acknowledge the late King, and to recover *Hudson's-Bay*. But during that whole War, the Sea was almost entirely neglected, and the greatest part of *Six* Millions Annually employed to Enlarge the Frontier of the *Dutch*. For the King was a General, but not an

Admiral; and although King of *England*, was a Native of *Holland*.

After ten Years Fighting to little purpose; after the Loss of above an hundred thousand Men, and a Debt remaining of twenty Millions, we at length hearkned to the Terms of a Peace, which was concluded with great Advantages to the *Empire* and *Holland*, but none at all to us; and clogged soon after by the famous Treaty of *Partition*; by which, *Naples*, *Sicily*, and *Lorrain*, were to be added to the *French* Dominions; or if that Crown should think fit to set aside the Treaty, upon the *Spaniards* refusing to accept it, as they declared they would, to the several Parties at the very time of Transacting it; then the *French* would have Pretensions to the whole Monarchy. And so it proved in the Event; for, the late King of *Spain* reckoning it an Indignity to have his Territories cantoned out into Parcels, by other Princes, during his own Life, and without his Consent, rather chose to bequeath the Monarchy entire to a younger Son of *France*: And this Prince was acknowledged for King of *Spain*, both by Us and *Holland*.

It must be granted, that the Counsels of entring into the present War were violently opposed by the *Church-Party*, who first advised the late King to Acknowledge the Duke of *Anjou*; and particularly, 'tis affirmed, that the Earl of *G——n*, who was then in the Church-Interest, told the King in *November*, 1701, That since his Majesty was determined to engage in a War, so contrary to his private Opinion, he could serve him no longer, and accordingly gave up his Employment; though he happened afterwards to change his Mind, when he was to be Lord High Treasurer, and have the

22 3. into the present War] into this War *ed. 1.* 26. the Earl of *G — n*] a certain *Great Person eds. 1, 2, 6.* 32. Lord High Treasurer] at the Head of the Treasury *eds. 1, 2, 6.* have the sole] have of the sole *eds. 3, 4.*

sole Management of Affairs at Home; while those Abroad were to be in the Hands of *One*, whose Advantage, by all sorts of Ties, he was engaged to promote.

The Declarations of War against *France* and *Spain*, made by Us and *Holland*, are dated within a few Days of each other. In that published by the *States*, they say very truly, That *they are nearest, and most exposed to the Fire*; that *they are blocked up on all sides, and actually attacked by the Kings of* France *and* Spain; that *their Declaration is the Effect of an urgent and pressing Necessity*; with other Expressions to the same purpose. They *desire the Assistance of all Kings and Princes*, &c. The grounds of their Quarrel with *France*, are such as only affect themselves, or at least more immediately than any other Prince or State; such as, *the* French *refusing to grant the Tariff promised by the Treaty of* Ryswick; *the loading the* Dutch *Inhabitants settled in* France, *with excessive Duties, contrary to the said Treaty; the Violation of the* Partition-Treaty, *by the* French *accepting the King of* Spain's *Will, and threatning the* States, *if they would not comply*; *the seizing the* Spanish Netherlands *by the* French *Troops, and turning out the* Dutch, *who by Permission of the late King of* Spain *were in Garrison there; by which means that Republick was deprived of her Barrier, contrary to the Treaty of* Partition, *where it was particularly stipulated, that the* Spanish Netherlands *should be left to the Archduke.* They alledged, that *the* French *King governed* Flanders *as his own, though under the Name of his Grandson, and sent great Numbers of Troops thither to fright them: That he had seized the City and Citadel of* Liege, *had possessed himself of several Places in the Archbishoprick of* Cologn, *and maintained Troops in the Country of* Wolfenbuttel, *in order to block up the* Dutch *on all sides; and caused his Resident to give in a Memorial, wherein he threatned the* States *to act against*

them, if they refused complying with the Contents of that Memorial.

The Queen's Declaration of War is grounded upon the *Grand Alliance*, as This was upon the unjust Usurpations and Encroachments of the *French* King; whereof the Instances produced are, *His keeping in Possession a great Part of the* Spanish *Dominions, seizing* Milan *and the* Spanish *Low Countries, making himself Master of* Cadiz, &c. *And instead of giving Satisfaction in these Points, his putting an Indignity and Affront on Her Majesty and Kingdoms, by Declaring the Pretended Prince of* Wales, *K. of* England, *&c.* which last was the only personal Quarrel we had in the War; and even this was positively denied by *France*, that King being then willing to Acknowledge Her Majesty.

I think it plainly appears by both Declarations, that *England* ought no more to have been a Principal in this War, than *Prussia*, or any other Power, who came afterwards into that Alliance. *Holland* was first in Danger, the *French* Troops being at that time just at the Gates of *Nimeguen*. But the Complaints made in our Declaration, do all, except the last, as much or more concern almost every Prince in *Europe*.

For, among the several Parties who came First or last into this Confederacy, there were few but who, in proportion, had more to get or to lose, to hope or to fear, from the good or ill Success of this War, than We. The *Dutch* took up Arms to defend themselves from immediate Ruin; and by a successful War, they proposed to have a larger Extent of Country, and a better Frontier against *France*. The *Emperor* hoped to recover the Monarchy of *Spain*, or some part of it, for his younger Son, chiefly at the Expence of Us and *Holland*.

15. then *om. ed. 1.* 19-20. in Danger] in the Danger *eds. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.*

The King of *Portugal* had received Intelligence, that *Philip* designed to renew the old Pretensions of *Spain* upon that Kingdom, which is surrounded by the other on all sides, except towards the Sea, and could therefore only be defended by *Maritime Powers*. This, with the advantageous Terms offered by King *Charles*, as well as by Us, prevailed with that Prince to enter into the Alliance. The Duke of *Savoy*'s Temptations and Fears were yet greater: The main Charge of the War on that side, was to be supplied by *England*, and the Profit to redound to him. In case *Milan* should be Conquered, it was stipulated that his Royal Highness should have the Dutchy of *Montferrat*, belonging to the Duke of *Mantua*, the Provinces of *Alexandria*, and *Valentia*, and *Lomellino*, with other Lands between the *Po* and the *Tanaro*, together with the *Vigevenasco*, or, in lieu of it, an Equivalent out of the Province of *Novara*, adjoining to his own State; beside whatever else could be taken from *France* on that side by the Confederate Forces. Then, he was in terrible Apprehensions of being surrounded by *France*, who had so many Troops in the *Milanese*, and might have easily swallowed up his whole Dutchy.

The rest of the Allies came in purely for Subsidies, whereof they sunk considerable Sums into their own Coffers, and refused to send their *Contingent* to the *Emperor*, alledging their Troops were already hired by *England* and *Holland*.

Some time after the Duke of *Anjou*'s succeeding to the Monarchy of *Spain*, in breach of the Partition-Treaty, the Question here in *England* was, Whether the Peace should be continued, or a new War begun. Those who were for the former, alledged the Debts and Difficulties we laboured under; that both We and

12. Royal *om. ed. 1.*

the *Dutch* had already acknowledged *Philip* for King of *Spain*; that the Inclinations of the *Spaniards* to the House of *Austria*, and their Aversion for that of *Bourbon*, were not so surely to be reckoned upon, as some would pretend; that We rightly thought it a piece of Insolence, as well as Injustice, in the *French*, to offer putting a King upon Us; and the *Spaniards* would conceive, we had as little Reason to force one upon Them; That it was true, the Nature and Genius of those two People differed very much, and so would probably continue to do, as well under a king of *French* Blood, as one of *Austrian*; but, if we should engage in a War for Dethroning the D. of *Anjou*, we should certainly effect what, by the Progress and Operations of it, we endeavoured to prevent, I mean an Union of Interest and Affections between the two Nations; For the *Spaniards* must of necessity call in *French* Troops to their Assistance: This would introduce *French* Counsellors into King *Philip*'s Court; and this, by degrees, would habituate and reconcile the two Nations: That, to assist King *Charles* by *English* or *Dutch* Forces, would render him odious to his new Subjects, who have nothing in so great an Abomination, as those whom they hold for *Hereticks*: That, the *French* would by this means become Masters of the Treasures in the *Spanish West-Indies*: That, in the last War, when *Spain*, *Cologn*, and *Bavaria* were in our Alliance, and by a modest Computation brought Sixty thousand Men into the Field against the Common Enemy; when *Flanders*, the Seat of war, was on our Side, and his Majesty, a Prince of great Valour and Conduct, at the head of the whole Confederate Army; yet we had no reason to boast of our Success: How then should we be able to oppose

5. rightly *om. eds 1, 2, 6.* 12. of *Austrian*] of the *Austrian eds. 2, 6.* but, if] but that if *ed. 1.* 33. be] *om. ed. 7.*

France with those Powers against us, which would carry Sixty thousand Men from us to the Enemy, and so make us, upon the Balance, weaker by One hundred and twenty thousand Men, at the beginning of this War, than of that in the Year 1688?

On the other side, those whose Opinion, or some private Motives, inclined them to give their Advice for entring into a new War, alledged how dangerous it would be for *England*, that *Philip* should be King of *Spain*; that we could have no Security for our Trade, while that Kingdom was subject to a Prince of the *Bourbon* Family; nor any hopes of preserving the Balance of *Europe*, because the Grandfather would, in effect, be King, while his Grandson had but the Title, and thereby have a better Opportunity than ever of pursuing his Design for Universal Monarchy. These and the like Arguments prevailed; and so, without offering at any other Remedy, without taking time to consider the Consequences, or to reflect on our own Condition, we hastily engaged in a War which hath cost us Sixty Millions; and after repeated, as well as unexpected Success in Arms, hath put us and our Posterity in a worse Condition, not only than any of our Allies, but even our conquered Enemies themselves.

The part we have acted in the Conduct of this whole War, with reference to our Allies abroad, and to a prevailing Faction at home, is what I shall now particularly examin; where I presume it will appear, by plain Matters of Fact, that no Nation was ever so long or so scandalously abused by the Folly, the Temerity, the Corruption, the Ambition of its domestick Enemies; or treated with so much Insolence, Injustice and Ingratitude by its foreign Friends.

5. in the Year 1688] in 1688 *ed. 1.* 27–8. particularly examin] particular examin *ed. 7.*

This will be manifest by proving the Three following Points.

First, That against all manner of Prudence or common Reason, we engaged in this War as Principals, when we ought to have acted only as Auxiliaries.

Secondly, That we spent all our Vigour in pursuing that Part of the War, which could least answer the End we proposed by beginning of it; and made no Efforts at all where we could have most weakned the Common Enemy, and at the same time enriched our Selves.

Lastly, That we suffered each of our Allies to break every Article in those Treaties and Agreements by which they were bound, and to lay the Burthen upon us.

Upon the first of these Points, That we ought to have entered into this War only as Auxiliaries. Let any Man reflect upon our Condition at that time: Just come out of the most tedious, expensive and unsuccessful War that ever *England* had been engaged in; sinking under heavy Debts, of a Nature and Degree never heard of by Us or Our Ancestors; the Bulk of the Gentry and People heartily tired of the War, and glad of a Peace, tho' it brought no other Advantage but it self: No sudden Prospect of lessening our Taxes, which were grown as necessary to pay our Debts, as to raise Armies: A sort of artificial Wealth of Funds and Stocks in the Hands of those who for ten Years before had been plundering the Publick: Many Corruptions in every Branch of our Government, that needed Reformation. Under these Difficulties, from which twenty Years Peace, and the wisest Management, could hardly recover us, we declare War against *France*, fortified by

10. enriched our Selves] enriched our Allies *eds. 2, 3, 6. Corrected in Errata to ed. 3.*

the Accession and Alliance of those Powers I mentioned before, and which, in the former War, had been Parties in our Confederacy. It is very obvious what a Change must be made in the Balance, by such Weights taken out of Our Scale and put into Theirs; since it was manifest by ten Years Experience, that *France* without those Additions of Strength, was able to maintain it self against us. So that Human Probability ran with mighty odds on the other side; and in that case, nothing under the most extream Necessity should force any State to engage in a War. We had already acknowledged *Philip* for King of *Spain*; neither does the Queen's Declaration of War take notice of the Duke of *Anjou*'s Succession to that Monarchy, as a Subject of Quarrel; but the *French* King's governing it as if it were his own; his seizing *Cadiz*, *Milan*, and the *Spanish Low Countries*, with the Indignity of Proclaiming the *Pretender*. In all which we charge that Prince with nothing directly relating to us, excepting the last: And this, although indeed a great Affront, might have easily been redressed without a War; for the *French* Court declared they did not acknowledge the *Pretender*, but only gave him the Title of *King*, which was allowed to *Augustus* by his Enemy of *Sueden*, who had driven him out of *Poland*, and forced him to acknowledge *Stanislaus*.

'Tis true indeed, the Danger of the *Dutch*, by so ill a Neighbourhood in *Flanders*, might affect us very much in the Consequences of it; and the Loss of *Spain* to the House of *Austria*, if it should be governed by *French* Influence, and *French* Politicks, might, in time, be very pernicious to our Trade. It would therefore have been prudent, as well as generous and charitable, to help our Neighbour; and so we might have done without injuring our selves; For by an old Treaty with *Holland*,

2. had had been *eds.* 5, 7.

we were bound to assist that Republick with Ten thousand Men, whenever they were attacked by the *French*; whose Troops, upon the King of *Spain's* Death, taking Possession of *Flanders*, in right of *Philip*, and securing the *Dutch* Garrisons 'till they would acknowledge Him, the *States General*, by Memorials from their Envoy here, demanded only the Ten thousand Men, we were obliged to give them by virtue of that Treaty. And I make no doubt but *Holland* would have exerted themselves so vigorously, as to be able, with that Assistance alone, to defend their Frontiers: Or, if they had been forced to a Peace, the *Spaniards*, who abhor dismembring their Monarchy, would never have suffered the *French* to possess themselves of *Flanders*. At that time they had none of those Endearments to each other which this War hath created; and whatever Hatred and Jealousie were natural between the two Nations, would then have appeared. So that there was no sort of necessity for Us to proceed further, although We had been in a better Condition. But our Politicians at that time had other Views, and a new War must be undertaken, upon the Advice of those who, with their Partisans and Adherents, were to be the sole Gainers by it. A Grand Alliance was therefore made between the Emperor, *England*, and the *States-General*; by which, if the Injuries complained of from *France* were not remedied in two Months, the Parties concerned were obliged mutually to assist each other *with their whole Strength*.

Thus We became Principal in a War, in Conjunction with two Allies, whose share in the Quarrel was, beyond all Proportion, greater than ours. However, I can see no Reason from the Words of the Grand Alliance, by which we were obliged to make those prodigious Expences we have since been at. By what I have always

8. them *om. eds. 5, 7.* 27. each *om. ed. 5.*

heard and read, I take the *whole Strength of the Nation*, as understood in that Treaty, to be the utmost that a Prince can raise Annually from his Subjects; if he be forced to Mortgage and Borrow, whether at Home or Abroad, it is not, properly speaking, *his own Strength*, or that of the Nation, but the entire Substance of particular Persons, which not being able to raise out of the annual Income of his Kingdom, he takes upon Security, and can only pay the Interest; and by this Method one Part of the Nation is pawned to the other, with hardly a Possibility left of being ever redeemed.

Surely it would have been enough for us to have suspended the Payment of our Debts contracted in the former War, to have continued our Land and Malt Tax, with those others which have since been mortgaged: These, with some Additions, would have made up such a Sum, as, with prudent Management, might, I suppose, have maintained an Hundred thousand Men by Sea and Land; a reasonable Quota in all conscience for that Ally, who apprehended least Danger, and expected least Advantage. Nor can we imagine that either of the Confederates, when the War begun, would have been so unreasonable, as to refuse joining with us upon such a Foot, and expect that we should every Year go between three and four Millions in Debt (which hath been our Case) because the *French* could hardly have contrived any Offers of a Peace so ruinous to us as such a War. Posterity will be at a loss to conceive what kind of Spirit could possess their Ancestors, who after ten Years Suffering, by the unexampled Politicks of a Nation, maintaining a War by annually Pawning it self; and during a short Peace, while they were looking back with Horror on the heavy Load of Debts they had contracted; universally condemning those pernicious Counsels which

1. *of the Nation*] *of a Nation ed. 1.*

had occasioned them; racking their Invention for some Remedies or Expedients to mend their shattered Condition: That these very People, without giving them selves time to breath, should again enter into a more dangerous, chargeable, and extensive War, for the same, or perhaps a greater Period of Time, and without any apparent Necessity. It is obvious in a private Fortune, that whoever annually runs out, and continues the same Expences, must every Year mortgage a greater quantity of Land than he did before; and as the Debt doubles and trebles upon him, so doth his Inability to pay it. By the same Proportion we have suffered twice as much by this last ten Years War, as we did by the former; and if it were possible to continue it five Years longer at the same rate, it would be as great a Burthen as the whole Twenty. This Computation, so easie and trivial as it is almost a shame to mention, Posterity will think that those who first advised the War, had either not the Sense or the Honesty to consider.

And as we have wasted our Strength and vital Substance in this profuse manner, so we have shamefully misapplied it to Ends at least very different from those for which we undertook the War, and often to effect others, which after a Peace we may severely repent. This is the second Article I proposed to examine.

We have now for Ten Years together turned the whole Force and Expence of the War, where the Enemy was best able to hold us at a Bay; where we could propose no manner of Advantage to our selves; where it was highly impolitick to enlarge our Conquests; utterly neglecting that Part which would have saved and gained us many Millions, which the perpetual Maxims of our Government teach us to pursue; which would have soonest weakned the Enemy, and must either have

promoted a speedy Peace, or enabled us to go on with the War.

Those who are fond of continuing the War, cry up our constant Success at a most prodigious rate, and reckon it infinitely greater than in all human Probability we had reason to hope. Ten glorious Campaigns are passed, and now at last, like the sick Man, we are just expiring with all sorts of good Symptoms. Did the Advisers of this War suppose it would continue Ten Years, without expecting the Successes we have had; and yet at the same time determine, that *France* must be reduced, and *Spain* subdued, by employing our whole Strength upon *Flanders*? Did they believe the last War left us in a Condition to furnish such vast Supplies for so long a Period, without involving Us and our Posterity in unextricable Debts? If after such Miraculous *Doings*, we are not yet in a Condition of bringing *France* to our Terms, nor can tell when we shall be so, though we should proceed without any Reverse of Fortune; What could we look for in the ordinary Course of Things, but a *Flanders* War of at least twenty Years longer? Do they indeed think a Town taken for the *Dutch*, is a sufficient Recompence to us for six Millions of Money? which is of so little Consequence to the determining the War, that the *French* may yet hold out a dozen Years more, and afford a Town every Campaign at the same Price.

I say not this, by any means, to detract from the Army or its Leaders. Getting into the Enemies Lines, passing Rivers, and taking Towns, may be Actions attended with many glorious Circumstances: But when all this brings no real solid Advantage to us, when it hath no other End than to enlarge the Territories of the *Dutch*, and encrease the Fame and Wealth of our

1. to go on with] to continue *ed. 1.*

G——l, I conclude, however it comes about, that Things are not as they should be; and that surely our Forces and Money might be better employed, both towards reducing our Enemy, and working some Benefit to our selves. But the Case is still much harder, we are destroying mnay thousand Lives, exhausting all our Substance, not for our own Interest, which would be but common Prudence; not for a Thing indifferent, which would be sufficient Folly, but perhaps to our own Destruction, which is perfect Madness. We may live to feel the Effects of our Valour more sensibly than all the Consequences we imagine from the Dominions of *Spain* in the Duke of *Anjou*. We have Conquered a noble Territory for the *States*, that will maintain sufficient Troops to Defend it self, feed many hundred thousand Inhabitants, where all Encouragement will be given to introduce and improve Manufactures, which was the only Advantage they wanted; and which, added to their Skill, Industry, and Parsimony, will enable them to undersell us in every Market of the World.

Our Supply of Forty thousand Men, according to the first Stipulation, added to the Quota's of the Emperor and *Holland*, which they were obliged to furnish, would have made an Army of near Two hundred thousand, exclusive of Garrisons; enough to withstand all the Power that *France* could bring against it; and we might have employed the rest much better, both for the common Cause and our own Advantage.

The War in *Spain* must be imputed to the Credulity of our Ministers, who suffered themselves to be persuaded by the Imperial Court, that the *Spaniards* were so violently affected to the House of *Austria*, as upon

4. working some] working out some *eds. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6.* 29. own *om. ed. 7.*

the first Appearance there, with a few Troops under the Archduke, the whole Kingdom would immediately revolt. This we tried, and found the Emperor to have deceived either Us or Himself: Yet there we drove on the War at a prodigious Disadvantage, with great Expence; And by a most corrupt Management, the only General, who by a Course of Conduct and Fortune almost miraculous, had nearly put us into Possession of the Kingdom, was left wholly unsupported, exposed to the Envy of his Rivals, disappointed by the Caprices of a young unexperienced Prince, under the Guidance of a rapacious *German* Ministry, and at last called home in Discontent: By which our Armies, both in *Spain* and *Portugal*, were made a Sacrifice to Avarice, Ill conduct or Treachery.

In common Prudence, we should either have pushed that War with the utmost Vigour, in so fortunate a Juncture, especially since the gaining that Kingdom was the great Point for which we pretended to continue the War, or at least, when we had *found* or *made* that Design impracticable, we should not have gone on in so expensive a Management of it; but have kept our Troops on the Defensive in *Catalonia*, and pursued some other way more effectual for distressing the common Enemy, and advantaging Ourselves.

And what a noble Field of Honour and Profit had we before us, wherein to employ the best of our Strength, which against all the Maxims of *British* Policy, we suffered to lie wholly neglected? I have sometimes wondered how it came to pass, that the Style of *Maritime Powers*, by which our Allies, in a sort of contemptuous manner, usually couple us with the *Dutch*, did never put us in mind of the Sea; and while some Politicians were shewing us the way to *Spain* by *Flanders*, others by *Savoy* or *Naples*, that the *West-*

Indies should never come into their Heads. With half the Charge we have been at, we might have maintained our original Quota of Forty thousand Men in *Flanders*, and at the same time by our Fleets and Naval Forces, have so distressed the *Spaniards* in the North and South Seas of *America*, as to prevent any Returns of Mony from thence, except in our own Bottoms. This is what best became us to do as a *Maritime Power*: This, with any common Degree of Success, would soon have compelled *France* to the Necessities of a Peace, and *Spain* to acknowledge the Archduke. But while We, for ten Years, have been squandring away our Mony upon the Continent, *France* hath been wisely engrossing all the Trade of *Peru*, going directly with their Ships to *Lima*, and other Ports, and there receiving Ingots of Gold and Silver for *French* Goods of little Value; which, beside the mighty Advantage to their Nation at present, may divert the Channel of that Trade for the future, so beneficial to us, who used to receive annually such vast Sums at *Cadiz*, for our Goods sent thence to the *Spanish West-Indies*. All this we tamely saw and suffered, without the least Attempt to hinder it; except what was performed by some private Men at *Bristol*, who, inflamed by a true Spirit of Courage and Industry, did, about three Years ago, with a few Vessels, fitted out at their own Charge, make a most successful Voyage into those Parts, took one of the *Aquapulco* Ships, very narrowly mist of the other, and are lately returned laden with unenvied Wealth; to shew us what might have been done with the like Management, by a publick Undertaking. At least we might easily have prevented those great Returns of Money to *France* and *Spain*, tho' we could not have taken it our selves.

And if it be true, as the Advocates for War would

1. Heads] Hands *eds. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.* 34. And if it be true] *run on, eds. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.*

have it, that the *French* are now so impoverished; in what Condition must they have been, if that Issue of Wealth had been stopped?

But great Events often turn upon very small Circumstances. It was the Kingdom's Misfortune, that the Sea was not the D— of *M————h*'s Element, otherwise the whole Force of the War would infallibly have been bestowed there, infinitely to the Advantage of his Country, which would then have gone hand in hand with his own. But it is very truly objected, That if we alone had made such an Attempt as this, *Holland* would have been jealous; or if we had done it in Conjunction with *Holland*, the House of *Austria* would have been discontented. This hath been the Style of late Years; which whoever introduced among us, they have taught our Allies to speak after them. Otherwise it could hardly enter into any Imagination, that while we are Confederates in a War, with those who are to have the whole Profit, and who leave a double share of the Burthen upon Us, we dare not think of any Design, tho' against the Common Enemy, where there is the least prospect of doing Good to our own Country, for fear of giving Umbrage and Offence to our Allies; while we are ruining our selves to Conquer Provinces and Kingdoms for Them. I therefore confess with Shame, that this Objection is true: For it is very well known, that while the Design of Mr. *Hill*'s Expedition remained a Secret, it was suspected in *Holland* and *Germany* to be intended against *Peru*; whereupon the *Dutch* made every where their publick Complaints, and the Ministers at *Vienna* talked of it *as an Insolence in the Qu—n to attempt such an Undertaking*; which, however it has failed, partly by the Accidents of a Storm, and partly by the Stubbornness or Treachery of some in that Colony, for whose Relief, and at whose Entreaty it was

in some measure designed, is no Objection at all to an Enterprize so well concerted, and with such fair Probability of Success.

It was something singular that the *States* should express their Uneasiness, when they thought we intended to make some Attempt in the *Spanish West-Indies*; because it is agreed between us, that whatever is Conquered there, by Us or Them, shall belong to the Conqueror: Which is the only Article that I can call to mind, in all our Treaties or Stipulations, with any View of Interest to this Kingdom; and for that very Reason, I suppose, among others, hath been altogether neglected. Let those who think this too severe a Reflection, examin the whole Management of the present War by Sea and Land with all our Alliances, Treaties, Stipulations and Conventions, and consider, whether the whole does not look as if some particular Care and Industry had been used, to prevent any Benefit or Advantage that might possibly accrue to *Britain*.

This kind of Treatment from our two Principal Allies, hath taught the same Dialect to all the rest; so that there is hardly a petty Prince, whom we half maintain by Subsidies and Pensions, who is not ready, upon every Occasion, to threaten Us, that He will recal his Troops (though they must rob or starve at home) if we refuse to comply with Him in any Demand, however so unreasonable.

Upon the Third Head I shall produce some Instances, to shew how tamely we have suffered each of our Allies to infringe every Article in those Treaties and Stipulations by which they are bound, and to lay the Load upon Us.

But before I enter upon this, which is a large Subject,

31. are bound] were bound *eds. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6.*

I shall take leave to offer a few Remarks on certain Articles in three of our Treaties; which may let us perceive how much those Ministers valued or understood the true Interest, Safety, or Honour of their Country.

We have made two Alliances with *Portugal*, an Offensive and Defensive: The first is to remain in force only during the present War; the second to be perpetual. In the Offensive Alliance, the Emperor, *England*, and *Holland* are Parties with *Portugal*; in the Defensive only We and the *States*.

Upon the first Article of the Offensive Alliance it is to be observed, that although the Grand Alliance, as I have already said, allows *England* and *Holland* to possess for their own, whatever each of them shall Conquer in the *Spanish West-Indies*; yet here we are quite cut out, by consenting, that the Archduke shall possess the Dominions of *Spain* in as full a manner as their late King *Charles*. And what is more remarkable, we broke this very Article in Favour of *Portugal*, by subsequent Stipulations; where we agree, that King *Charles* shall deliver up *Estramadura*, *Vigo*, and some other Places, to the *Portuguese*, as soon as we can Conquer them from the Enemy. They who were guilty of so much Folly and Contradiction, know best whether it proceeded from Corruption or Stupidity.

By two other Articles (besides the Honour of being Convoys and Guards in ordinary to the *Portuguese* Ships and Coasts) we are to guess the Enemies Thoughts, and to take the King of *Portugal*'s Word, whenever he has a Fancy that he shall be invaded: We also are to furnish him with a Strength superior to what the Enemy intends to invade any of his Dominions with, let that be what it will: And, 'till we know what the Enemy's

26. besides] beside *eds. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.* 30. We also are] We are also *ed. 1.*

Forces are, His *Portuguese* Majesty is sole Judge what Strength is superior, and what will be able to prevent an Invasion; and may send our Fleets, whenever he pleases, upon his Errands, to some of the furthest Parts of the World, or keep them attending upon his own Coasts, 'till he thinks fit to dismiss them. These Fleets must likewise be subject in all things, not only to the King, but to his Viceroys, Admirals and Governors, in any of his Foreign Dominions, when he is in a Humour to apprehend an Invasion; which, I believe, is an Indignity that was never offered before, except to a Conquered Nation.

In the Defensive Alliance with that Crown, which is to remain perpetual, and where only *England* and *Holland* are Parties with them, the same Care, in almost the same Words, is taken for our Fleet to attend their Coasts and Foreign Dominions, and to be under the same Obedience. We and the *States* are likewise to furnish them with Twelve thousand Men at our own Charge, which we are constantly to recruit, and these are to be subject to the *Portuguese* Generals.

In the Offensive Alliance we took no care of having the Assistance of *Portugal*, whenever we should be invaded. But in this, it seems, we were wiser; for that King is obliged to make War on *France* or *Spain*, whenever We or *Holland* are invaded by either; but before this, we are to supply them with the same Forces, both by Sea and Land, as if he were invaded himself: And this must needs be a very prudent and safe Course for a Maritime Power to take upon a sudden Invasion; by which, instead of making use of our Fleets and Armies for our own Defence, we must send them abroad for the Defence of *Portugal*.

By the Thirteenth Article we are told, what this Assistance is which the *Portuguese* are to give us, and

upon what Conditions. They are to furnish ten Men of War; and when *England* or *Holland* shall be invaded by *France* and *Spain* together, or by *Spain* alone; in either of these Cases, those ten *Portugueze* Men of War are to serve only upon their own Coasts; where, no doubt, they will be of mighty Use to their Allies, and Terror to the Enemy.

How the *Dutch* were drawn to have a Part in either of these two Alliances, is not very material to enquire, since they have been so wise as never to observe them, nor, I suppose, ever intended it, but resolved, as they have since done, to shift the Load upon us.

Let any Man read these two Treaties from the beginning to the end, he will imagine, that the King of *Portugal* and his Ministers sat down and made them by themselves, and then sent them to their Allies to Sign; the whole Spirit and Tenor of them, quite through, running only upon this single Point, What We and *Holland* are to do for *Portugal*, without any mention of an Equivalent, except those ten Ships, which at the time when we have greatest need of their Assistance, are obliged to attend upon their own Coasts.

The Barrier-Treaty between *Great Britain* and *Holland*, was concluded at the *Hague* on the 29th of *October*, in the year 1709. In this Treaty, neither Her Majesty, nor Her Kingdoms, have any Interest or Concern, farther than what is mentioned in the Second and the Twentieth Articles: By the former, the States are to assist the Qu—n in Defending the Act of Succession; and by the other, not to Treat of a Peace 'till *France* acknowledges the Qu—n, and the Succession of *Hannover*, and promises to remove the *Pretender* out of his Dominions.

As to the first of these, It is certainly for the Safety and Interest of the *States-General*, that the Protestant Succession should be preserved in *England*; because such

a Popish Prince as we apprehend, would infallibly join with *France* in the Ruin of that Republick. And the *Dutch* are as much bound to support our Succession, as they are tied to any Part of a Treaty of League Offensive and Defensive, against a Common Enemy, without any separate Benefit upon that Consideration. Her Majesty is in the full peaceable Possession of Her Kingdoms, and of the Hearts of her People; among whom, hardly one in five hundred are in the *Pretender*'s Interest. And whether the Assistance of the *Dutch*, to preserve a Right so well established, be an Equivalent to those many unreasonable exorbitant Articles in the rest of the Treaty, let the World judge. What an Impression of our Settlement must it give Abroad, to see our Ministers offering such Conditions to the *Dutch*, to prevail on them to be Guarantees of our Acts of Parliament! Neither perhaps is it right, in point of Policy or good Sense, that a Foreign Power should be called in to confirm our Succession by way of Guarantee; but only to acknowledge it. Otherwise we put it out of the Power of our own Legislature to change our Succession, without the Consent of that Prince or State who is Guarantee; however our Posterity may hereafter, by the Tyranny and Oppression of any succeeding Princes, be reduced to the fatal Necessity of breaking in upon the excellent and happy Settlement now in force.

As to the other Article, it is a natural Consequence that must attend any Treaty of Peace we can make with *France*; being only the Acknowledgment of Her Majesty as Queen of Her own Dominions, and the Right of Succession by our own Laws, which no Foreign Power hath any Pretence to dispute.

However, in order to deserve these mighty Advan-

23 6. however our Posterity . . . now in force] how much soever the Necessities of the Kingdom may require it *eds. 1, 2, 3, 6.*

tages from the *States*, the rest of the Treaty is wholly taken up in directing what we are to do for them.

By the Grand Alliance, which was the Foundation of the present War, the *Spanish Low Countries* were to be recovered and delivered to the King of *Spain*: But by this Treaty, that Prince is to possess nothing in *Flanders* during the War: And after a Peace, the *States* are to have the Military Command of about twenty Towns with their Dependances, and Four hundred thousand Crowns a Year from the King of *Spain* to maintain their Garrisons. By which means they will have the Command of all *Flanders*, from *Newport* on the Sea to *Namur* on the *Maese*, and be entirely Masters of the *Pais de Waas*, the richest part of those Provinces. Further, they have liberty to Garrison any Place they shall think fit in the *Spanish Low-Countries*, whenever there is an Appearance of War; and consequently to put Garrisons into *Ostend*, or where else they please, upon a Rupture with *England*.

By this Treaty likewise, the *Dutch* will, in effect, be entire Masters of all the *Low Countries*, may impose Duties, Restrictions in Commerce, and Prohibitions at their Pleasure; and in that fertile Country may set up all sorts of Manufactures, particularly the Woollen, by inviting the disobliged Manufacturers in *Ireland*, and the *French* Refugees, who are scattered all over *Germany*. And as this Manufacture encreases abroad, the Cloathing People of *England* will be necessitated, for want of Employment, to follow; and in few Years, by help of the low Interest of Money in *Holland*, *Flanders* may recover that beneficial Trade which we got from them: The Landed-Men of *England* will then be forced to re-establish the Staples of Wooll abroad; and the *Dutch*, instead of being only the Carriers, will

25. Manufacturers] Manufactures *ed.* 7.

become the original Possessors of those Commodities, with which the greatest part of the Trade of the World is now carried on. And as they increase their Trade, it is obvious they will enlarge their Strength at Sea, and that ours must lessen in Proportion.

All the Ports in *Flanders* are to be subject to the like Duties the *Dutch* shall lay upon the *Scheld*, which is to be closed on the side of the *States*: Thus all other Nations are, in effect, shut out from Trading with *Flanders*. Yet in the very same Article it is said, That the *States* shall be *favoured in all the* Spanish *Dominions as much as* Great Britain, *or as the People most favoured*. We have Conquered *Flanders* for them, and are in a worse Condition, as to our Trade there, than before the War began. We have been the great Support of the King of *Spain*, to whom the *Dutch* have hardly contributed any thing at all; and yet *they are to be equally favoured with us in all his Dominions*. Of all this the Queen is under the unreasonable Obligation of being Guarantee, and that they shall possess their Barrier, and their four hundred thousand Crowns a Year, even before a Peace.

It is to be observed, that this Treaty was only Sign'd by one of our Plenipotentiaries: And I have been told, that the other was heard to say, He would rather lose his Right-hand, than set it to such a Treaty. Had he spoke those Words in due season, and loud enough to be heard on this side of the Water, considering the Credit he had then at Court, he might have saved much of his Country's Honour, and got as much to himself: Therefore if the Report be true, I am inclined to think he only SAID it. I have been likewise told, that some very necessary Circumstances were wanting

10. it is] is is *ed.* 7. 28. of *om. eds.* 1, 2, 3, 4, 6. 29. he had then] he then had *eds.* 1, 2, 3, 4, 6.

in the Entrance upon this Treaty; but the Ministers here rather chose to sacrifice the Honour of the Crown, and the Safety of their Country, than not ratifie what one of their Favourites had transacted.

Let me now consider in what manner our Allies have observed those Treaties they made with Us, and the several Stipulations and Agreements pursuant to them.

By the Grand Alliance between the Empire, *England* and *Holland*, we were to assist the other two, *totis viribus*, by Sea and Land. By a Convention subsequent to this Treaty, the Proportions which the several Parties should contribute towards the War, were adjusted in the following manner. The Emperor was obliged to furnish Ninety thousand Men against *France*, either in *Italy*, or upon the *Rhine*: *Holland* to bring Sixty thousand into the field in *Flanders*, exclusive of Garrisons; and we Forty thousand. In Winter, 1702, which was the next Year, the Duke of *Marlborough* proposed the raising of Ten thousand Men more, by way of Augmentation, and to carry on the War with greater Vigour; to which the Parliament agreed, and the *Dutch* were to raise the same Number. This was upon a *Par*, directly contrary to the former Stipulation, whereby our Part was to be a Third less than theirs; and therefore it was granted, with a Condition, that *Holland* should break off all Trade and Commerce with *France*. But this Condition was never executed, the *Dutch* only amusing us with a specious Declaration 'till our Session of Parliament was ended; and the following Year it was taken off, by concert between our General and the *States*, without any Reason assigned for the Satisfaction of the Kingdom. The next and some ensuing Campaigns, further and additional Forces were allowed by Parliament for the War in *Flanders*; and in every new

33. and *om. eds. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.*

Supply, the *Dutch* gradually lessened their Proportions; though the Parliament addressed the Queen that the *States* might be desired to observe them according to Agreement; which had no other Effect, than to teach them to elude it, by making their Troops Nominal Corps, as they did by keeping up the Numbers of Regiments, but sinking a fifth part of the Men and Money. So that now things are just inverted, and in all new Levies we contribute a third more than the *Dutch*, who at first were obliged to the same Proportion more than us.

Besides, the more Towns we Conquer for the *States*, the worse Condition we are in towards reducing the Common Enemy, and consequently of putting an end to the War. For they make no scruple of employing the Troops of their Quota, towards Garrisoning every Town as fast as it is taken, directly contrary to the Agreement between us, by which all Garrisons are particularly excluded. This is at length arriv'd, by several Steps, to such a height, that there are at present in the Field, not so many Forces under the Duke of *M*————'s Command in *Flanders*, as *Britain* alone maintains for that Service, nor have been for some Years past. The Troops we maintain in *Flanders* (as appears by the Votes of the House of Commons for the Year 1709.) are Forty thousand, the original Quota; Ten thousand the first Augmentation; three thousand *Palatines*; four thousand six hundred thirty-nine *Saxons*; *Bothmar*'s Regiment of eight hundred Men; and a further Augmentation taken that Year into the Service, of about two thousand; making in the whole upwards of sixty thousand: And it is well known, that the Battles of *Hochstet* and *Ramellies* were fought with not above Fifty thousand Men on a side.

22-31. The Troops . . . sixty thousand *om. eds. 1, 2, 3, 6.*
31-3. And it is well known . . . on a side *om. ed. 1.*

The Duke of *Marlborough* having entred the Enemies Lines, and taking *Bouchain*, formed the Design of keeping so great a Number of Troops, and particularly of Cavalry, in *Lisle*, *Tournay*, *Doway*, and the Country between, as should be able to harass all the Neighbouring Provinces of *France*, during the Winter, prevent the Enemy from erecting their Magazines, and by consequence, from subsisting their Forces next Spring, and render it impossible for them to assemble their Army another Year, without going back behind the *Soame* to do it. In order to effect this Project, it was necessary to be at an Expence extraordinary of Forage for the Troops, of building Stables, finding Fire and Candle for the Soldiers, with other incident Charges. The Q—n readily agreed to furnish Her Share of the first Article, that of the Forage, which only belonged to Her. But the *States* insisting that Her Majesty should likewise come into a Proportion of the other Articles, which belonged totally to them: She agreed even to that, rather than a Design of this Importance should fail. And yet we know it hath failed, and that the *Dutch* refused their Consent, till the time was past for putting it in Execution, even in the Opinion of those who proposed it. Perhaps a certain Article in the Treaties of Contributions, submitted to by such of the *French* Dominions as pay them to the *States*, was the principal Cause of defeating this Project; since one great Advantage to have been gained by it, was, as before is mentioned, to have hindred the Enemy from erecting their Magazines: And one Article in those Treaties of Contributions is, that the Product of those Countries shall pass free and unmolested. So that the Question was reduced to this short Issue, Whether the *Dutch* should

18. which belonged] which in Justice belonged *eds. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6.*

lose this paultry Benefit, or the Common Cause an Advantage of such mighty Importance?

The Sea being the Element where we might most probably carry on the *War* with any Advantage to our selves, it was agreed that we should bear five Eighths of the *Charge* in that Service, and the *Dutch* the other three: And by the *Grand Alliance*, whatever we or *Holland* should Conquer in the *Spanish West-Indies*, was to accrue to the Conquerors. It might therefore have been hop'd, that this *Maritime Ally* of ours, would have made up in their Fleet, what they fell short in their Army; but quite otherwise, they never once furnished their Quota either of Ships or Men; or if some few of their Fleet now and then appear'd, it was no more than appearing, for they immediately separated to look to their Merchants and protect their Trade. And we may remember very well when these *Guarantees of our Succession*, after having not one Ship for many Months together in the *Mediterranean*, sent that part of their Quota thither, and furnished nothing to us, at the same time that they allarmed us with the Rumour of an Invasion. And last Year, when Sir *James Wishart* was dispatched into *Holland* to expostulate with the *States*, and to desire they would make good their Agreements, in so important a part of the Service; he met with such a Reception as ill became a Republick to give, that lies under so many great Obligations to us; in short, such a one, as those only deserve, who are content to take.

It hath likewise been no small Inconvenience to us, that the *Dutch* are always slow in paying their Subsidies, by which means the weight and pressure of the Payment lies upon the Queen, as well as the Blame, if Her Majesty be not very exact; nor will even this always content our Allies. For in *July* 1711, the King of *Spain*

was paid all his Subsidies to the first of *January* next; nevertheless he hath since complained for want of Money; and his Secretary threatned, that if we would not further supply his Majesty, he could not answer for what might happen; altho' K—g *C——s* had not at that time, one third of the Troops for which he was paid; and even those he had, were neither Paid nor Cloathed.

I shall add one Example more, to shew how this Prince has treated the Q—n, to whom he owes such infinite Obligations. Her Maj—y borrowed Two hundred thousand Pounds from the *Genoese*, and sent it to *Barcelona*, for the Payment of the *Spanish* Army; This Money was to be re-coined into the current Species of *Catalonia*, which by the Allay is lower in Value 25*l. per Cent.* The Q—n expected, as she had Reason, to have the Benefit of the Re-coinage, offering to apply it All to the Use of the War; but K—g *C——s*, instead of consenting to this, made a Grant of the Coinage to one of his Courtiers; which put a stop to the *Work*: And when it was represented, that the Army would starve by this Delay, his Majesty only replied, *Let them Starve!* and would not recal his Grant.

I cannot forbear mentioning here another Passage concerning Subsidies, to shew what Opinion *Foreigners* have of our Easiness, and how much they reckon themselves Masters of our Money, whenever they think fit to call for it. The Queen was by Agreement to pay Two hundred thousand Crowns a Year to the *Prussian* Troops, the *States* One hundred thousand, and the Emperor only Thirty thousand, for Recruiting, which his Imperial Majesty never paid. Prince *Eugene* happening to pass by *Berlin*, the Ministers of that Court applied themselves to him for Redress in this Particular;

8-22. I shall add . . . recal his Grant *om. ed. 1.* 16. the Re-coinage] this Re-coinage *eds. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.*

and his Highness very frankly promised them, that in Consideration of this Deficiency, *Britain* and the *States* should encrease their Subsidies to Seventy thousand Crowns more between them, and that the Emperor should be punctual for the time to come: This was done by that Prince, without any Orders or Power whatsoever. The *Dutch* very reasonably refused consenting to it; but the *Prussian* Minister here, making his Applications to our Court, prevailed on us to agree to our Proportion, before we could hear what Resolution would be taken in *Holland.* It is therefore to be hoped, that his *Prussian* Majesty at the end of this War, will not have the same grievous Cause of Complaint, which he had at the Close of the last; that his Military-Chest was emptier by Twenty thousand Crowns, than at the time that War began.

The Emperor, as we have already said, was by Stipulation to furnish Ninety thousand Men against the Common Enemy, as having no Fleets to maintain, and in Right of his Family, being most concerned in the Success of the War. However, this Agreement hath been so ill observed, that from the Beginning of the War to this Day, neither of the two last Emperors had ever Twenty thousand Men, on their own Account, in the Common Cause, excepting once in *Italy*; when the Imperial Court exerted it self in a Point they have much more at heart than that of gaining *Spain* or the *Indies* to their Family. When they had succeeded in their Attempts on the side of *Italy*, and observed our blind Zeal for pushing on the War at all Adventures, they soon found out the most effectual Expedient to excuse themselves. They computed easily, that it would cost them less to make large Presents to one

9. to our Court] at our Court *eds. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.* 13. grievous *om. eds. 1, 2.*

single Person, than to pay an Army, and turn to as good Account. They thought they could not put their Affairs into better Hands; and therefore wisely left us to fight their Battles.

Besides, it appeared by several Instances, how little the Emperor regarded his Allies, or the Cause they were engaged in, when once he thought the Empire it self was secure. 'Tis known enough, that he might several Times have made a Peace with his discontented Subjects in *Hungary*, upon Terms not at all unbefitting either his Dignity or Interest: But he rather chose to sacrifice the whole Alliance to his private Passion, by entirely subduing and enslaving a miserable People, who had but too much Provocation to take up Arms to free themselves from the Oppressions under which they were groaning: Yet this must serve as an Excuse for breaking his Agreement, and diverting so great a Body of Troops, which might have been employed against *France*.

Another Instance of the Emperor's Indifference, or rather Dislike to the Common Cause of the Allies, is the Business of *Toulon*. This Design was indeed discovered here at home, by a Person whom every Body knows to be the Creature of a certain *Great Man*, at least as much noted for his Skill in Gaming as in Politicks, upon the base mercenary End of getting Mony by Wagers; which was then so common a Practice, that I remember a Gentleman in Employment, who having the Curiosity to enquire how Wagers went upon the *Exchange*, found some People, deep in the Secret, to have been concerned in that kind of Traffick, as appeared by Præmiums named for Towns, which no body but those behind the Curtain could suspect. However, although this Project had gotten Wind by so scandalous

28. in Employment] in Business *eds. 1, 2, 3, 6.*

a Proceeding, yet *Toulon* might probably have been taken, if the Emperor had not thought fit, in that very Juncture, to detach twelve or fifteen thousand Men to seize *Naples*, as an Enterprize that was more his private and immediate Interest. But it was manifest that his Imperial Majesty had no mind to see *Toulon* in Possession of the Allies; for even with these Discouragements the Attempt might have yet succeeded, if Prince *Eugene* had not thought fit to oppose it; which cannot be imputed to his own Judgment, but to some Politick Reasons of his Court. The Duke of *Savoy* was for attacking the Enemy, as soon as our Army arrived; but when the Mareschal *de Thesse*'s Troops were all come up, to pretend to besiege the Place, in the Condition we were at that time, was a Farce and a Jest. Had *Toulon* fallen then into our Hands, the Maritime Power of *France* would, in a great measure, have been destroyed.

But a much greater Instance than either of the foregoing, how little the Emperor regarded Us or Our Quarrel, after all we had done to save his Imperial Crown, and to assert the Title of his Brother to the Monarchy of *Spain*, may be brought from the Proceedings of that Court not many Months ago. It was judged, that a War carried on upon the side of *Italy*, would cause a great Diversion of the *French* Forces, wound them in a very tender Part, and facilitate the Progress of our Arms in *Spain*, as well as *Flanders*. It was proposed to the Duke of *Savoy* to make this Diversion; and not only a Diversion during the Summer, but the Winter too, by taking Quarters on this side of the Hills. Only in order to make him willing and able to perform this Work, two Points were to be settled. First, It was necessary to end the Dispute between the Imperial Court, and his Royal Highness; which had no other Foundation, than the Emperor's refusing to make good

some Articles of that Treaty, on the Faith of which the Duke engaged in the present War, and for the Execution whereof *Britain* and *Holland* became Guarantees, at the Request of the late Emperor *Leopold*. To remove this Difficulty, the Earl of *Peterborow* was dispatched to *Vienna*, got over some part of those Disputes, to the Satisfaction of the Duke of *Savoy*, and had put the rest in a fair way of being accommodated, at the time the Emperor *Joseph* died. Upon which great Event, the Duke of *Savoy* took the Resolution of putting himself immediately at the Head of the Army, though the whole Matter was not finished, since the Common Cause required his Assistance; and that until a new Emperor were Elected, it was impossible to make good the Treaty to Him. In order to enable him, the only thing he asked was, that he should be reinforced by the Imperial Court with eight Thousand Men, before the end of the Campaign. Mr. *Whitworth* was sent to *Vienna* to make this Proposal, and it is credibly reported, that he was impowered, rather than fail, to offer forty Thousand Pounds for the March of those eight Thousand Men, if he found it was want of Ability, and not Inclination, that hindered the sending them. But he was so far from succeeding, that it was said, the Ministers of that Court did not so much as give him an Opportunity to tempt them with any particular Sums; but cut off all his Hopes at once, by alleging the Impossibility of complying with the Queen's Demands, upon any Consideration whatsoever. They could not plead their old Excuse of the War in *Hungary*, which was then brought to an end: They had nothing to offer but some general Speculative Reasons, which it would expose them to repeat; and so, after much Delay, and many trifling Pretences, they utterly refused so small and seasonable an Assistance;

to the Ruin of a Project that would have more terrified *France*, and caused a greater Diversion of their Forces, than a much more numerous Army in any other Part. Thus, for want of eight Thousand Men, for whose Winter-Campaign the Queen was willing to give Forty thousand Pounds; and for want of executing the Design I lately mentioned, of hindring the Enemy from erecting Magazines, towards which Her Majesty was ready, not only to bear Her own Proportion, but a Share of that which the *States* were obliged to, our Hopes of taking Winter-Quarters in the North and South Parts of *France* are eluded, and the War left in that Method, which is like to continue it longest. Can there an Example be given in the whole Course of this War, where we have treated the pettiest Prince, with whom we had to deal, in so contemptuous a manner? Did we ever once consider what we could afford, or what we were obliged to, when our Assistance was desired, even while we lay under immediate Apprehensions of being invaded?

When *Portugal* came, as a Confederate, into the Grand Alliance, it was stipulated, That the Empire, *England* and *Holland*, should each maintain Four thousand Men of their own Troops in that Kingdom, and pay between them a Million of Pattacoons to the King of *Portugal*, for the Support of Twenty eight thousand *Portuguese*; which number of Forty thousand, was to be the Confederate Army against *Spain* on the *Portugal* side. This Treaty was ratified by all the three Powers. But in a short time after, the Emperor declared himself unable to comply with his part of the Agreement, and so left the Two thirds upon Us; who very generously undertook that Burthen, and at the same time Two thirds of the Subsidies for Maintenance

20. invaded. *cds. 5. 7.* 34. time *om. ed. 7.*

of the *Portugueze* troops. But neither is this the worst Part of the Story: For, although the *Dutch* did indeed send their own particular Quota of Four thousand Men to *Portugal* (which however they would not agree to, but upon Condition, that the other Two thirds should be supplied by us;) yet they never took care to recruit them: For in the Year, 1706. the *Portugueze, British* and *Dutch* Forces, having marched with the Earl of *G——y* into *Castile*, and by the noble Conduct of that General, being forced to retire into *Valentia*, it was found necessary to raise a new Army on the *Portugal* side; where the Queen hath, at several times, encreased Her Establishment to Ten thousand five hundred Men, and the *Dutch* never replaced one single Man, nor paid one Penny of their Subsidies to *Portugal* in six Years.

The *Spanish* Army on the side of *Catalonia* is, or ought to be, about Fifty thousand Men (exclusive of *Portugal*): And here the War hath been carried on almost entirely at our Cost. For this whole Army is paid by the Queen, excepting only seven Battalions and fourteen Squadrons of *Dutch* and *Palatines*; and even Fifteen hundred of these are likewise in our Pay; besides the Sums given to King *Charles* for Subsidies and the Maintenance of his Court. Neither are our Troops at *Gibraltar* included within this number. And further, we alone have been at all the Charge of Transporting the Forces first sent from *Genoa* to *Barcelona*; and of all the Imperial Recruits from time to time: And have likewise paid vast Sums as Levy-Mony, for every individual Man and Horse so furnished to Recruit, tho' the Horses were scarce worth the Price of Transportation. But this hath been almost the constant Misfortune of our Fleet, during the present War; instead of being employed on some Enterprize for the Good of

3. particular] particulars *ed.* 7.

the Nation, or even for the Protection of our Trade, to be wholly taken up in transporting Soldiers.

We have actually Conquered all *Bavaria*, *Ulm*, *Ausburg*, *Landau*, and a great part of *Alsace*, for the Emperor: And by the Troops we have furnished, the Armies we have paid, and the Diversions we have given to the Enemies Forces, have chiefly contributed to the Conquests of *Milan*, *Mantua*, and *Mirandola*, and to the Recovery of the Dutchy of *Modena*. The last Emperor drained the Wealth of those Countries into his own Coffers, without encreasing his Troops against *France* by such mighty Acquisitions, or yielding to the most reasonable Requests we have made.

Of the many Towns we have taken for the *Dutch*, we have consented, by the Barrier-Treaty, that all those which were not in Possession of *Spain*, upon the Death of the late Catholick King, shall be part of the *States* Dominions, and that they shall have the Military Power in the most considerable of the rest; which is, in effect, to be the absolute Sovereigns of the whole. And the *Hollanders* have already made such good use of their Time, that, in Conjunction with our G——l, the Oppressions of *Flanders* are much greater than ever.

And this Treatment which we have received from our two principal Allies, hath been pretty well copied by most other Princes in the Confederacy, with whom we have any Dealings. For Instance, seven *Portuguese* Regiments after the Battle of *Almanza*, went off, with the rest of that broken Army, to *Catalonia*: The King of *Portugal* said, he was not able to pay them, while they were out of his Country; the Queen consented therefore to do it Herself, provided the King would raise as many more to supply their Place. This he engaged to do, but never performed. Notwithstanding which, his Subsidies were constantly paid him by my Lord *G———n*,

for almost four Years, without any Deduction upon Account of those seven Regiments, directly contrary to the Seventh Article of our Offensive Alliance with that Crown, where it is agreed, that a Deduction shall be made out of those Subsidies, in Proportion to the number of Men wanting in that Complement, which the King is to maintain. But whatever might have been the Reasons for this Proceeding, it seems they are above the Understanding of the present Lord Treasurer; who not entring into those Refinements, of paying the *publick* Money upon *private* Considerations, hath been so uncourtly as to stop it. This Disappointment, I suppose, hath put the Court of *Lisbon* upon other Expedients of raising the Price of Forage, so as to force us either to lessen our number of Troops, or be at double Expence in maintaining them; and this at a time when their own Product, as well as the Import of Corn, was never greater; and of demanding a Duty upon the Soldiers Clothes we carry over for those Troops, which have been their sole Defence against an inveterate Enemy; and whose Example might have infused Courage, as well as taught them Discipline, if their Spirits had been capable of receiving either.

In order to augment our Forces every Year, in the same Proportion as those, for whom we Fight, diminish theirs, we have been obliged to hire Troops from several Princes of the Empire, whose Ministers and Residents here, have perpetually importuned the Court with unreasonable Demands, under which our late Ministers thought fit to be Passive. For those Demands were always backed with a Threat to recal their Soldiers, which was a thing not to be heard of, because it might *Discontent the Dutch*. In the mean time those Princes never sent their Contingent to the Emperor, as by the Laws of the Empire they are obliged to do, but gave for

their Excuse, that we had already hired all they could spare.

But if all this be true: If, according to what I have affirmed, we began this War contrary to Reason: If, as the other Party themselves, upon all Occasions, acknowledge, the Success we have had was more than we could reasonably expect: If, after all our Success, we have not made that use of it, which in Reason we ought to have done: If we have made weak and foolish Bargains with our Allies, suffered them tamely to break every Article, even in those Bargains to our Disadvantage, and allowed them to treat us with Insolence and Contempt, at the very Instant when We were gaining Towns, Provinces and Kingdoms for them, at the Price of our Ruin, and without any prospect of Interest to our selves: If we have consumed all our Strength in attacking the Enemy on the strongest side, where (as the old Duke of *Schomberg* expressed it) *to engage with* France, *was to take a Bull by the Horns*; and left wholly unattempted, that part of the War, which could only enable us to continue or to end it: If all this, I say, be our Case, it is a very obvious Question to ask, by what Motives, or what Management, we are thus become the *Dupes* and *Bubbles* of *Europe*? Sure it cannot be owing to the Stupidity arising from the coldness of our Climate, since those among our Allies, who have given us most Reason to complain, are as far removed from the Sun as our selves.

If in laying open the real Causes of our present Misery, I am forced to speak with some Freedom, I think it will require no Apology; Reputation is the smallest Sacrifice those can make us, who have been

1. could spare] could possibly spare *eds. 1, 2, 6.* 3. be *om. ed. 5.* 25. owing to to the *ed. 3.*

the Instruments of our Ruin; because it is That, for which in all Probability they have the least Value. So that in exposing the Actions of such Persons, I cannot be said, properly speaking, to do them an Injury. But as it will be some Satisfaction to the People, to know by whom they have been so long abused; so it may be of great use to Us and our Posterity, not to trust the Safety of their Country in the Hands of those who act by such Principles, and from such Motives.

I have already observed, that when the Counsels of this War were debated in the late King's Time, my Lord *G———n* was then so averse from entring into it, that he rather chose to give up his Employment, and tell the King he could serve him no longer. Upon that Prince's Death, although the Grounds of our Quarrel with *France* had received no manner of Addition, yet this Lord thought fit to alter his Sentiments; for the Scene was quite changed; his Lordship and the Family with whom he was engaged by so complicated an Alliance, were in the highest Credit possible with the Q—n: The Treasurer's Staff was ready for his Lordship, the Duke was to Command the Army, and the Dutchess, by her Employments, and the Favour she was possessed of, to be always nearest her M——y's Person; by which the whole Power, at Home and Abroad, would be devolved upon that Family. This was a Prospect so very inviting, that, to confess the Truth, it could not be easily withstood by any who have so keen an Appetite for Wealth or Ambition. By an Agreement subsequent to the Grand Alliance, we were to assist the *Dutch* with Forty thousand Men, all to be Commanded by the D. of *M.* So that whether this War were prudently begun or not, it is plain, that the true Spring or Motive

11-12. my Lord *G——n*] a certain *Great Man ed. 1.* 14. him. *om. ed. 7.*

of it, was the aggrandizing a particular Family; and in short, a War of the *General* and the *Ministry*, and not of the *Prince* or *People*; since those very Persons were against it when they knew the Power, and consequently the Profit, would be in other Hands.

With these Measures fell in all that Sett of People, who are called the *Monied Men*; such as had raised vast Sums by Trading with Stocks and Funds, and Lending upon great Interest and Præmiums; whose perpetual Harvest is War, and whose beneficial way of Traffick must very much decline by a Peace.

In that whole Chain of Encroachments made upon us by the *Dutch*, which I have above deduced, and under those several gross Impositions from other *Powers*, if any one should ask, why our G——l continued so easie to the last? I know no other way so probable, or indeed so charitable to account for it, as by that unmeasurable Love of Wealth, which his best Friends allow to be his predominant Passion. However, I shall wave any thing that is personal upon this Subject. I shall say nothing of those great Presents made by several Princes, which the Soldiers used to call Winter Foraging, and said it was better than that of the Summer; of Two and an half *per Cent.* substracted out of all the Subsidies we pay in those Parts, which amounts to no inconsiderable Sum; and lastly, of the grand Perquisites in a long successful War, which are so amicably adjusted between Him and the *States*.

But when the War was thus begun, there soon fell in other Incidents here at home, which made the Continuance of it necessary for those who were the chief Advisers. The *Whigs* were at that time out of all Credit or Consideration: The reigning Favourites had

14. other *Powers*] other Princes *ed. 1.* 17. unmeasurable] unanswerable *ed. 1.* 24. substracted] sustracted *ed. 7.*

always carried what was called the *Tory principle*, at least as high, as our Constitution could bear; and most others in great Employments, were wholly in the Church-Interest. These last, among whom several were Persons of the greatest Merit, Quality and Consequence, were not able to endure the many Instances of Pride, Insolence, Avarice and Ambition, which those Favourites began so early to discover, nor to see them presuming to be the sole Dispensers of the Royal Favour. However, their Opposition was to no purpose; they wrestled with too great a Power, and were soon crushed under it. For, those in Possession finding they could never be quiet in their Usurpations, while others had any Credit, who were at least upon an equal Foot of Merit, began to make Overtures to the discarded *Whigs*, who would be content with any Terms of Accommodation. Thus commenced this *Solemn League and Covenant*, which hath ever since been cultivated with so much Application. The great Traders in Money were wholly devoted to the *Whigs*, who had first raised them. The Army, the Court, and the Treasury, continued under the old *Despotick* Administration: The *Whigs* were received into Employment, left to manage the Parliament, cry down the Landed Interest, and worry the Church. Mean time our Allies, who were not ignorant that all this artificial Structure had no true Foundation in the Hearts of the People, resolved to make their best use of it, as long as it should last. And the General's Credit being raised to a great height at home, by our Success in *Flanders*, the *Dutch* began their gradual Impositions, lessening their Quota's, breaking their Stipulations, Garrisoning the Towns we took for them, without supplying their Troops; with many other Infringements: All which we were forced

1–2. at least, as high as *eds. 3, 4, 5, 7.*

to submit to, because the General was *made easie*; because the Monied Men at home were fond of the War; because the *Whigs* were not yet firmly settled; and because that exorbitant degree of Power, which was built upon a supposed Necessity of employing particular Persons, would go off in a Peace. It is needless to add, that the Emperor, and other Princes, followed the Example of the *Dutch*, and succeeded as well, for the same Reasons.

I have here imputed the Continuance of the War to the mutual Indulgence between our General and Allies, wherein they both so well found their Accounts; to the Fears of the *Mony-changers*, lest their *Tables should be overthrown*; to the Designs of the *Whigs*, who apprehended the Loss of their Credit and Employments in a Peace; and to those at home, who held their immoderate Engrossments of Power and Favour, by no other Tenure than their own Presumption upon the Necessity of Affairs. The Truth of this will appear indisputable, by considering with what Unanimity and Concert these several Parties acted towards that great End.

When the Vote passed in the House of Lords, against any Peace without *Spain* being restored to the *Austrian* Family, the Earl of *W——n* told the House, That indeed it was impossible and impracticable to recover *Spain*; but however, there were *certain Reasons* why such a Vote should be made at that time; which Reasons wanted no Explanation: For the G——l and the M——y having refused to accept very advantageous Offers of a Peace, after the Battle of *Ramellies*, were forced to take in a Set of Men, with a previous Bargain, to skreen them from the Consequences of that Miscarriage. And

25-6. That indeed it was] That it was indeed *eds. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6.*

accordingly upon the first succeeding Opportunity, which was that of the Prince of *Denmark*'s Death, the Chief Leaders of the Party were brought into several great Employments.

So when the Q—— was no longer able to bear the Tyranny and Insolence of those ungrateful Servants, who as they *wexed the Father*, did but *kick the more*; our two great Allies abroad, and our Stock-jobbers at home, took immediately the Alarm; applied the nearest way to the Throne, by Memorials and Messages, jointly directing Her Majesty not to change Her Secretary or Treasurer; who for the true Reasons that these officious Intermedlers demanded their Continuance, ought never to have been admitted into the least Degree of Trust; since what they did was nothing less than betraying the Interest of their Native Country, to those Princes, who in their Turns were to do what they could to support them in Power at home.

Thus it plainly appears, that there was a Conspiracy on all sides to go on with those Measures, which must perpetuate the War; and a Conspiracy founded upon the Interest and Ambition of each Party; which begat so firm a Union, that instead of wondring why it lasted so long, I am astonished to think how it came to be broken. The Prudence, Courage, and Firmness of Her Majesty in all the Steps of that great Change, would, if the Particulars were truly related, make a very shining Part in Her Story: Nor is Her Judgment less to be admired, which directed Her in the Choice of perhaps the only Persons who had Skill, Credit, and Resolution enough to be Her Instruments in overthrowing so many Difficulties.

1–2. Opportunity, which] Opportunity that fell, which *ed. 1.* 7. *wexed*] *waxed ed. 1.* 9. immediately the Alarm] immediate Alarm *eds. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6.* 28. in Her Story] in Story *eds. 5, 7.*

Some would pretend to lessen the Merit of this, by telling us, that the Rudeness, the Tyranny, the Oppression, the Ingratitude of the late Favourites towards their Mistress, were no longer to be born. They produce Instances to shew, how Her M——y was pursued through all Her Retreats, particularly at *Windsor*; where, after the Enemy had possessed themselves of every Inch of Ground, they at last attacked and stormed the Castle, forcing the Qu—n to fly to an adjoining Cottage, pursuant to the Advice of *Solomon*, who tells us, *It is better to dwell in a corner of the House-top, than with a brawling Woman in a wide House.* They would have it, that such continued ill Usage was enough to enflame the meekest Spirit: They blame the Favourites in point of Policy, and think it nothing extraordinary, that the Qu—n should be at an end of Her Patience, and resolve to discard them. But I am of another Opinion, and think their Proceedings were right. For nothing is so apt to break even the bravest Spirits, as a continual Chain of Oppressions: One Injury is best defended by a second, and this by a third. By these Steps, the old *Masters of the Palace* in *France* became *Masters of the Kingdom*; and by these Steps, a *G——l during Pleasure*, might have grown into a *G——l for Life*, and a *G——l for Life* into a *King*. So that I still insist upon it as a Wonder, how Her M——y, thus besieged on all sides, was able to extricate Her self.

Having thus mentioned the real Causes, tho' disguised under specious Pretences, which have so long continued the War; I must beg leave to reason a little with those Persons who are against any Peace, but what they call a *Good One*; and explain themselves, that no Peace can

11–12. *to dwell in . . . . in a wide House*] *to live on the House Tops than with a scolding Woman in a large House eds. 1, 2.* 22. became] become *eds. 5, 7.*

be *good*, without an entire Restoration of *Spain* to the House of *Austria*. It is to be supposed, that what I am to say upon this Part of the Subject, will have little Influence on those, whose particular Ends or Designs of any sort, lead them to wish the Continuance of the War. I mean the General and our Allies abroad; the Knot of late Favourites at home; the Body of such as Traffick in Stocks; and lastly, that Set of Factious Politicians, who were so violently bent, at least, upon *Clipping* our Constitution in Church and State. Therefore I shall not apply my self to any of those, but to all others indifferently, whether *Whig* or *Tory*, whose private Interest is best answered by the Welfare of their Country. And if among these there be any, who think we ought to fight on till King *Charles* is quietly settled in the Monarchy of *Spain*, I believe there are several Points which they have not thoroughly considered.

For, First, It is to be observed, that this Resolution against any Peace without *Spain*, is a new Incident, grafted upon the Original Quarrel, by the Intrigues of a Faction among us, who prevailed to give it the Sanction of a Vote in both Houses of Parliament, to justifie those, whose Interest lay in perpetuating the War. And, as this Proceeding was against the Practice of all Princes and States, whose Intentions were fair and honourable; so is it contrary to common Prudence, as well as Justice. I might add, that it was impious too, by presuming to controul Events, which are only in the Hands of God. Ours and the *States* Complaint against *France* and *Spain*, are deduced in each of our Declarations of War, and our Pretensions specified in the *Eighth Article* of the Grand Alliance; but there is not in any of these, the least mention of demanding *Spain* for the House of *Austria*, or of refusing any Peace without that Condition. Having already made an Extract from both

Declarations of War, I shall here give a Translation of the Eighth Article in the Grand Alliance, which will put this Matter out of Dispute.

The Eighth Article of the Grand Alliance.

When the War is once undertaken, none of the Parties shall have the Liberty to enter upon a Treaty with the Enemy, but jointly, and in concert with the others. Nor is Peace to be made, without having first obtained a just and reasonable Satisfaction for his Cesarean *Majesty, and for his Royal Majesty of* Great Britain, *and a particular Security to the Lords the* States-General, *of their Dominions, Provinces, Titles, Navigations, and Commerce, and a sufficient Provision, that the Kingdoms of* France *and* Spain *be never united, or come under the Government of the same Person, or that the same Man may never be King of both Kingdoms; and particularly, that the* French *may never be in Possession of the* Spanish West-Indies; *and that they may not have the liberty of Navigation, for conveniency of Trade, under any Pretence whatsoever, neither directly nor indirectly; except it is agreed, that the Subjects of* Great Britain *and* Holland, *may have full Power to use and enjoy all the same Privileges, Rights, Immunities and Liberties of Commerce, by Land and Sea, in* Spain, *in the* Mediterranean, *and in all the Places and Countries, which the late King of* Spain, *at the time of his Death, was in Possession of, as well in* Europe, *as elsewhere, as they did then use and enjoy; or which the Subjects of both, or each Nation, could use and enjoy, by virtue of any Right, obtained before the Death of the said King of* Spain, *either by Treaties, Conventions, Custom, or any other way whatsoever.*

Here, we see the Demands intended to be insisted on

6. *a Treaty with*] *a Treaty of Peace with eds. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6.*
12. *Navigations*] *Navigation eds. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6.*

by the Allies upon any Treaty of Peace, are, a just and reasonable Satisfaction for the Emperor and King of *Great Britain*, a Security to the *States-General* for their Dominions, *&c.* and a sufficient Provision, that *France* and *Spain* be never united under the same Man, as King of both Kingdoms. The rest relates to the Liberty of Trade and Commerce for Us and the *Dutch*, but not a Syllable of engaging to dispossess the Duke of *Anjou*.

But to know how this new Language of *No Peace without* Spain, was first introduced, and at last prevailed among us, we must begin a great deal higher.

It was the Partition Treaty, which begot the Will in favour of the Duke of *Anjou*: For this naturally led the *Spaniards* to receive a Prince supported by a great Power, whose Interest, as well as Affection, engaged them to preserve that Monarchy entire, rather than to oppose him in favour of another Family, who must expect Assistance from a Number of Confederates, whose principal Members had already disposed of what did not belong to them, and by a previous Treaty parcelled out the Monarchy of *Spain*.

Thus the Duke of *Anjou* got into the full Possession of all the Kingdoms and States belonging to that Monarchy, as well in the old World, as the new. And whatever the House of *Austria* pretended from their Memorials to Us and the *States*, it was at that time but too apparent, that the Inclinations of the *Spaniards* were on the Duke's side.

However, a War was resolved, and in order to carry it on with greater Vigour, a Grand Alliance formed, wherein the Ends proposed to be obtained, are plainly and distinctly laid down, as I have already quoted them. It pleased God in the Course of this War, to bless the Armies of the Allies with remarkable Successes; by which we were soon put into a Condition of demanding

and expecting such Terms of a Peace, as we proposed to our selves when we began the War. But instead of this, our Victories only served to lead us on to further visionary Prospects; Advantage was taken of the Sanguin Temper, which so many Successes had wrought the Nation up to; new Romantick Views were proposed, and the old, reasonable, sober Design, was forgot.

This was the Artifice of those here, who were sure to grow Richer, as the Publick became poorer, and who after the Resolutions, which the two Houses were prevailed upon to make, might have carried on the War with Safety to themselves, till Malt and Land were Mortgaged, till a general Excise were established; and the *dizieme denier* raised, by *Collectors in Red Coats*. And this was just the Circumstance which it suited their Interests to be in.

The House of *Austria* approved this Scheme with Reason, since whatever would be obtained by the Blood and Treasure of others, was to accrue to that Family, and they only lent their Name to the Cause.

The *Dutch* might, perhaps, have grown resty under their Burthen; but Care was likewise taken of That by a *Barrier-Treaty* made with the *States*, which deserveth such Epithets as I care not to bestow: But may perhaps consider it, at a proper Occasion, in a *Discourse* by it self.

By this Treaty, the Condition of the War, with respect to the *Dutch*, was widely altered: They fought no longer for Security, but for Grandeur; and we, instead of labouring to make them *safe*, must beggar our selves to render them *Formidable*.

Will any one contend, that if in the Treaty at *Gertruydenburg*, we could have been satisfied with such Terms of a Peace, as we proposed to our selves by the Grand Alliance, the *French* would not have allowed them?

31. in the Treaty at] at the Treaty of *eds. 1, 2, 6.*

'Tis plain, they offered many more, and much greater, than ever we thought to insist on, when the War began: And they had reason to grant, as well as we to demand them, since Conditions of Peace do certainly turn upon Events of War. But surely there is some Measure to be observed in this: Those who have defended the Proceedings of our Negotiators at *Gertruydenburg*, dwell very much upon their Zeal and Patience, in endeavouring to work the *French* up to their Demands, but say nothing to justify those Demands, or the Probability, that *France* would ever accept them. Some of the Preliminary Articles were so very Extravagant, that in all Human Probability we could not have obtained them by a successful War of forty Years. One of them was inconsistent with common Reason; wherein the Confederates reserved to themselves full Liberty of demanding, what further Conditions they should think fit; and in the mean time, *France* was to deliver up several of their strongest Towns in a Month. These Articles were very gravely Signed by our Plenipotentiaries, and those of *Holland*, but not by the *French*, though it ought to have been done interchangeably; nay they were brought over by the Secretary of the Ambassy, and the Ministers here prevailed on the Queen to execute a Ratification of Articles, which only one Party had Signed: This was an Absurdity in Form, as well as in Reason, because the usual Form of a Ratification is, with a Preamble, shewing, *That whereas Our Ministers and those of the Allies, and of the Enemy, have Signed, &c. We Ratify, &c.* The Person who brought over the Articles, said in all Companies, (and perhaps believed) that it was a Pity, we had not demanded more,

7. at *Gertruydenburg*] at the Treaty of *Gertruydenburg ed. 1.* 12. the Preliminary Articles] the Articles in that Treaty *ed. 1.* 26. Party] Part *eds. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.*

for the *French* were in a Disposition to refuse us nothing we would ask. One of our Plenipotentiaries affected to have the same Concern, and particularly, that we had not obtained some further Security for the Empire on the *Upper Rhine*.

What could be the Design of all this Grimace, but to amuse the People, and raise Stocks for their Friends in the Secret, to Sell to Advantage? I have too great a Respect for the Abilities of those who acted in this Negotiation, to believe they hoped for any other Issue from it, than what we found by the Event. Give me leave to suppose the continuance of the War was the Thing at Heart, among those in Power, both Abroad, and at Home, and then I can easily shew the Consistency of their Proceedings; otherwise they are wholly unaccountable and absurd. Did those, who insisted on such wild Demands, ever sincerely intend a Peace? Did they really think that going on with the War was more eligible for their Country, than the least Abatement of those Conditions? Was the smallest of them worth Six Millions a Year, and an Hundred thousand Men's Lives? Was there no way to provide for the Safety of *Britain*, or the Security of its Trade, but by the *French* King's turning his own Arms to beat his Grandson out of *Spain*? If these able Statesmen were so truly concerned for our Trade, which they made the Pretence of the War's Beginning, as well as Continuance, why did they so neglect it in those very Preliminaries, where the Enemy made so many Concessions, and where all that related to the Advantage of *Holland*, or the other Confederates, was expressly settled? But whatever concerned us, was to be left to a general Treaty; no Tariff agreed on with *France* or the *Low Countries*, only the *Scheld* was to remain shut, which ruins our Commerce with *Antwerp*. Our Trade

with *Spain* was referred the same way; but this they will pretend to be of no Consequence, because that Kingdom was to be under the House of *Austria*; and we had already made a Treaty with King *Charles*. I have indeed heard of a Treaty made by Mr. *Stanhope*, with that Prince, for settling our Commerce with *Spain*: But whatever it were, there was another between Us and *Holland*, which went Hand in Hand with it, I mean that of *Barrier*, wherein a Clause was inserted, by which all Advantages proposed for *Britain*, are to be in common with *Holland*.

ANOTHER point which, I doubt, those have not considered, who are against any Peace without *Spain*, is, that the Face of Affairs in *Christendom*, since the Emperor's Death, hath been very much changed. By this Accident the Views and Interests of several Princes and States in the Alliance, have taken a new Turn, and I believe, it will be found that Ours ought to do so too. We have sufficiently blundered once already, by changing our Measures with regard to a Peace, while our Affairs continued in the same Posture; and it will be too much in Conscience to blunder again by *not* changing the first, when the others are so much altered.

To have a Prince of the *Austrian* Family on the Throne of *Spain*, is undoubtedly more desirable than one of the House of *Bourbon*; but to have the Empire and *Spanish* Monarchy united in the same Person, is a dreadful Consideration, and directly opposite to that wise Principle, on which the Eighth Article of the Grand Alliance is founded.*

* *We and* Holland, *as well as* Portugal, *were so apprehensive of this, that by the 25th Article of the Offensive Alliance, his* Portugueze *Majesty was not to acknowledge the Arch-Duke for King of* Spain, *till the two late Emperors had made a Cession to* Charles *of the said Monarchy.*

30. Grand *om. ed. 1.*

31–4. (note) *We and* Holland . . . . *Monarchy om. ed. 1.*

To this perhaps it will be objected, that the indolent Character of the *Austrian* Princes, the wretched Oeconomy of that Government, the want of a Naval Force, the remote distance of their several Territories from each other, would never suffer an Emperor, though at the same time King of *Spain*, to become Formidable: On the contrary, that his Dependance must continually be on *Great Britain*; and the Advantages of Trade, by a Peace founded upon that Condition, would soon make us Amends for all the Expence of the War.

In Answer to this, Let us consider the Circumstances we must be in, before such a Peace could be obtained, if it were at all practicable. We must become not only Poor for the present, but reduced by further Mortgages to a state of Beggary, for endless Years to come. Compare such a weak Condition as this with so great an Accession of Strength to *Austria*, and then determine how much an Emperor, in such a State of Affairs, would either fear or need *Britain*.

Consider, that the Comparison is not formed between a Prince of the House of *Austria*, Emperor and King of *Spain*, and between a Prince of the *Bourbon* Family, King of *France* and *Spain*; but between a Prince of the latter only King of *Spain*, and one of the former uniting both Crowns in his own Person.

What Returns of Gratitude can we expect, when we are no longer wanted? Has all that we have hitherto done for the Imperial Family been taken as a Favour, or only received as the Due of the *Augustissima Casa?*

Will the House of *Austria* yield the least Acre of Land, the least Article of strained and even usurped Prerogative, to resettle the Minds of those Princes in the Alliance, who are alarmed at the Consequences of

10. Expence] Expences *cds. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6.*

this Turn of Affairs, occasioned by the Emperor's Death? We are assured it never will. Do we then imagine, that those Princes, who dread the overgrown Power of the *Austrian*, as much as that of the *Bourbon* Family, will continue in our Alliance, upon a System contrary to that which they engaged with us upon? For instance; What can the Duke of *Savoy* expect in such a Case? Will he have any Choice left him but that of being a Slave and a Frontier to *France*; or a *Vassal*, in the utmost Extent of the Word, to the Imperial Court? Will he not therefore, of the two Evils choose the least; by submitting to a Master, who has no immediate Claim upon Him, and to whose Family he is nearly allied; rather than to another, who hath already revived several Claims upon him, and threatens to revive more?

Nor are the *Dutch* more inclined than the rest of *Europe*, that the *Empire* and *Spain* should be united in King *Charles*, whatever they may now pretend. *On the contrary, 'tis known to several Persons, that upon the Death of the late Emperor* Joseph, *the* States *resolved, that those two Powers should not be joined in the same Person*; And this they determined as a fundamental Maxim, by which they intended to proceed. So that *Spain* was first given up by *Them*; and since they maintain no Troops in that Kingdom, it should seem, that they understand the Duke of *Anjou* to be lawful Monarch.

Thirdly, Those who are against any Peace without *Spain*, if they be such as no way find their private Account by the War, may perhaps change their Sentiments, if they will reflect a little upon our present Condition.

I had two Reasons for not sooner publishing this Discourse: The first was, Because I would give way

to others, who might argue very well upon the same Subject, from general Topicks and Reason, though they might be ignorant of several Facts, which I had the Opportunity to know. The Second was, Because I found it would be necessary, in the course of this Argument, to say something of the State to which this War hath reduced us: At the same time I knew, that such a Discovery ought to be made as late as possible, and at another Juncture would not only be very indiscreet, but might perhaps be dangerous.

It is the Folly of too many, to mistake the Eccho of a *London* Coffee-house for the Voice of the Kingdom. The City Coffee-houses have been for some Years filled with People, whose Fortunes depend upon the *Bank*, *East-India*, or some other Stock: Every new Fund to these, is like a new Mortgage to an Usurer, whose Compassion for a young Heir is exactly the same with that of a Stock-jobber to the Landed Gentry. At the Court-End of the Town, the like Places of Resort are frequented either by Men out of Place, and consequently Enemies to the Present Ministry, or by Officers of the Army: No wonder then, if the general Cry, in all such Meetings, be against any Peace either *with* Spain, or *without;* which, in other Words, is no more than this, That discontented Men desire another Change of Ministry; that Soldiers would be glad to keep their Commissions; and, that the Creditors have Mony still, and would have the Debtors borrow on at the old extorting Rates, while they have any Security to give.

Now, to give the most ignorant Reader some Idea of our present Circumstances, without troubling him or my self with Computations in form: Every body knows, that our Land and Malt Tax amount annually to about two Millions and an half. All other Branches

of the Revenue are mortgaged to pay Interest, for what we have already borrowed. The yearly Charge of the War is usually about Six Millions; to make up which Sum, we are forced to take up, on the Credit of new Funds, about three Millions and an half. This last Year the computed Charge of the War came to above a Million more, than all the Funds the Parliament could contrive would pay Interest for; and so we have been forced to divide a Deficiency of Twelve hundred thousand Pounds among the several Branches of our Expence. This is a Demonstration, that if the War lasts another Campaign, it will be impossible to find Funds for supplying it, without mortgaging the Malt-Tax, or by some other Method equally desperate.

If the Peace be made this Winter, we are then to consider, what Circumstances we shall be in towards paying a Debt of about Fifty Millions, which is a fourth Part of the Purchase of the whole Island, if it were to be Sold.

Towards clearing our selves of this monstrous Incumbrance, some of these Annuities will expire or pay off the Principal in Thirty, Forty, or an Hundred Years; the Bulk of the Debt must be lessened gradually by the best Management we can, out of what will remain of the Land and Malt-Taxes, after paying Guards and Garrisons, and maintaining and supplying our Fleet in the time of Peace. I have not Skill enough to compute what will be left, after these necessary Charges, towards annually clearing so vast a Debt; but believe it must be very little: However, it is plain that both these Taxes must be continued, as well for supporting the Government, as because we have no other Means for paying off the Principal. And so likewise must all the other Funds remain for paying the Interest. How long a time this must require, how steady an Adminis-

tration, and how undisturbed a state of Affairs, both at Home and Abroad, let others determine.

However, some People think all this very reasonable; and that since the Struggle hath been for Peace and Safety, Posterity, who is to partake the Benefit, ought to share in the Expence: As if at the breaking out of this War there had been such a Conjuncture of Affairs, as never happened before, nor would ever happen again. 'Tis wonderful, that our Ancestors, in all their Wars, should never fall under such a Necessity; that we meet no Examples of it, in *Greece* and *Rome*; that no other Nation in *Europe* ever knew anything like it, except *Spain*, about an Hundred and twenty Years ago; which they drew upon themselves, by their own Folly, and have suffered for it ever since: No doubt, we shall teach Posterity Wisdom, but they will be apt to think the Purchase too dear; and I wish they may stand to the Bargain we have made in their Names.

'Tis easie to entail Debts on succeeding Ages, and to hope they will be able and willing to pay them; but how to insure Peace for any Term of Years, is difficult enough to apprehend. Will Human Nature ever cease to have the same Passions? Princes to entertain Designs of Interest or Ambition, and Occasions of Quarrel to arise? May not we Ourselves, by the variety of Events and Incidents which happen in the World, be under a Necessity of recovering Towns out of the very Hands of those, for whom we are now ruining our Country to Take them? Neither can it be said, that those *States*, with whom we may probably differ, will be in as bad a Condition as Ourselves; for, by the Circumstances of our Situation, and the Impositions of our Allies, we are more exhausted, than either they or the Enemy; and by the Nature of our Govern-

12. anything] anythink *eds.* 5, 7.

ment, the Corruption of our Manners, and the Opposition of Factions, we shall be more slow in recovering.

It will, no doubt, be a mighty Comfort to our Grandchildren, when they see a few Rags hang up in *Westminster-Hall*, which cost an hundred Millions, whereof they are paying the Arrears, and boasting, as Beggars do, that their Grandfathers were Rich and Great.

I have often reflected on that mistaken Notion of Credit, so boasted of by the Advocates of the late Ministry: Was not all that Credit built upon Funds raised by the Landed Men, whom they so much hate and despise? Are not the greatest part of those Funds raised from the Growth and Product of Land? Must not the whole Debt be entirely paid, and our Fleets and Garrisons be maintained, by the Land and Malt-Tax, after a Peace? If they call it Credit to run ten Millions in Debt, without Parliamentary Security, by which the Publick is defrauded of almost half, I must think such Credit to be dangerous, illegal, and perhaps treasonable. Neither hath any thing gone further to ruin the Nation, than their boasted Credit. For my own part, when I saw this false Credit sink, upon the Change of the Ministry, I was singular enough to conceive it a good Omen. It seemed, as if the young extravagant Heir had got a new Steward, and was resolved to look into his Estate before things grew desperate, which made the Usurers forbear feeding him with Mony, as they used to do.

Since the Monied Men are so fond of War, I should be glad, they would furnish out one Campaign at their own Charge: It is not above six or seven Millions; and I dare engage to make it out, that when they have done this, instead of contributing equal to the Landed Men, they will have their full Principal and Interest, at

6 *per Cent.* remaining of all the Money they ever lent to the Government.

Without this Resource, or some other equally miraculous, it is impossible for us to continue the War upon the same Foot. I have already observed, that the last Funds of Interest fell short above a Million, though the Persons most conversant in Ways and Means employed their utmost Invention ; so that of necessity we must be still more defective next Campaign. But perhaps our Allies will make up this Deficiency on our side, by greater Efforts on their own. Quite the contrary; both the Emperor and *Holland* failed this Year in several Articles ; and signified to us, some time ago, that they cannot keep up to the same Proportions in the next. We have gained a noble Barrier for the latter, and they have nothing more to demand or desire. The Emperor, however sanguin he may now affect to appear, will, I suppose, be satisfied with *Naples*, *Sicily*, *Milan*, and his other Acquisitions, rather than engage in a long hopeless War, for the Recovery of *Spain*, to which his Allies the *Dutch* will neither give their Assistance nor Consent. So that since we have done their Business ; since they have no further Service for our Arms, and we have no more Money to give them ; And lastly, since we neither desire any Recompence, nor expect any Thanks, we ought, in pity, to be dismissed, and have leave to shift for our selves. They are ripe for a Peace, to enjoy and cultivate what we have conquered for them; and so are we, to recover, if possible, the Effects of their Hardships upon Us. The first Overtures from *France*, are made to *England*, upon safe and honourable Terms: We who bore the Burthen of the War, ought, in reason, to have the greatest share in making the Peace. If we do not hearken to a Peace, others certainly will ; and get the Advantage of us there,

as they have done in the War. We know the *Dutch* have perpetually threatned us, that they would enter into separate Measures of a Peace; and by the Strength of that Argument, as well as by *other Powerful Motives*, prevailed on those, who were then at the Helm, to comply with them on any Terms, rather than put an end to a War, which every Year brought them such great Accessions to their Wealth and Power. Whoever falls off, a Peace will follow; and then we must be content with such Conditions, as our Allies, out of their great Concern for our Safety and Interest, will please to choose. They have no further occasion for Fighting; they have gained their Point, and they now tell us, it is *our War*; so that in common Justice it ought to be *our Peace*.

All we can propose, by the desperate Steps of pawning our Land or Malt-Tax, or erecting a general Excise, is only to raise a Fund of Interest, for running us annually four Millions further in Debt, without any Prospect of ending the War so well, as we can do at present: And when we have sunk the only un-engaged Revenues we had left, our Incumbrances must of necessity remain perpetual.

We have hitherto lived upon *Expedients*, which in time will certainly destroy any Constitution, whether Civil or Natural, and there was no Country in *Christendom* had less Occasion for them, than ours. We have dieted a Healthy Body into a Consumption, by plying it with Physick, instead of Food; Art will help us no longer; and if we cannot recover by letting the Remains of Nature work, we must inevitably die.

What Arts have been used to possess the People with a *strong Delusion*, that *Britain* must infallibly be ruined, without the Recovery of *Spain* to the House of *Austria*? Making the Safety of a great and powerful Kingdom,

as ours was then, to depend upon an Event, which, even after a War of miraculous Successes, proves impracticable. As if Princes and Great Ministers could find no way of settling the Publick Tranquility, without changing the Possessions of Kingdoms, and forcing Sovereigns upon a People against their Inclinations. Is there no Security for the Island of *Britain*, unless a King of *Spain* be Dethroned by the Hands of his Grandfather? Has the Enemy no Cautionary Towns and Sea-Ports, to give us for securing Trade? Can he not deliver us Possession of such Places, as would put him in a worse Condition, whenever he should perfidiously renew the War? The present King of *France* has but few Years to live, by the course of Nature, and, doubtless, would desire to end his Days in Peace: Grandfathers in private Families are not observed to have great Influence on their Grandsons, and I believe they have much less among Princes. However, when the Authority of a Parent is gone, is it likely that *Philip* will be directed by a Brother, against his own Interest, and that of his Subjects? Have not those two Realms their separate Maxims of Policy, which must operate in Times of Peace? These at least are Probabilities, and cheaper by six Millions a Year than recovering *Spain*, or continuing the War, both which seem absolutely impossible.

But the common Question is, If we must now Surrender *Spain*, what have we been Fighting for all this while? The Answer is ready; We have been Fighting for the Ruin of the Publick Interest, and the Advancement of a Private. We have been fighting to raise the Wealth and Grandeur of a particular Family: to enrich Usurers and Stock-jobbers; and to cultivate the pernicious Designs of a Faction, by destroying the Landed-Interest. The nation begins now to think these

Blessings are not worth Fighting for any longer, and therefore desires a Peace.

But the Advocates on the other side cry out, that we might have had a better Peace, than is now in Agitation, above two Years ago. Supposing this to be true, I do assert, that by parity of Reason we must expect one just so much worse, about two Years hence. If those in Power could then have given us a better Peace, more is their Infamy and Guilt, that they did it not; why did they insist upon Conditions, which they were certain would never be granted? We allow it was in their Power to have put a good End to the War, and left the Nation in some hope of recovering it self. And this is what we charge them with as answerable to God, their Country, and Posterity, that the bleeding Condition of their Fellow-Subjects, was a Feather in the Balance with their private Ends.

When we offer to lament the heavy Debts and Poverty of the Nation, 'tis pleasant to hear some Men answer all that can be said, by crying up the Power of *England*, the Courage of *England*, the inexhaustible Riches of *England*. I have heard a Man very sanguine upon this Subject, with a good Employment for Life, and a Hundred thousand Pounds in the Funds, bidding us *Take Courage*, and *Warranting, that all would go well.* This is the Style of Men at Ease, *who lay the heavy Burthens upon others, which they will not touch with one of their Fingers.* I have known some People such ill Computers, as to imagine the many Millions in Stocks and Annuities, are so much real Wealth in the Nation; whereas every Farthing of it is entirely lost to us, scattered in *Holland, Germany,* and *Spain*; and the Landed-Men, who now pay the Interest, must at last pay the Principal.

26. *the heavy*] *heavy cds. 1, 2, 6.*

FOURTHLY, Those who are against any Peace without *Spain*, have, I doubt, been ill informed, as to the low Condition of *France*, and the mighty Consequences of our Successes. As to the first, it must be confessed, that after the Battle of *Ramellies* the *French* were so discouraged with their frequent Losses, and so impatient for a Peace, that their King was resolved to comply on any reasonable Terms. But when his Subjects were informed of our exorbitant Demands, they grew jealous of his Honour, and were unanimous to assist him in continuing the War at any hazard, rather than submit. This fully restored his Authority; and the Supplies he hath received from the *Spanish West-Indies*, which in all are computed, since the War, to amount to Four hundred Millions of Livres, (and all in *Specie*) have enabled him to pay his Troops. Besides, the Money is spent in his own Country; and he hath since waged War in the most thrifty manner, by acting on the Defensive, compounding with us every Campaign for a Town, which costs us fifty times more than it is worth, either as to the Value, or the Consequences. Then he is at no Charge of a Fleet, further than providing Privateers, wherewith his Subjects carry on a Piratical War at their own Expence, and he shares in the Profit; which hath been very considerable to *France*, and of infinite Disadvantage to us, not only by the perpetual Losses we have suffered to an immense Value, but by the general Discouragement of Trade, on which we so much depend. All this considered, with the Circumstances of that Government, where the Prince is Master of the Lives and Fortunes of so mighty a Kingdom, shews that Monarch to be not so sunk in his Affairs, as we have imagined, and have long flattered Our selves with the Hopes of. For an absolute Government may

34 ff. For an absolute . . . . . Countries. *om. ed. 1.*

endure a long War, but it hath generally been ruinous to Free Countries.

Those who are against *any Peace without Spain*, seem likewise to have been mistaken in judging our Victories, and other Successes, to have been of greater Consequence than they really were.

When our Armies take a Town in *Flanders*, the *Dutch* are immediately put into *Possession*, and we at home make *Bonfires*. I have sometimes pitied the deluded People, to see them squandring away their Fewel to so little purpose. For Example, What is it to Us that *Bouchain* is taken, about which the Warlike Politicians of the Coffee-House make such a Clutter? What though the Garrison surrendered Prisoners of War, and in sight of the Enemy? We are not now in a Condition to be fed with Points of Honour. What Advantage have We, but that of spending three or four Millions more to get another Town for the States, which may open them a new Country for *Contributions*, and encrease the Perquisites of the G——l?

In that War of ten Years, under the late King, when our Commanders and Soldiers were raw and unexperienced, in comparison of what they are at present, we lost Battles and Towns, as well as we gained them of late, since those Gentlemen have better learned their Trade; yet we bore up then, as the *French* do now: Nor was there any thing decisive in their Successes: They grew weary, as well as we, and at last consented to a Peace, under which we might have been happy enough, if it had not been followed by that wise *Treaty* of *Partition*, which revived the Flame, that hath lasted ever since. I see nothing else in the modern way of making War, but that the Side which can hold out longest, will end it with most Advantage. In such a close Country as *Flanders* where it is carried on

by Sieges, the Army that acts offensively, is at a much greater Expence of Men and Mony; and there is hardly a Town taken in the common Forms, where the Besiegers have not the worse of the Bargain. I never yet knew a Soldier, who would not affirm, That any Town might be Taken, if you were content to be at the Charge. If you will count upon sacrificing so much Blood and Treasure, the rest is all a regular, established Method, which cannot fail. When the King of *France*, in the Times of his Grandeur, sat down before a Town, his Generals and Engineers would often fix the Day when it should surrender. The Enemy, sensible of all this, hath for some Years past avoided a Battle, where he hath so ill succeeded, and taken a surer way to consume us, by letting our Courage evaporate against Stones and Rubbish, and sacrificing a single Town to a Campaign, which he can so much better afford to Lose, than we to Take.

Lastly, Those who are so violent against *any Peace* without *Spain* being restored to the House of *Austria*, have not, I believe, cast their Eye upon a Cloud gathering in the North, which we have helped to raise. and may quickly break in a Storm upon our Heads.

The Northern War hath been on Foot, almost ever since our Breach with *France*: The Success of it various; but one Effect to be apprehended was always the same, that sooner or later it would involve us in its Consequences, and that, whenever this happened, let our Success be never so great against *France*, from that Moment *France* would have the Advantage.

By our Guaranty of the Treaty of *Travendall*, we were obliged to hinder the King of *Denmark* from engaging in a War with *Sweden*. It was at that time understood by all Parties, and so declared, even by the *British*

Ministers, that this Engagement especially regarded *Denmark*'s not assisting King *Augustus*. But, however, if this had not been so, yet our Obligation to *Sueden* stood in Force, by virtue of former Treaties with that Crown, which were all revived and confirmed by a subsequent one, concluded at the *Hague* by Sir *Joseph Williamson* and Monsieur *Lilienroot*, about the latter end of the late King's Reign.

However, the War in the North proceeded, and our not assisting *Sueden*, was at least as well excused by the War, which we were entangled in, as his not contributing his Contingent to the Empire, whereof he is a Member, was excused by the Pressures he lay under, having a Confederacy to deal with.

In this War the King of *Sweden* was Victorious; and what Dangers were we not then exposed to? What Fears were we not in? He marched into *Saxony*, and if he had really been in the *French* Interest, might at once have put us under the greatest Difficulties. But the Torrent turned another way, and he contented himself with imposing on his Enemy the Treaty of *Alt Rastadt*; by which King *Augustus* makes an absolute Cession of the Crown of *Poland*, renounces any Title to it, acknowledges *Stanislaus*; and then, both he and the King of *Sueden* join in desiring the Guaranty of *England* and *Holland*. The Q—n did, indeed, not give this Guaranty in Form; but, as a Step towards it, the Title of *King* was given to *Stanislaus*, by a Letter from Her M——y; and the strongest Assurances were made to the *Suedish* Minister, in Her M——y's Name and in a Committee of Council, that the Guaranty should speedily be granted; and that in the mean while, it was the same thing as if the Forms were passed.

29. made] given *ed. 1.*

In 1708, King *Augustus* made the Campaign in *Flanders*; what Measures he might at that time take, or of *what Nature* the Arguments might be that he made use of, is not known: But immediately after he breaks through all he had done, marches into *Poland*, and re-assumes the Crown.

After this we apprehended that the Peace of the Empire might be endangered; and therefore entered into an Act of Guaranty for the Neutrality of it. The King of *Sueden* refused, upon several Accounts, to submit to the Terms of this Treaty; particularly, because we went out of the Empire to cover *Poland* and *Jutland*, but did not go out of it to cover the Territories of *Sueden*.

Let us therefore consider, what is our Case at present. If the King of *Sueden* returns, and gets the better, he will think himself under no Obligation of having any Regard to the Interests of the Allies; but will naturally pursue, according to his own Expression, *His Enemy, where-ever he finds him.* In this Case the *Corps* of the Neutrality is obliged to oppose him, and so we are engaged in a second War, before the first is ended.

If the Northern Confederates succeed against *Sueden*, how shall we be able to preserve the Balance of Power in the North, so essential to our Trade, as well as in many other Respects? What will become of that great Support of the *Protestant Interest* in *Germany*, which is the Footing that the *Suedes* now have in the Empire? Or, who shall answer that these Princes, after they have settled the North to their Minds, may not take a fancy to look Southward, and make our Peace with *France* according to their own Schemes?

And lastly, if the King of *Prussia*, the Elector of *Hannover*, and other Princes whose dominions lie contiguous, are forced to draw from those Armies which

act against *France*; we must live in hourly Expectation of having those Troops recalled, which they now leave with us; and this Recal may happen in the midst of a Siege, or on the Eve of a Battel. Is it therefore our Interest, to toil on in a ruinous War, for an impracticable End, 'till one of these Cases shall happen, or to get under shelter before the Storm?

There is no doubt, but the present Ministry (provided they could get over the Obligations of Honour and Conscience) might find their Advantage in advising the Continuance of the War, as well as the last did, tho' not in the same Degree, after the Kingdom has been so much exhausted. They might prolong it till the Parliament would desire a Peace; and in the mean time leave them in full Possession of Power. Therefore it is plain, that their Proceedings at present are meant to serve their Country, directly against their private Interest; whatever Clamour may be raised by those, who, for the vilest Ends, would remove Heaven and Earth to oppose their Measures. But they think it infinitely better, to accept such Terms as will secure our Trade, find a sufficient Barrier for the *States*, give *Reasonable Satisfaction* to the Emperor, and restore the Tranquility of *Europe*, though without adding *Spain* to the Empire: Rather than go on in a languishing way, upon the vain Expectation of some improbable Turn, for the Recovery of that Monarchy out of the *Bourbon* Family; and at last be forced to a worse Peace, by some of the Allies falling off, upon our utter Inability to continue the War.

14. would *om. ed. 1.*

POSTSCRIPT

I Have in this Edition explained three or four Lines in the 21st Page,* which mentions the *Succession*, to take off, if possible, all manner of Cavil; though, at the same time, I cannot but observe, how ready the Adverse Party is to make use of any Objections, even such as destroy their own Principles. I put a distant Case of the possibility that our *Succession*, through extream Necessity, might be changed by the Legislature, in future Ages; and it is pleasant to hear those People quarrelling at this, who profess themselves for changing it as often as they please, and that even without the Consent of the entire Legislature.

[I have just seen a Paper, called, *An Answer to the Conduct*, &c. I am told several Others are preparing: I faithfully promise, that whatever Objections of Moment I can find in any of them, shall be fully answered in a Paragraph at the end of the Preface, in the next Edition of this Discourse.]

FINIS

* Page 30 of this edition.—Ed.

1–12. I Have in this Edition . . . . entire Legislature. *om. eds. 1, 2, 3, 6.* 13–18. I have just . . . this Discourse *in ed. 4 only.*

NOTES.

TITLE PAGE. *Partem tibi Gallia nostri*, &c.: 'some of us have been carried off in your service in Gaul, some in the cruel wars in Spain, some have fallen in Italy. Over all the world, while you have conquered, our armies have been destroyed. Of what use is it to have shed our blood in northern lands, and brought the Rhone and the Rhine beneath your sway?' Lucan, *Pharsalia*, v. 264, sqq. In the first edition this extract ends at 'perit'.

Odimus accipitrem, &c.: 'we hate the hawk because he is always armed.' Ovid, *Ars Amatoria*, ii. 147. This line was often quoted in connexion with Napoleon.

Victrix Provincia plorat: 'tu, victrix provincia, ploras', 'you, conquering province, are left to mourn', Juvenal i. 50.

One of these mottoes, we are not told which, was suggested by Harley; see Introduction, p. xxxix.

THE PREFACE.

PAGE 3. 1. *admire*: wonder at.

8. *Whig or Tory . . . those foolish Terms*: see Introduction, p. xxxv.

24. *the Late Ministry*: that in which Godolphin was the nominal head, as Lord Treasurer, though Marlborough was the ruling spirit; the other members were Whigs. The ministry fell in August 1710.

25. *the Treaty at Gertruydenburg*: this was not a treaty; see Introduction, p. xxvi.

PAGE 4. 13. *a Mock Treaty*: i. e. the negotiations at Gertruydenberg.

33. *that impracticable Point*: the surrender of Spain by Philip, a point Swift discusses below, pp. 53, sqq.

THE CONDUCT OF THE ALLIES.

PAGE 5. 10. *Political Casuists*: a casuist is one who discusses how far general principles should be applied to particular cases (*casus*); there is no inherent bad sense in the term, but as the argument naturally tended to show that any particular case was exempt from the ordinary rules of morality, casuistry soon came to be looked on as little more than subtle dishonesty.

14. *pro aris & focis*: 'for house and home', a common Latin expression. In a Roman house the family gods (*penates*) were worshipped at the *ara* ('altar'), the house gods (*lares*) at the *focus* ('hearth').

22. *Anticipations*: a term still common in law to mean using money before it actually comes into one's possession.

PAGE 6. 4. *free Trade*: unrestricted trade. The narrower sense of the term, in which it is opposed to Protection, is not found till the end of the eighteenth century.

PAGE 7. 9. *in course*: in the natural course of events.

27. *what Servants he should keep*: an allusion to the incident recorded below, p. 51. 11.

33. *Civil-Wars of the Barons*: those in the reigns of John and Henry III. It can hardly be said that in either of these was there 'great destruction of the nobility and gentry'; though the statement is entirely true of the Wars of the Roses. In these, indeed, the higher nobility were almost annihilated. The almost unchecked despotism of the Tudors for over a century was the direct outcome of their destruction; so that it took a good deal more than 'a very few years' to 'set all right again'.

PAGE 8. 2. *the Money spent on both sides was employed . . . at Home*: this is perhaps the most extraordinary defence of Civil War that has ever appeared. Swift's insistence on the importance of money, trade, and national thrift, is very marked in this pamphlet. Louis's sneer at the Dutch as 'a nation of shopkeepers' might well have been applied to the English, as indeed it was a century later by Napoleon.

8. *great Armies in constant Pay*: the strength of Cromwell's standing army was probably, on an average, about 40,000, a far larger number than had ever before been maintained on a permanent footing in England.

continual War with Spain or Holland: this is an exaggeration. Out of the eleven years of the Commonwealth England was at war with the Dutch for two years, and with Spain for a like period.

15. *our first Wars with France*: Henry II's possessions in France amounted to more than one-third of the whole country, and were larger than the territories under the direct rule of the French king. These gradually dwindled till the loss of Calais in 1558 left England without a rood of French soil.

19. *chargeable*: in the obsolete sense of 'costly'.

a Subsidy: from its general meaning of a parliamentary grant to the sovereign, this term came to be narrowed down to mean a property tax of 4*s.* in the pound on land, and 2*s.* 8*d.* in the pound on movables. This being reckoned on a definite assessment, the subsidy by the time of the Stuart kings had come to be a fixed amount, viz. £70,000.

20. *two or three Fifteenths*: the first tax levied on personal property in this country was the 'Saladin tithe', collected by Henry II in 1188 for the expenses of a new crusade. From that time onward a similar tax was continually imposed, and before long it crystallized into the demand for one or more fifteenths. An assessment was made of each town in the eighth year of Edward III (1335), which was used as the basis of all future taxation; so that henceforth a fifteenth became a fixed amount like the subsidy.

22. *so prudent to Fight*: the only two instances of the omission of 'as' in such a phrase given in *N. E. D.* are from tragedies by Tourneur (1607) and Swinburne (1874).

24. *The Dutch Wars*: besides the war mentioned on p. xii of the Introduction, we were engaged in a naval war with Holland from 1665 to the treaty of Breda in 1667. It was in the course of this war that De Ruyter sailed up the Thames and burnt the shipping at Chatham. Swift can hardly have been thinking of this war, which arose mainly from commercial rivalry, and though inexcusable can hardly be termed dishonourable. But the war of 1672 into which England plunged, under the administration of the infamous Cabal, was one of the most disgraceful in our history. In his anxiety to become independent of Parliament, Charles abandoned the Dutch, with whom he had just concluded an alliance, and sold himself and his country to Louis by the secret Treaty of Dover. Knowing that Parliament would disapprove of the Dutch war, the king did not summon it for nearly two years; and when he was at last driven to do so, he could obtain no supplies till reasonable terms of peace had been offered to Holland. In the following year the king's necessities made him again call a parliament, but he met with the same opposition and was forced to make peace with the Dutch in February 1674. Charles, like his father, would have preferred to rule without a Parliament, and never summoned one but to replenish his purse.

32. *a general War*: see Introduction, p. xiii.

PAGE 9. 3. *the Custom . . . of borrowing Millions upon Funds of Interest*: the National Debt was a standing bugbear with the Tories. Swift's gloomy forecast of the inevitable bankruptcy of the nation, which appears in this pamphlet, is merely typical of what the Tory party said in his day, and continued to say with increasing vehemence for the next hundred years. They could not distinguish between private and national indebtedness, the latter of which should be regarded rather as an investment, an investment moreover necessary for the nation's welfare, and indeed sometimes for its very existence. In a national loan there is not necessarily any idea of repayment; the government which borrows is content that posterity, which will reap its share of the benefit the loan was intended to

compass, should equally bear its share in paying the interest. Swift also neglects to take into account the fact that since the Restoration wealth had greatly accumulated, while the opportunities for investment were exceedingly few. Consequently people did not know what to do with their savings, till, shortly after the Revolution, the creation of a large number of bubble companies provided an easy, if unprofitable, means of disposing of them. There was, on the one hand, a host of people eager to lend money, on the other, the government's urgent need for large supplies. It hardly needed the brain of a Godolphin or a Montague to see that these two problems solved each other. The only other possible way of providing funds was by taxation, which was no more popular in the eighteenth century than in the twentieth. Between taxes paid unwillingly and a loan eagerly subscribed, there could be no hesitation in choosing. Accordingly, in December 1692, Montague brought in his proposal to borrow a million, the consideration for which was to take the form of life annuities. The bill passed both Houses without division. See Macaulay's *History of England*, chap. xix.

11. *Proemiums*: sums paid by the borrower in addition to the interest, as a further inducement to make a loan.

14. *The Person said to have been Author*: Swift, as he shows in the *Four Last Years*, meant Dr. Gilbert Burnet, Bishop of Salisbury and author of *History of my own Time* and several other works. He was a great favourite of William's and much in the royal counsels; but though he was generally credited at the time, and afterwards, with having originated the National Debt, there is no evidence that he did so, while there is a strong presumption to the contrary in the fact that, though not overburdened with modesty, he never seems to have claimed to be the originator.

18. *closed . . . with*: combined with, suited.

23. *Undertakers*: this term was first applied in politics to Sir Henry Nevill and others who undertook in 1614 that, if James I would concede the points in dispute between himself and the Commons, that House would not be niggardly in granting supplies; others even undertook the return of 'well-affected' persons to Parliament.

29. *The Ground of the first War*: William and Mary's Declaration of War (May 7, 1689) says nothing about 'making France acknowledge' their right to the throne, but recites Louis's invasion of the Netherlands and his breach of treaties, together with his 'many injuries' to the King and Queen of England and their subjects in Newfoundland, the Caribbee Islands, and Hudson's Bay, the seizure of English ships by French privateers, and, above all, the 'unchristian Prosecution' of Protestant English subjects in France.

32. *Hudson's-Bay*: the Hudson's Bay Company was granted a charter by Charles II in 1670; but the French, who had settled in Canada sixty years earlier, continually encroached on the English settlers, and in the course of the war of 1689–97 captured all the chief forts in the Hudson's Bay Territory. These were restored at the Peace of Ryswick.

the Sea was almost entirely neglected: the result of the naval battle off Beachy-head (June 1690) was not one to encourage William to make use of that arm of attack, for it left the French navy in command of the Channel. But in May 1692 Admiral Russell inflicted a crushing defeat on the French fleet off Cap La Hogue, which put an end to any fear of a French invasion, and to the growth of the French navy.

35. *the King was . . . not an Admiral*: it is true that William neglected the navy; he confessed that he did not understand sea affairs (Dalrymple's *Memoirs*).

PAGE 10. 6. *the Terms of a Peace*: the Treaty of Ryswick (September 1697), see Introduction, p. xiv. To say that England got no advantage out of this treaty is to assert that she had nothing to gain by defeating Louis's design of dominating Europe. But the treaty was hardly considered as more than a temporary truce.

8. *the famous Treaty of Partition*: this was the Second Partition Treaty (June 1700); see Introduction, p. xvi.

10. *or if that Crown*, &c.: this was not a provision of the treaty; Swift's language is obscure, and his punctuation is certainly not illuminating. The meaning is, that England was hampered by the knowledge that, if Louis chose to break the treaty, . . . he might claim the whole Spanish dominions.

17. *cantoned*: to canton is to quarter, divide into parts; from French *cantonner*, to quarter.

20. *this Prince was acknowledged*: William would never have recognized Philip as King of Spain if it had not been for the pressure put upon him by the Tories, who were at that time strongly High Church and even Jacobite in their principles. The Whigs too were very lukewarm in their support of the Dutch king, so that, as William remarked with disgust, the whole country seemed to prefer a settlement under the late King of Spain's will to one under the Partition Treaty.

23. *the Church-Party*: the Tories were at this time violent upholders of the Church of England, which was one cause of the favour with which the Queen regarded them. Marlborough and Godolphin, who must be counted as Tories at this time, were, however, not so anxious as the rest of the party to re-impose disabilities on members of other sects; and when a bill was introduced to repeal the Occasional Conformity Act—the Act which allowed Protestant Nonconformists to hold office, provided they took the sacrament according to the rites of the

Church of England once each year—the secret machinations of these two peers prevented the bill from passing.

26. *the Earl of G——n*: Godolphin had been at the head of the Treasury, 1690–6; in December 1700 he was reappointed, but when William dissolved Parliament eleven months later, Godolphin resigned. There is no evidence that he resigned because he was opposed to a war with France. The office of Treasurer dated from the eleventh century, and in course of time came to be the third in the kingdom. In the seventeenth century it was often put into commission, as it was throughout William's reign: but Anne revived the office in favour of Godolphin on her accession. This explains the correction given in the footnote.

PAGE 11. 2. *in the Hands of One*: i. e. Marlborough. He and Godolphin had been associated in office since early in the reign of Charles II; they were both Tories and High Churchmen, and worked in harmony till Godolphin died. Nor were their ties confined to matters of state; they were connected by blood, Godolphin was a fervent admirer of the Duchess, and his only son married Marlborough's eldest daughter.

4. *The Declarations of War*: in May 1702.

16. *The Tariff promised by the Treaty of Ryswick*: Colbert, who was Louis's chief minister for over twenty years, had imposed a high tariff against Dutch goods and heavy export duties on raw material. These regulations, which dealt a heavy blow at French as well as Dutch trade, were practically withdrawn by the Treaty of Ryswick.

21. *the seizing the Spanish Netherlands*: see Introduction, p. xviii.

32. *Cologn*: since the fourteenth century the Archbishop of Cologne had been one of the Electors of the Empire.

33. *the Country of Wolfenbuttel*: to the south-east of Brunswick, in the heart of the Empire, of which its dukedom formed a part. The duke had been secretly in the pay of France, but in 1702 he was compelled by the Elector of Hanover to return to his allegiance. Five years later his daughter married Charles III of Spain.

PAGE 12. 14. *this was positively denied by France*: Swift explains this later, p. 17. 21 sqq.

20. *the French Troops . . . at the Gates of Nimeguen*: with the Barrier Towns in French hands Nimeguen remained the sole defence of Holland, and Marshal Boufflers was directed to make an attempt to seize it on June 10. In this he was foiled by a force of British and Allied troops under the Earl of Athlone, who succeeded in heading off the French and reaching the fortress first.

PAGE 13. 2. *the old Pretensions of Spain*: on the death of Henry I of Portugal in 1580, Philip II of Spain, son of the great

Emperor Charles V, claimed the throne as the grandson of Emmanuel 'the Fortunate', King of Portugal. Two of his cousins had a prior claim, but as neither of them was nearly as powerful as Philip, Portugal was united to Spain till 1640, a disastrous period of her history which is fittingly known as 'the sixty years' captivity'. In 1640 the rightful heirs, the House of Braganza, were reinstated in the person of John IV by a general revolt of the Portuguese, but hostilities between Spain and Portugal did not cease for twenty-eight years more, during which the restored dynasty was supported, at one time or another, by England, France, and Holland.

When Charles II of Spain died, Pedro II was on the throne of Portugal. Louis had enough influence with him to secure his recognition of Philip V as King of Spain, and was even allowed to shelter his fleet in the Tagus in 1701 when it was being pursued by Sir George Rooke. This hostile action on the part of her ancient ally led England to send Sir John Methuen to Lisbon, where in May 1703 Portugal was induced to join the Grand Alliance. The terms of the treaty are severely handled by Swift below, pp. 27, sqq. The gain to the Allies of Pedro's support was very slight: the Portuguese as a fighting force were almost valueless, and the allied attacks through Portugal uniformly unsuccessful. In the December of the same year, however, Methuen signed a treaty of far-reaching consequences: by this England agreed to the importation of Portuguese wine at a lower duty than that on wine from France or Germany, in consideration of a similar admission of English cloth to Portugal; and as a result port, rather than hock or claret, became the drink of Englishmen for the next century and a half.

8. *The Duke of Savoy*: the dominions of Savoy extended from the Lake of Geneva to the Mediterranean, which however they touched only at Nice, the eastern littoral being in the occupation of Genoa. The Duke at this time was Victor Amadeus II, who had succeeded in 1675 and married Mary of Orleans, niece of Louis XIV and granddaughter of Charles I of England. He had joined the first great alliance against France in 1690, and abandoned it five years later, two years before the Treaty of Ryswick. At the next outbreak of hostilities, in 1700, he fought for three years on the side of Louis, but failing to receive the reward he had anticipated in the shape of a portion of the Milanese, he came over to the Allies in October 1703. This very astute politician, who throughout acted solely in his own interests, became King of Sicily at the Treaty of Utrecht, besides gaining the Duchy of Montferrato, which he had long coveted, and the other territories mentioned in the text. It is from his grand-uncle that the present Royal House of Italy is descended.

13. *the Dutchy of Montferrat* lay south of the Po and north of the Ligurian Alps and the Apennines. For a century and a half it had been an apanage of the Duchy of Mantua. Of the other places mentioned, Alessandria and Valenza lie to the south of Casale, the capital of Montferrat; Lomellina (*sic*) to the east; Vigevano is a town in the northern part of Lomellina, and Novara is to the north of the same province.

PAGE 14. 2. *the Inclinations of the Spaniards to the House of Austria*: Charles II of Spain had strongly favoured the Austrian family and detested the Bourbons, so that it was only by the strongest pressure put upon him when he was almost on his death-bed, that his chief minister Cardinal Porto Carrero had induced him to make his will in Philip's favour. But when once the will was declared, the Spaniards, with the exception of the Catalonians, were almost unanimously on the French side. Their devotion to Philip was probably due rather to their dislike at having a sovereign forced upon them by the Allies than to any affection for Philip, who was a compound of indolence, sensuality, and bigotry. The Archduke, however, relying on the late King of Spain's preference for his family, always represented to the Allies that the people of Spain were strongly in his favour.

25. *the Spanish West-Indies*: this term comprised not only the islands of Cuba, San Domingo, Jamaica, &c., but all the Spanish territory on the mainland, which included Mexico, Central America, Venezuela, New Granada (Colombia), Peru, and Chile.

27. *Bavaria*: Maximilian Emmanuel, Elector of Bavaria, was the father of the Electoral Prince who had been one of the claimants to the Spanish succession. By joining the forces of the Grand Monarque, he and the Archbishop were guilty of desertion and rebellion against the Empire, but their feelings of loyalty were swamped by their conviction that Louis must inevitably prove the victor. This belief seems to have been pretty general among the smaller states of Germany: 'to doubt that he must triumph in any great European contest was almost deemed a mark of imperfect understanding or defective intelligence'—Burton. The Elector found, however, that he had backed the wrong horse: after the Battle of Blenheim his dominions were forfeited, and were only restored ten years later, in 1714.

PAGE 15. 18. *offering at any other Remedy*: to offer at, for to attempt, seems to be obsolete; the latest use unearthed by *N. E. D.* is from a letter of Mrs. Carlyle's in 1847.

without taking time to consider the Consequences: there does not seem to have been any undue precipitancy. Louis had seized the Barrier Towns in February 1701: the Grand Alliance was not made till September of the same year, and therein it

was expressly declared that two months should be given the French to make restitution. Even after the expiration of that time, six months more elapsed before war was declared (May 1702).

23. *in a worse Condition . . . than . . . our conquered Enemies*: this is mere hyperbole; England had not suffered nearly so severely as France.

26. *a prevailing Faction*: the supporters of the war included the 'monied men' (i. e. the capitalists) and others, who hoped to make their profit out of the war, together with the great majority of the Whigs; but it must be remembered that the terms Whig and Tory were not synonymous with supporters and opponents of the war respectively, though the insane preference of the English people for recognized party-labels caused them often to be so used.

PAGE 16. 10. *enriched our Selves*: the variant 'our Allies' (see footnote) is very interesting. Possibly the change was one of those made by Harley for the second edition—see Introduction, p. xxxix—who might have thought it would sound better to pose as the benefactors of our Allies. The new reading would then be followed by the third edition, though Swift had time to correct it in the Errata. The sixth edition, which in all but two places is identical with the second, and which generally ignores the intervening editions, would then copy the new reading without paying any attention to the Errata in edition three. It is highly improbable that Swift would ever have spoken of enriching the Allies as desirable, when one of the strong points he makes in the pamphlet is that throughout the war we had been foolishly impoverishing ourselves and allowing our Allies to reap all the benefit.

17. *the most tedious, expensive and unsuccessful War*: it had lasted for seven years; its cost may be gauged from the National Debt, which was something over half a million before the war, and twenty millions after it; this does not take into account the extra amount which had been raised by taxes. The war was certainly unsuccessful in so far as it had merely scotched the snake, not killed it; French aggression was checked for a time, though it flared out again as soon as Louis felt himself strong enough to gain his ends. That prudent monarch had spent the interval in preparing for a fresh offensive; while the English people, true to their instincts, refused to take warning by their past danger or to make any provision against its recurrence.

PAGE 17. 6. *by ten Years Experience*: this can only be nine years at the outside, if we reckon from Louis's dispatching an army to the Rhine in September 1688 to the Peace of Ryswick in September 1697. England can hardly be said to have appeared in the war till the Battle off Beachy Head, June 1690.

22. *only gave him the Title of King*: Louis must have been far too astute to consider the cases parallel. Charles XII of Sweden entered Poland with a victorious army and forced Augustus to abdicate; he then seated Stanislaus Leszczynski, a Polish noble, on the throne (see below, note to p. 72. 24), but allowed Augustus to retain the empty title of king. Such conduct on the part of a conqueror may be considered an act of grace; but without having conquered a country, to proclaim as king of it a prince rejected by the overwhelming majority of its inhabitants can only be termed an impertinence.

26. *the Danger of the Dutch*, &c.: i. e. the danger incurred by the Dutch from a Bourbon occupation of the Spanish Netherlands. This might, of course, have resulted in a French conquest of Holland, and so have proved seriously detrimental to England.

34. *by an old Treaty with Holland*: by a 'Separate Article' annexed to the treaty of Mar. 3, 1678, signed by Finch, Danby, Arlington, and others for Charles II. The obligation to send the ten thousand men was reciprocal in case of invasion.

PAGE 18. 12. *the Spaniards . . . would never have suffered the French*, &c.: unfortunately for this argument, the Spaniards had raised no protest when Louis seized the Barrier Towns in the Spanish Netherlands. See Introduction, p. xviii.

20. *our Politicians at that time had other Views*: it was, of course, William and his Dutch councillors who were the chief advocates of the war, and they no doubt were largely swayed by the love of their native land. But England, in her own interests, was vitally concerned to check French continental aggression, a fact which Swift either failed to perceive or conveniently ignored; and to suppose that this could have been effected by merely sending 10,000 men to Holland is absurd.

23. *A Grand Alliance*: signed at the Hague, Sept. 7, 1701.

PAGE 19. 11. *hardly a Possibility left of being ever redeemed*: probably this is not a piece of clever casuistry, but represents the real Tory attitude of the time towards a National Debt. Swift did not see that, whereas an individual debtor is, in a measure, at the mercy of his creditors, a debtor state has the whip-hand of its creditors and can defer its repayments to the Greek Kalends if it thinks fit. Neither will the creditors consider themselves aggrieved, provided that the payment of interest is regularly made.

14. *to have continued*: Mr. Temple Scott inserts 'and' before these words, and it is clearly wanted, though it does not appear in any edition. Had there been no war Swift would have liked to see the twenty millions of the Debt repaid out of the taxes. As, however, the war was necessary, he would have postponed the repayment till peace came, and devoted the proceeds of the taxes to the conduct of the war.

Land and Malt Tax: these were the only taxes which had not been appropriated to pay annuities under the National Debt. The Land Tax, first instituted under Charles I, had in 1693 been fixed at 4*s.* in the pound on a valuation of land made the previous year. This valuation yielded two millions per annum, and remained in force for over two centuries. The Malt Tax, which was also established temporarily under Charles I, was revived in 1697 on a basis of 6$\frac{3}{4}$*d.* a bushel; in 1711, as we learn from p. 62. 34, below, it yielded half a million. The Malt Tax was not abolished till 1880. The chief taxes besides these two were the customs and excise.

29. *who after ten Years Suffering*: Swift has got lost in this long sentence, and, for once, his punctuation rather obscures than elucidates his meaning. There is no verb after 'who', but some such expression as 'found themselves' is probably to be understood, and the state in which they found themselves is described by the clauses 'maintaining . . . condemning . . . [and] racking . . .'; then all the preceding clauses are picked up again with the words, 'That these very People', as though he had begun his sentence 'Posterity will wonder'. But I cannot feel sure that 'a Nation, maintaining' is not put for 'a Nation's maintaining', which makes better sense in itself, but plays havoc with what follows. Fortunately, though the sentence defies analysis, its meaning is perfectly clear.

PAGE **20**. 8. *runs out*: comes to the end of his resources.

16. *This Computation*: Swift's insistence on the cost of the war is painfully sordid. He seems to have no conception that war is not a luxury, but at times a necessity if life and freedom are to be retained, and that when these are at stake decent people do not ask whether they can afford money for their defence.

25. *the second Article*: Swift now demonstrates the folly of not striking at the over-seas possessions of Spain, and so recouping ourselves for the cost of the war; but he states this so vaguely at first that the author of one of the replies to the pamphlet (*A full Answer*, &c.) wastes several pages in trying to guess his meaning.

PAGE **21**. 25. *the French may yet hold out a dozen Years more*: this does not appear to have been the view Louis took of the situation, if we may judge by his frequent appeals for peace. Swift has a sounder argument in his contention that the French losses were mainly going into the pockets of the Dutch.

PAGE **22**. 12. *the Dominions of Spain in the Duke of Anjou*: a terse expression for '. . . being in the hands of . . .'

PAGE **23**. 6. *the only General*: the versatile and erratic Charles Mordaunt, Earl of Peterborough, who was said 'to have seen more kings and more postilions than any man in Europe'. At the age of 47 he was made commander of the land forces and

joint commander, with Sir Cloudesley Shovel, of the fleet dispatched against Spain in 1705. His chief exploit was the capture of Barcelona, the other great schemes he formed being overruled by the prudence or timidity of the Allies. Hampered in his movements, and incapable of prolonged effort, he quitted the country in March 1707, receiving the thanks of the House of Lords on his return 'for his great and eminent services'. His chief characteristic was his restless energy, which drove him, as though stung by a gad-fly, to make sudden and rapid journeys to different parts of Europe, killing his horses and outdistancing his wearied suite. Swift, who felt strongly attracted towards him, embodied this feature in his poem on 'Mordanto', who 'Flies like a squib from place to place'. In the *Journal to Stella* there are several references to him: 'It is the ramblingest lying rogue on earth' (Nov. 23, 1710); 'We are to be mighty constant correspondents' (Jan. 1, 1710–11); 'I love the hang-dog dearly' (Jan. 10, 1712–13). Their friendship subsisted, in spite of the fact that Peterborough was opposed to a peace (July 3, 1711). The judgement of Pope, who was equally the friend of both, is worth recording: 'I tremble for my Lord Peterborow, whom I now lodge with; he has too much wit, as well as courage, to make a solid general'. Macaulay gives a delightful, if one-sided, account of Peterborough in his *War of the Succession in Spain*; he terms him 'assuredly the most extraordinary character of that age, the King of Sweden himself not excepted'.

10. *the Envy of his Rivals*: had Peterborough been the only general in the campaign, his daring project of marching on Madrid might have been successfully carried out; though, as subsequent events showed, the occupation of the capital would not have meant 'the Possession of the Kingdom'. But he was accompanied by the Archduke Charles, in temporary enjoyment of the title of Charles III of Spain, who was then only twenty years of age, and at no time in his life displayed any military talent; and by the Prince of Hesse-Darmstadt, who had been governor in Catalonia seven years before. According to Colonel Parnell, in his *War of the Succession in Spain*, the Prince was 'the very life and soul of the Austrian cause in Spain', which differs considerably from Macaulay's estimate of him. Whichever view is correct, there can be no doubt that the dissensions between the Prince and Peterborough were most disastrous to the Allies.

19. *pretended*: professed, without any implication of deceit.

31. *Maritime Powers*: England and Holland were the only states among the Allies which possessed anything worth speaking of in the way of a navy; for though Portugal had a few ships, these were required for the protection of her own shores.

PAGE 24. 1. *Heads*: the substitution of 'Hands', the reading

of five editions, is so astonishingly foolish, that one is driven to attribute it to the interference of some unusually crass printer.

3. *our original Quota*: furnished under a convention subsequent to the Grand Alliance. See below, p. 33. 10.

14. *going directly with their Ships to Lima*: the Spanish kings had always jealously kept the trade with their American colonies in their own hands, no foreign nation being allowed to carry goods to or from any Spanish port in the New World. When Philip of Anjou came to the throne of Spain, this prohibition was relaxed in favour of France, whose merchants were allowed to trade directly with Peru till the peace of Utrecht. Before and after this interval all legitimate trade was carried on through a single Spanish port, at first Seville, and afterwards Cadiz, where all goods going in either direction were transhipped. But a large illicit trade was always kept up, partly by smuggling, partly with the connivance of the Spanish port officers in America. By the Treaty of Utrecht England secured the right to trade directly with America to the extent of sending one ship of five hundred tons each year.

23. *some private Men at Bristol*: on August 2, 1708, Captain Woodes Rogers sailed from Bristol with two ships, which had been fitted out by some merchants of that city to prey on the Spanish commerce in the South Seas. The celebrated William Dampier, who had twice sailed round the world, was engaged as the pilot for the Pacific. In the following February they found Alexander Selkirk on the island of Juan Fernandez, where he had been marooned four years and four months before. In December of the next year they captured one of the Spanish ships sailing from Manila in the Philippines to Acapulco, though they were beaten off in their attack on the other, and larger, vessel. Thence they sailed westward, and, after calling at the Cape of Good Hope, reached Erith in the Thames on October 14, 1711. See *A Cruising Voyage round the World*, by Captain Woodes Rogers (1712), for which reference I am indebted to the kindness of Professor Bensly.

27. *Aquapulco*: Acapulco on the Pacific is still the chief port of Mexico.

PAGE 25. 27. *Mr. Hill's Expedition*: Major-General John Hill, Mrs. Masham's brother, was sent to America in May 1711 with five regiments withdrawn from Flanders to make an attack on French settlements. He attempted to sail up the St. Lawrence and attack Quebec, but lost eight transports with over a thousand men through stress of weather and the captains' ignorance of navigation. Upon this he returned home with the survivors. Despite this failure, he remained in favour till the accession of George I, when he was deprived of his command.

34. *by the Stubbornness*, &c.: there seems to be no support for this charge. The expedition put in to Boston to get

provisions and men, but the former were unobtainable because the authorities at home, in their anxiety to keep their scheme secret, had sent no intimation that provisions would be required. Four thousand men, however, were recruited, of whom one thousand were Indians. The failure of the expedition is often attributed to Hill's incapacity, but, as Burton says, he really had no opportunity either of ruining it or of carrying it to a successful issue.

PAGE 26. 7. *it is agreed between us*: by the sixth article of the Grand Alliance (Sept. 7, 1701).

25. *they must rob or starve at home*: Dr. Hare, the Duke of Marlborough's chaplain, who issued a lengthy reply to the *Conduct of the Allies*, is very indignant with Swift for this abuse of 'Sovereign Princes', and for 'branding Crown'd Heads with such Words of Infamy'. Swift calls attention to this misrepresentation in his *Remarks on the Barrier Treaty*, adding caustically, 'This is what the Whigs call answering a book'.

PAGE 27. 5. *two Alliances with Portugal*: they are both dated May 16, 1703. The Offensive Treaty is given in Almon's *Collection of Treaties* (1772), and the Defensive in Chalmers's work with the same title (1790). The very favourable terms which Portugal got in these treaties were necessary to gain the support of that country, which had till then been in alliance with France. Whether Portugal was sufficiently dangerous as an enemy, or sufficiently useful as a friend, to have justified the outlay may well be doubted. See note to p. 13. 2.

16. *shall possess the Dominions of Spain*: this is, no doubt, what the draftsman of the treaty meant to say; what he actually said was, 'all Spain, as it was possessed by . . . Charles II'. It would seem to be as difficult to say what one means in a treaty as it notoriously is in an Act of Parliament.

19. *by subsequent Stipulations*: these were the 'Secret and Separate Articles' appended to the same treaty and signed by all the four contracting powers. Estremadura was not, as one would gather from the text, a 'place', but a province in Spain bordering on Portugal. Charles agreed that on his gaining the throne of Spain four towns in this province and four others in Galicia (of which Vigo was one) should be handed over to Portugal, together with all the country to the north of the Rio de la Plata in South America. None of these transfers ever took place.

26. *By two other Articles*: this paragraph is a fair summary of articles 17-20 in the Offensive Treaty. Further stipulations are given in the text below, p. 42.

PAGE 28. 24. *that King is obliged*: Defensive Treaty, article 12.

PAGE 29. 23. *The Barrier-Treaty*: see Introduction, p. xxv. Dr. Hare, in his second pamphlet in reply, protests that this

Treaty has nothing to do with 'the Operations of the War', and that its introduction here is 'horribly wicked and unjust', which looks as if Swift's shot had gone home. In another passage Hare denounces the criticism of treaties as 'prophane', 'for Treaties have been always reckon'd Sacred Things'.

PAGE 30. 8. *hardly one in five hundred*: the value of Swift's opinion on this point may be gauged from his ignorance of the fact that Harley and St. John, whom he thought he knew intimately, were both in correspondence with the Pretender, and that the Queen herself favoured her brother's accession after her own decease.

23. *however our Posterity*, &c.: the blunter form in which this sentence was couched in the first edition (see footnote to the text) roused great indignation among the war party and some alarm among the advocates of peace. See Swift's Postscript below, p. 76; and Introduction, p. xli. The alteration in the fourth edition and those which were printed from it was, no doubt, made by Harley's wish. See Introduction, p. xxxix. In his *Remarks on the Barrier Treaty* Swift says, 'I was assured that my Lord Chief Justice affirmed that passage [i.e. as it stood in the early editions] was treason'. That nobody seems to have objected to the revised version, though it maintains precisely the same principle, shows how much more importance is attached to language than to ideas in politics. The right of Parliament to alter the succession had been definitely settled by the Revolution twenty-two years before, and was not likely to be upset by the clamours of a faction.

PAGE 31. 5. *delivered to the King of Spain*: the Grand Alliance too would have been all the better for having a draftsman with Swift's power of lucid expression; all it says is, 'to recover the provinces of the Spanish Low Countries, that they may be a fence and rampart, commonly called a barrier, separating and distancing France from the United Provinces, for the security of the States General'. But Swift's description of the terms of the Barrier Treaty (ll. 6–11) is quite accurate.

13. *Newport*: this is the Nieuport at the mouth of the Yser, names which are not likely to be soon forgotten in England. The barrier demanded by the Dutch ran along the southern part of what is now Belgium, and several of the towns (e.g. Lille and Valenciennes) were in France.

14. *the Pais de Waas*: the Pays de Waes is the part of East Flanders which lies west and north of the Scheldt.

25. *the disobliged Manufacturers in Ireland*: the history of the crushing of Irish industries by the English Parliament is one which no Englishman can read without shame. After Charles II had ruined Irish shipping, and forbidden the exportation of horses, cattle, meat, and dairy produce, the unfortunate inhabitants were yet able to make a living out of the woollen

manufacture; till on the petition of the English clothiers in 1699 William prohibited the exportation of manufactured wool altogether. In this way it was computed that 42,000 families were thrown out of employment. Swift attacked this foolish and criminal policy in his *Short View of the State of Ireland*. The restrictions were removed in 1800 at the Union.

Disobliged is used in the obsolete sense of 'released from obligation', and so here is equivalent to 'unemployed'.

26. *the French Refugees*: those who had left France after the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685. A hundred thousand Huguenots fled over the borders to take refuge in Holland, Switzerland, and the Palatinate; while many thousands found a home in England, where they established the silk industry of Spitalfields.

33. *the Staples of Wooll*: the staple was the chief mart or emporium of any manufacture. The wool trade was the oldest and, till the end of the eighteenth century, the richest of the English industries. It was fostered with jealous care by the English kings, who were constantly either prohibiting or regulating the export of wool. The Ordinances of the Staple in 1353 (27 Edward III, st. 2) were extraordinarily severe in this respect, forbidding the export of wool under pain of death and forfeiture of all the offender's land and goods; they also declared ten towns in England, and others in Wales and Ireland, to be staple towns. Swift speaks of 're-establishing' the staple abroad because it had at one time or another been fixed at Antwerp, St. Omer, and Calais.

PAGE 32. 7. *the Scheld*: by the Treaty of Münster (1648) the Scheldt was to remain closed to all nations except the Dutch. They accordingly exacted heavy tolls from all foreign ships coming up to Antwerp; and now, to prevent the conquest of Flanders injuring their trade, by the fifteenth article of the Barrier Treaty, they established the rule that commerce should not 'be made more easy by the seaports than by the rivers'.

24. *one of our Plenipotentiaries*: Charles Townshend, second Viscount. He was beyond all question 'a statesman of unsullied integrity', but he would appear to have been over-simple for a diplomatist. It is true that by assenting to the Barrier Treaty he won the favour of the Elector of Hanover, afterwards George I, who considered that his chance of securing the English crown rested on the goodwill of the Dutch, and was prepared to see England pay highly for this; but it is not easy to assign so unpatriotic a motive to a man of Townshend's character. He got his reward in both directions: the House of Commons declared him 'an enemy of the country' in 1712, and George I made him Secretary of State and Prime Minister in 1714. Townshend, at any rate, deserves well of his country in one

respect: on his retirement from public life in 1730 he devoted himself to agriculture, and introduced into this country the cultivation of the turnip. In this capacity he is immortalized by Pope's allusion to 'Townshend's turnips', *Imitation of Horace, Epistle II. ii.* 273.

25. *the other*: the Duke of Marlborough. In a letter to the Queen, dated Aug. 19, 1709, he asks to be excused from signing a treaty 'so very prejudicial to England'. 'For it is most certain', he adds, 'that Lord Townshend does not judge right in that matter'. Swift's suggestion that Marlborough, though he refused to sign the treaty, was not really opposed to it, is sufficiently refuted by this letter.

PAGE 33. 22. *upon a Par*: on an equality.

25. *with a Condition*, &c.: after the war had lasted a year the Dutch were still continuing to trade with France (which throws an interesting light on their devotion to commerce), so that England had to insist on this trade being stopped (January 1703). In consideration of this we asked the Dutch to raise only as many men as ourselves for the first new levies. It is unfair to say that their complying with our terms was 'directly contrary to the former Stipulation'; for therein no mention had been made of the proportion in which new levies should be made. After their trade with France had been stopped for a year, the Dutch people raised such a clamour, that the States General requested the English Parliament's leave to resume it; and this—after some demur—was granted! Warfare two hundred years ago had some remarkable features.

PAGE 34. 16. *contrary to the Agreement*: when the Dutch agreed to put a certain number of men into the field, 'the garrisons excluded', this can only have meant, in addition to the men who were then in garrison. It is unreasonable to demand that they should not draw on their field force to garrison the towns that were taken, and they were certainly not bound by their agreement to keep their field force up to its original numbers.

19. *there are at present in the Field*, &c.: i.e. not merely the Dutch troops, but many of the English as well, had been withdrawn for garrison duty, so that the total number left in Marlborough's army was less than those which England alone maintained. From the Parliamentary estimates we learn that these were 64,000, but Hare asserts that a reference to 'the common News-Papers' shows Marlborough's army to have been on any occasion nearly twice as large.

26. *Palatines . . . Saxons*: the Palatines were mercenaries engaged by England and Holland in May 1706, 20,000 of them being in English pay. The Saxons were similarly engaged in April 1707, one-half of them being paid by England.

27. *Bothmar's Regiment*: the Baron de Bothmar was the

Elector of Hanover's minister. He subsequently came as his envoy to London; see Introduction, p. xxix.

31. *the Battles of Hochstet and Ramellies*: at Höchstädt or Blenheim, there were, according to Coxe's *Life of Marlborough*, 56,000 French and Bavarian troops, of whom 40,000 were either killed, wounded, or made prisoners; the Allies had an army of 52,000, and a casualty list of 11,000. Kansler makes the numbers of troops engaged 60,000 and 56,000 respectively. At Ramillies the numbers were about 70,000 on either side.

PAGE 35. 2. *taking Bouchain*: the campaign of 1711 was very barren of result. Almost the only decisive feature was Marlborough's clever strategy by which he decoyed the French from a very strong position they were holding near Bouchain, a town on the Scheldt between Cambrai and Valenciennes, and then by a forced night-march doubled back, occupied that same position, and was able to invest the town. After a six weeks' siege it fell in September, but no decisive result followed from its capture.

8. *subsisting their Forces*: the transitive use of this verb (= provide sustenance for) is apparently not uncommon, neither is it solely a military term.

18. *which belonged*: the omission of the words 'in Justice', which are in all the editions except the fifth and seventh, is noteworthy—unless, of course, it is due to the printer. The words are only used by those who know they have no stronger ground of appeal; as here there had been a distinct agreement, the use of the words weakens the force of the sentence.

24. *the Treaties of Contributions*: it appears that the inhabitants of French territory in the occupation of the Dutch were allowed on payment of a fixed sum to traffic freely in their own produce, and so to furnish the French troops in other districts with supplies; the French were thus enabled to 'erect their magazines' and maintain their troops through the winter.

PAGE 36. 17. *Guarantees of our Succession*: see above, p. 29. 28.

21. *the Rumour of an Invasion*: even Hare is not quite certain to what occasion this refers. He takes it to mean the winter of 1709–10, when orders were sent to the English and Dutch squadrons in the Mediterranean not to return home for the winter as usual; but the Dutch messenger failing to reach the Admiral, their fleet came home; upon which another squadron was sent by the States General to replace it. There was, says Hare, a rumour of invasion at this time, but, as it came to nothing, ''twas presently said to be a Plot of the *Dutch* and the late M——y'.

22. *Sir James Wishart*: Admiral Sir James Wishart, who had seen service under Rooke, was appointed one of the Lords of the Admiralty in 1710, mainly through his support of the

Tory party. Fourteen months later he was sent to Holland as a Commissioner to determine the relative strength of the Dutch contingent of the fleet. George I punished him for having meddled in politics by depriving him of his command.

PAGE 37. 8. *I shall add one Example more*: this paragraph was, no doubt, one of the 'small additions' made by Harley to the second edition. See Introduction, p. xxxix.

11. *the Genoese*: before Montague's great experiment of borrowing from the public, money was usually raised by applying to merchants, goldsmiths, and other wealthy persons. Among these the Lombards, the Genoese, and the Venetians had far the biggest business; of Genoa, in particular, it has been said that she was a bank before she was a city.

13. *the current Species*: the currency.

14. *Allay*: alloy, which is a later form of the same word.

PAGE 38. 1. *his Highness . . . promised them*: this took place in 1710; the incident is clearly one which would lend itself to misrepresentation; if for 'promised them that Britain and the States should increase' we substitute, 'promised to use his influence with Britain and the States to make them increase', the transaction becomes more probable.

12. *his Prussian Majesty*: the Elector Frederick of Brandenburg, who succeeded his father 'the Great Elector' in 1688, found himself at the head of the largest state of the Empire, Austria alone excepted; and one-third of his dominions lay beyond the limits of the Empire, and were therefore independent of Imperial control. In 1701 he took the title of King of Prussia, the Emperor's consent being purchased by Frederick's promise to send 8,000 men to fight for the Archduke. In January of the following year he came in to the Grand Alliance.

13. *same grievous Cause of Complaint*: Swift's irony, when he wrote 'same Cause of Complaint', was apparently not obvious enough to his duller readers; so that he emphasized it in the third and subsequent editions.

23. *two last Emperors*: Leopold I (d. 1705) and Joseph I (d. 1711).

25. *excepting once in Italy*: of the various objects of the Grand Alliance, the one the Emperors had most at heart was the regaining of the Milanese and the other Italian and Mediterranean territory for the Empire. After fluctuating fortunes, this end was in a great measure achieved by Prince Eugene's decisive victory over the French at Turin in 1706, and the result was confirmed by a treaty at the beginning of the following year, by which the conquered territory became neutral till the end of the war. By the Treaty of Utrecht, Sicily proper was made over to the Duke of Savoy, but the other Spanish territories in the peninsula were allotted to the Empire.

33. *to one single Person*: for the victory of Blenheim the

Emperor gave Marlborough the title of Prince of Mindelheim and the little estate of that name in Swabia; in 1706 he made him governor of the Spanish Netherlands, a post worth £60,000 a year, though this appointment had to be cancelled owing to the protests of the Dutch.

PAGE 39. 9. *his discontented Subjects in Hungary*: throughout the reign of Leopold I Hungary had been the scene of internal wars and insurrections, the latter being partly provoked by dislike of the Hapsburg rule, partly by a determination to assert freedom of worship for the Protestants. The last of these rebellions broke out in 1703 under Francis Rákóczy the younger; this was not finally put down till May 1711, when by the compact of Szatmár the rebels secured an amnesty, together with political and religious liberty.

22. *the Business of Toulon*: the subjugation of the provinces in North Italy in 1706 left the Imperial forces free for an attack on France, and a combined invasion by the Allies was resolved on. But from the first there were disagreements, the Emperor wishing to invade Dauphiné, while the Maritime Powers were anxious for a joint attack on Toulon, where their fleets would be able to render valuable aid. When at length the Emperor gave way, he insisted on detaching 12,000 men for the invasion of Naples. This proved entirely successful, but took two months more; so that it was not till June 1707 that Eugene with 10,000 men was able to co-operate with the Duke of Savoy, who was at the head of 25,000 troops in the English and Dutch pay. With these forces a fleet of forty sail was to co-operate under Sir Cloudesley Shovel. On July 26 the combined forces appeared before the town. But the delay had been fatal. The French had got warning of the intended attack, and a few hours before the arrival of the Allies had thrown 8,000 men into the town. Maréchal de Tessé too in the rear of the Allies' lines succeeded in cutting off their supplies; and after a futile bombardment by the ships, which was vigorously answered by the French, the Allies determined to abandon a hopeless enterprise and retired by land and sea, having suffered the loss of 13,000 men.

23. *a Person . . . the Creature of a certain Great Man*: this is no doubt a shaft aimed at Godolphin or Marlborough, though I have not been able to find the 'Person's' name. Hare's rejoinder is a recrimination to the effect that the plan was revealed 'by the Clerk of another Great Man who was then Sec—— of S ——'. This would seem to be certainly aimed at Harley, whose clerk, William Gregg, was hanged for treason in another connexion in 1708; but Hare, in a postscript to his fourth part, says he does not refer to Gregg. There is, however, no need to look for a traitor in this case. The real cause of the failure was the procrastination of the Allies, but a large section of the English people are always ready to raise the cry of

treachery when a plan has miscarried through their own blunders or apathy.

26. *getting Mony by Wagers*: in his *Essay on Projects* (1697) Defoe notices this extension of gambling into the sphere of politics. Wagers would be laid on the issue of a battle or a siege as openly as they now are on horse-racing. Thus on the second siege of Limerick, he tells us, as much as £200,000 was laid that the city would or would not fall. Offices were opened for dealing in this highly profitable form of speculation, and books were made by astute people so that they were certain of profit in either event.

28. *in Employment*: the regular term for holding an office under government. Of course, in wagering of this kind, a government official might be in possession of special information which would make his bets a certainty, and not only the public, but the enemy, might get wind of some scheme, such as that of Toulon, by watching the market.

PAGE 40. 3. *to seize Naples*: see note to p. 39. 22. The populace were bitterly hostile to the Bourbons, so that a small army under General Daun was easily able to occupy the kingdom for Charles III.

30. *on this side of the Hills*: i.e. to the west of Dauphiné.

PAGE 41. 1. *that Treaty, on the Faith of which* &c.: this was made in October 1703. See note to p. 13. 8. Under this treaty the Duke was to receive part of the duchy of Montferrat, but the Emperor had delayed to carry out the contract.

13. *and that until*: 'that' here stands instead of a repetition of the preceding 'though'—a common construction of the time which is found several times in Shakespeare and occasionally in the Bible. The French *que* is similarly used.

18. *Mr. Whitworth*: Charles Whitworth entered the diplomatic service in William's reign, and was envoy to Russia 1704–10. Early in 1711 he was sent on this fruitless errand to Vienna. In 1721 he was created Baron Whitworth in the Irish peerage, and next year he sat in Parliament as member for Newport, I.W. He died in 1725.

PAGE 42. 21. *When Portugal came*: see note to p. 27. 5. In both the Offensive and the Defensive Treaty it was provided that the three principal Allies should furnish 12,000 men for the war in Spain, but there was no stipulation that each of them should furnish one-third of that number. Their responsibility was joint for the provision of the whole, as it was for the equipment and payment of the 28,000 men whom Pedro was to raise.

25. *Pattacoons*: the patacoon was a Spanish and Portuguese silver coin, worth at the time about 4*s*. 8*d*., so the sum payable would amount to over £233,000.

PAGE 43. 8. *having marched with the Earl of G——y*: for the Earl of Galway see Introduction, p. xxi. He had been sent

to Portugal in 1704 to invade Spain with 8,000 English and Dutch troops, accompanied by the Archduke, but had been foiled by the superior skill of the Duke of Berwick. In 1706 he landed in Catalonia and marched victoriously to Madrid, where he seated Charles III on the throne. The failure to maintain his position in the capital was, according to Colonel Parnell's history, more the result of Peterborough's neglect of orders than his own 'noble Conduct'. Swift's disparagement of Galway proceeds from his warm attachment to Peterborough, who throughout was Galway's rival and was recognized as such by the nation, heated debates being conducted and insulting pamphlets written on the merits of the two commanders. Macaulay's account of this campaign in his *War of the Succession in Spain* is as fascinating as usual, but quite unreliable.

25. *Gibraltar*: having landed Galway and the Archduke at Lisbon in 1704, Sir George Rooke attacked Gibraltar in July of that year, and took it in three days. The French and Spanish forces made several unavailing attempts to retake it, and at the end of the war it was finally allotted to England.

PAGE 44. 3. *all Bavaria* &c.: Swift's selection of places is rather perplexing. As a result of the battle of Blenheim the French evacuated Bavaria, in which Augsburg is situated, and fell back west of the Rhine. At the same time the garrison of Ulm in Würtemberg surrendered on terms. Louis of Baden even crossed the Rhine and captured Landau in the Palatinate, overrunning a great part of Alsace at the same time.

8. *Mirandola* and *Modena* are in North Italy, to the south of Mantua. They were conquered by Eugene in 1706.

22. *the Oppressions of Flanders*: after the battle of Oudenarde the citizens of Ghent and Bruges found the Dutch rule and Marlborough's exactions so oppressive that they sought deliverance in 1708 by opening their gates to the French; but after Marlborough took Lille they thought it prudent to return to the side of the Allies.

28. *after the Battle of Almanza*: when Galway was forced to retire into Valencia (see note to p. 43. 8), the Archduke insisted on his dispatching 10,000 men to garrison fortresses throughout that country and Catalonia. This left Galway only 16,000 men, of whom one-half were Portuguese, to oppose to the 25,000 commanded by Berwick. The armies met at Almanza (April 1707), where the day was decided by the cowardice of the Portuguese horse, who refused at a critical moment to charge, and the battle became a rout. The Allies lost 5,000 men slain, and 8,000 who surrendered; it was long before the memory of the disaster faded from the minds of the English at home. The practical effect of Berwick's victory was to secure Spain for Philip; for though in 1710 Charles once again secured a temporary seat on the throne at Madrid, he found the people more hostile than ever,

and was speedily forced to make another—and final—retirement. After Almanza, Galway was superseded by General Stanhope, and retired to England to write a pamphlet in defence of his conduct of the war.

PAGE 45. 20. *inveterate*: this seems to be used in the obsolete and incorrect sense of 'malignant'; its usual meaning, 'of long standing', yields very poor sense. In a letter of October 26, 1709, the Queen speaks of the Duchess of Marlborough's 'inveteracy against poor Masham'.

26. *to hire Troops from several Princes of the Empire*: the mercenaries in English pay included troops from Anspach, Mecklenburg, Hanover, Zell, Hesse-Cassel, the Palatinate, Würtemberg, Saxony, Wolfenbüttel, Holstein, and Münster; as well as Danes and Swiss.

PAGE 46. 18. *the old Duke of Schomberg*: Frederick Schomberg was a soldier of fortune who fought at different times for the Protestant Princes of Germany, for France, for the Elector of Brandenburg, and for William III. By the last he was created, in succession, baron, marquis, and duke; and £100,000 was voted him by the House of Commons. He fell at the battle of the Boyne in July 1689, and was buried in St. Patrick's Cathedral, Dublin, his epitaph being written by Swift.

24. *Bubbles*: the last instance in *N. E. D.* of this use of the word (=gull, dupe) is from Crabbe's *Parish Register* (1807). The verb to bubble (=to cheat) was very common in the eighteenth century, though it is now rarely used.

PAGE 47. 10. *I have already observed*: see above, p. 10. 26.

22. *the Dutchess, by her Employments*: for the word 'Employments' see above, note to p. 39. 28. Sarah Jennings was attendant to Anne before she married John Churchill in 1678 at the age of eighteen. When Anne married in 1683 Lady Churchill was appointed one of the ladies of her bedchamber, and from that time onward she completely dominated her mistress. On Anne's accession she was made groom of the stole, mistress of the robes, and keeper of the privy purse; she was also made Ranger of Windsor Park. From about 1702 her influence began to decline, and from 1706 onwards she was gradually supplanted in the Queen's affections by Miss Abigail Hill, who became later Mrs. Masham. The final interview between the Queen and the Duchess took place in February 1710, and eleven months later the Duchess resigned her offices; these by her own admission were worth £5,600 per annum.

PAGE 48. 3. *those very Persons were against it*: I cannot find any evidence that either Marlborough or Godolphin ever opposed the war with France, except Swift's statements here and on p. 10. The reason for Godolphin's resignation seems never to have been made public.

14. *other Powers*: this alteration from the 'other Princes' of

the first edition is noteworthy. The earlier term would not have included 'their High Mightinesses, the Lords the States General'.

17. *unmeasurable*: the 'unanswerable' of the first edition can hardly be anything but a printer's error.

21. *great Presents*: as the Parliament at home had voted large sums to Marlborough, they can hardly have resented his accepting other sums from foreign princes who had benefited far more by his services. The two-and-a-half per cent. deduction from the subsidies dated back from the time of William III, who, being insufficiently provided with money for the secret service, had been allowed by the Allies to deduct that percentage from the subsidies paid them by England. On her accession Anne had given Marlborough a warrant empowering him to make the same deduction, a fact which, though it was not disclosed till the House of Commons ordered an inquiry into the matter in December 1711, exonerates Marlborough from illegality on this count. The *grand Perquisites*, however, are not so easily disposed of. Sir Solomon Medina, contractor for bread and bread-wagons for the troops in the Netherlands, said that in ten years he had paid more than £63,000 to Marlborough 'for his own use'; which payment the House of Commons, by 270 votes to 165, declared to be 'unwarrantable and illegal'. But it must not be forgotten that the voting was decided far more by party feeling than by any principles of law or justice. This is shown by their further declaration that the two-and-a-half per cent. deductions ought to be repaid, which with the 'perquisites' amounted to over £282,000,000. As Sir Leslie Stephen says in *D. N. B.*, the best proof that none of these payments was strictly illegal is afforded by the fact that no attempt was made to compel Marlborough to refund them.

29. *But when the War was thus begun*: Swift here goes back to the ministerial changes at the beginning of Anne's reign. At this time the Queen herself, the great majority of the Tories, and the High Church party were bent on preventing the succession of the House of Brunswick, and would have welcomed that of the Pretender if he gave security for the maintenance of the Church of England. The Church party did their utmost to secure the passing of a bill against 'occasional conformity', which would have barred Nonconformists from all municipal corporations, and so greatly weakened the Whig element in the House of Commons. But Marlborough and Godolphin, though strong churchmen, were not minded to see the Tories too powerful in the state, and secretly hindered the passage of the bill. For this, Swift, whose attitude towards Nonconformity was one of bigoted intolerance, as may be seen in his *Free Thoughts*, the paper on *Public Absurdities*, and many other places, never forgave the two ministers. Nottingham and the other disappointed Tories avenged themselves by opposing the continuance

of the war, and were accordingly got rid of by Marlborough (1704), their places being filled by Harley, St. John, and others, who were at that time more willing to fall in with his views. Having thus quarrelled with the extreme Tories Marlborough secured himself by entering into correspondence in 1705 with the Whig junto consisting of Somers, Halifax, Wharton, Orford, and Sunderland. This 'Solemn League and Covenant' did not last long. The appointment of Sunderland as Secretary of State in the following year, not only estranged the Queen, who detested all Whigs, but led to the further appointments of Somers and Wharton in 1708, and the Whig triumph which lasted till Sacheverell's sermon and its consequences once more blew them from their seats.

PAGE 50. 17. *Engrossments*: appropriation of the whole stock of a commodity, so as to have a monopoly of it.

23. *the Vote passed in the House of Lords*: in December 1707 the two Houses had voted that no peace could be safe or honourable which left any part of the Spanish dominions in Bourbon hands. For a later motion on the same subject see Introduction, p. xxix.

25. *the Earl of W——n*: Thomas Wharton, the reputed author of 'Lilliburlero', the song which sang James II out of three kingdoms', was noted for his wit, his profligacy, and his staunch devotion to the Whigs. He had been created Earl of Wharton in 1706, and Marquis two years later, when he was appointed Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. A scathing *Short Character of His Excellency*, written by Swift in 1710, is a masterpiece of invective, and leaves Wharton with hardly a shred of decent reputation; and though Swift's judgements of his contemporaries were always based on personal or party feeling, there seems to be no ground for believing that the character was untrue in the main. Yet, such was the influence of party spirit in those days, that the gentle and pure-minded Addison dedicated the fifth volume of the *Spectator* to the greatest rake, the most notorious liar, and the openest enemy of religion in his day, professing himself, moreover, to be one of 'His Lordship's greatest Admirers'.

30. *very advantageous Offers of a Peace*: after his defeat at Ramillies in 1706 Louis made secret overtures for peace to the Maritime Powers. He was willing to surrender to Charles either Spain and Spanish America, or the Italian territories. But the terms were rejected as being 'too vague', which probably means that the Allies doubted whether Louis ever intended to carry them into effect.

32. *a Set of Men*: i. e. the Whig junto. It is not true, however, to say that the Whigs were only brought in after the rejection of the terms of peace, and to prevent them making political capital out of that mistake. Lord Cowper had taken

office in 1705, though Lord Sunderland, Marlborough's son-in-law, only joined the ministry at the end of 1706.

PAGE 51. 2. *the Prince of Denmark's Death*: Prince George, brother of the King of Denmark, married Princess Anne in 1683. In seventeen years she bore him as many children, but they all died before she came to the throne. The Prince seems to have been as dull, as ignorant, and as indolent as the Queen, though he was more good-humoured; his two chief interests in life were eating and field sports. Like his wife he regarded the Whigs with detestation, but he had little influence in politics, so that Swift is probably wrong in representing Marlborough as having waited for the Prince's death—which occurred in October 1708—before adding more Whigs to the ministry.

7. *wexed the Father* &c.: a reminiscence of Deuteronomy xxxii. 15, 'Jeshurun waxed fat, and kicked'. The change of 'waxed' in the first edition to 'wexed' in the second is interesting. *Wex* was the M.E. past tense of 'wax', but it was used by Spenser as a present; Dryden also has the participle 'wexing'.

our two great Allies abroad: after the dismissal of Sunderland in June 1710, a deputation was sent to the Queen by the Bank of England, representing that the Funds had fallen and that public credit would suffer by the dismissal of the Whigs. The Dutch Envoy, M. Vryberg, and Count Gallas, the Imperial Minister, made similar remonstrances, which were instigated, as has since been shown, by Godolphin. In both cases the Queen replied with a general assurance that she would safeguard all common interests.

8. *Stock-jobbers*: 'it was about the year 1688 that the word stockjobber was first heard in London.'—Macaulay, *History*, ch. xix.

11. *Her Secretary or Treasurer*: these were Boyle and Godolphin. Henry Boyle had taken Harley's place as Secretary of State in 1708. He is said to have first brought Addison to the notice of the Whigs by persuading him to write a poem, 'The Campaign', on the victory at Blenheim. It was perhaps for this reason that Addison dedicated the third volume of the *Spectator* to him. Shortly after these remonstrances Boyle was dismissed in favour of St. John; but in 1714 on the accession of George I he was raised to the peerage as Baron Carleton. The 'true reason' why the Allies and the capitalists wanted no change in the ministry was, of course, that they desired a continuance of the war and saw that the retirement of Marlborough's friends would probably lead to peace.

25. *The Prudence, Courage, and Firmness of Her Majesty*: this eulogy of the Queen is very much at variance with Swift's true opinion of her, as it may be gleaned from the *Journal to Stella*. There he speaks of her 'confounded trimming', and her

liability to be 'frightened or flattered'; and in the pamphlet on the *Change in the Ministry* he speaks of her 'incurable disease, either of negligence or procrastination'.

PAGE 52. 9. *to fly to an adjoining Cottage*: Godolphin had sold his house at Cranbourne, just outside Windsor Park, to Queen Anne. According to the Duchess, the Queen spent much of her time there in order to see such people as Mrs. Masham wished to introduce without the Duchess's knowledge.

10. *the Advice of Solomon*: from Proverbs xxi. 9, and xxv. 24.

22. *the old Masters of the Palace*: the Merovingian dynasty, established in Gaul and part of Germany by Clovis in A. D. 486, had by the end of the next century and a half dwindled into insignificance, the last monarchs being 'generally treated by later historians as *insensati* or idiots' (Hallam). The whole power rested in the hands of the Mayors of the Palace (*Majores Domus*), who were originally officers of the royal household through whom petitions were presented to the king. This office became hereditary and was held in succession by Pepin of Heristal, Charles Martel, and Pepin the Short, the last of whom put an end to the farce by deposing Childeric III in 751 and causing himself to be crowned King of the Franks.

24. *a G——l for Life*: in the early part of 1709 Marlborough perceived that his influence over the Queen was waning, and, anxious to secure himself against further loss of power, he applied to the Queen to be made Captain General for life. She required time to consider his request, and meanwhile the Duke applied to the Lord Chancellor (Cowper) to know if there was any precedent for such an appointment. He was told that the office had always been held 'during pleasure', and strongly advised not to renew his application. The Queen, moreover, who was greatly alarmed by the proposal, took counsel with the Duke of Argyle and other Whig noblemen, stating that she apprehended danger in case she refused to make the appointment. Argyle tried to reassure her and undertook, whenever she commanded, to seize the Duke at the head of his troops and bring him away either dead or alive. With this support the Queen found courage to refuse Marlborough's application, and received from him in return a letter reproaching her for her ingratitude. In the *Four Last Years* Swift writes: 'I am persuaded, his chief motive [in making his request] was the pay and perquisites, by continuing the war; and that he had *then* no intentions of settling the crown in his family, his only son having been dead some years before.' The italics, which are Swift's, are noticeable.

PAGE 53. 19. *a new Incident*: this is not the case. One of the expressed objects of the Alliance of 1689 was to help the Emperor to take possession of the Spanish dominions; and in the Offensive Treaty with Portugal (May 1703) the object of the war was declared to be 'to put Charles into possession of all

Spain'. The treaty with the Duke of Savoy (October 1703) was equally explicit.

21. *the Sanction of a Vote in both Houses*: see note to p. 50. 23.

27. *it was impious too*: this horrid little piece of cant may be placed alongside of that of Dr. Hare quoted in the note to p. 29. 23.

35. *Having already made an Extract*: see above, pp. 11, 12.

PAGE 54. 9. *His Cesarean Majesty*: in the translation of the treaty given in Almon's *Collection* (1772) this appears less pedantically as 'His Imperial Majesty'.

and for his Royal Majesty: Swift, intentionally or otherwise, gives a wrong turn to this sentence. In Almon there is nothing about 'satisfaction for Great Britain', but 'satisfaction for his Imperial Majesty, and the particular Security of the Kingdoms . . . for his Majesty of Great Britain and the States General'. In other words the Emperor had been wronged, England and Holland had only been endangered, by Louis.

20. *except it is agreed* &c.: Almon, more intelligibly, has, 'and lastly unless full liberty be granted unto the subjects' &c. The 'except' clause as given by Swift seems to refer to the clause immediately preceding; it really goes back to 'Nor is peace to be made'.

PAGE 55. 12. *the Partition Treaty*: see Introduction, p. xvi.

13. *this naturally led the Spaniards*: the right of a King of Spain to leave his dominions by will was uncontested, and had been exercised by Charles II's father before him. The Spaniards were thus drawn to Philip by traditional loyalty in the first place; and in the second by religion. For though the Austrian princes were Catholics, the English and the Dutch and many of the Germans were heretics, and detestation of heretics formed a strong feature in the Spanish character. Philip, moreover, was seated on the throne and had been recognized as king by the very powers who were now trying to dethrone him. If to all these motives we add the indignation natural to a proud people at seeing their wide empire dismembered and portioned out, not by their own sovereign, who might have some right to disintegrate the dominions of his forefathers, but by foreign powers acting for their own interests, we can understand the devotion manifested by the great majority of the Spaniards towards Philip.

PAGE 56. 10. *after the Resolutions*: see note to p. 50. 23.

12. *till Malt and Land were Mortgaged*: see note to p. 19. 14.

14. *the dizieme denier*: originally a tax of one-tenth of the value of all movables, it had come to be a fixed sum demanded from each township on an assessment made in the reign of Edward III. Cf. note on 'fifteenth', p. 8. 20.

21. *resty*: a variant of 'restiff' and 'restive', which has since the eighteenth century been confined to dialect.

23. *a Barrier-Treaty*: see Introduction, p. xxv. Swift's 'Discourse' on it was based on material given him by Harley (*Journal to Stella*, Feb. 12, 1711–12). It was published before the end of the month, i. e. shortly after the seventh and last edition of the *Conduct of the Allies*.

31. *the Treaty at Gertruydenburg*: see Introduction, p. xxvi.

PAGE 57. 7. *our Negotiators*: Marlborough and Townshend.

23. *the Secretary of the Ambassy*: this was Horatio Walpole, the younger brother of Sir Robert Walpole, and so the uncle of his more famous namesake, the writer of the *Letters*. In 1756 he was raised to the peerage as Baron Walpole. The spelling 'ambassy' is noted by Johnson as being obsolete in 1755.

PAGE 59. 4. *a Treaty with King Charles*: I have not found any information about this.

5. *a Treaty made by Mr. Stanhope*: James Stanhope, created Earl Stanhope in 1718, succeeded Methuen as minister to Spain in 1706, and two years later became commander-in-chief of the British forces in Spain. He took Minorca and won the battle of Saragossa, but had to capitulate at Brihuega in 1710, remaining a prisoner till the summer of 1712. In July 1707 he had signed a treaty with the representatives of Charles III by which England secured, not only lower duties for her imports into Spain, but the right to send ten ships to trade with the Spanish Indies. Of course, as Charles was not, and never became, *de facto* King of Spain, the treaty proved abortive.

9. *a Clause was inserted*: by the fifteenth article of the Barrier Treaty the Queen and the States General promised to take care that the subjects of the two powers should be treated 'in the Spanish Low countries, as well as in all Spain, the kingdoms and states belonging to it, equally, and as well the one as the other, as favourably as the people most favoured'.

14. *since the Emperor's Death*: see Introduction, p. xxvii.

PAGE 60. 2. *Oeconomy*: management, administration.

20. *between a Prince . . . and between a Prince*: the second 'between' is not only ungrammatical but misleading. The alternative to an Austrian prince ruling over the Empire and Spain, was not a Bourbon prince ruling over France and Spain, but one Bourbon prince ruling over Spain, while another was ruling over France. The possibility of the former alternative coming into existence is ignored by Swift. See Introduction, p. xxxii.

29. *Augustissima Casa*: 'the most worshipful house', i.e. of the Hapsburgs, the royal line of Austria.

PAGE 61. 8. *a Slave and a Frontier*: the use of the latter word in the sense of 'a barrier against attack' was common in the seventeenth century, but is now obsolete. *N. E. D.* quotes no instance later than 1690.

13. *to whose Family he is nearly allied*: Mary of Orleans,

wife of the wily Victor Amadeus (see note to p. 13. 8), was the niece of Louis XIV; and the two sons of the Dauphin, the Duke of Burgundy and the Duke of Anjou, had both married daughters of Victor Amadeus.

26. *to be lawful Monarch*: they had acknowledged Philip as King of Spain in 1701; see Introduction, p. xviii.

PAGE 62. 2. *Topicks*: in the obsolete sense of 'considerations', 'arguments'.

PAGE 63. 9. *to divide a Deficiency . . . among the several Branches of our Expence*: I can only conjecture that this means, defer payment of government debts in various departments, so that the whole loss did not fall upon the army. A modern Chancellor of the Exchequer would, of course, raise the money required either by additional taxation, which Swift seems never to have contemplated, or by a fresh war loan, which the Tories looked on as national bankruptcy.

17. *Fifty Millions, which is a fourth Part of the Purchase of the whole Island*: Colbert had valued the land in England in 1660 at £4 10*s*. an acre, and its value had probably not greatly increased in the next fifty years. The land in Scotland was certainly worth very much less, so we may perhaps take £4 per acre as the value of Great Britain. If we reckon fifty-seven million acres as the area, the total value will then be two hundred and twenty-eight million pounds, which is not much at variance with Swift's estimate.

21. *these Annuities will expire* &c.: the annuity had to be paid during the lifetime of one or more persons. Annuities for three lives were fairly common; but one for a single life was often a lucrative speculation. The father of William Duncombe subscribed £100 in 1693 for an annuity for his son, aged three. The son died at the age of 79, having received £10 every year by way of interest; in addition to which, as the annuity was arranged on the Tontine principle, so that the interest of an annuitant who died was transferred to the surviving annuitants, Duncombe became possessed of several thousands. See Nichols's *Literary Anecdotes*, viii. 265.

PAGE 64. 7. *such a Conjuncture of Affairs, as never happened before*: this, in point of fact, exactly describes the position of affairs. Since the fall of the Roman Empire there had been no such attempt on the part of one power to subjugate all the rest of Europe as that made by Louis XIV.

11. *no Examples of it, in Greece and Rome*: it could hardly have been otherwise, the practice of investment in public companies not having arisen till a very much later date. It was only when a large number of people had amassed more wealth than they could use in enlarging their own private undertakings that investment in outside concerns became required. To say that public borrowings by a government were unknown in Europe

before 1692 is untrue. The custom had prevailed in Italy for several generations, and between 1672 and 1679 the French government had borrowed thirty millions from the English people. The States General too in 1674 had borrowed five millions from its own subjects, and imposed heavy taxes to pay the interest. 'In effect Holland was the source of modern finance, and proved how taxation, though apparently of crushing weight, could be easily endured, if it were counterbalanced by industry and thrift.'—Thorold Rogers.

13. *Spain about an Hundred and twenty years ago*: the Spanish system of taxation was probably the worst in the world, being at once oppressive, unremunerative, destructive of commerce, and frequently eluded. The date given by Swift brings us to about the year 1590, when Philip II was on the throne, and two years after the destruction of the Armada; but I cannot find that either then or at any other time the Spanish government borrowed from its subjects.

33. *we are more exhausted than . . . the Enemy*: see note to p. 21. 25. It is, however, satisfactory to find Swift, the keenest of party politicians, denouncing 'the Opposition of Factions' as a hindrance to the prosperity of the country.

PAGE 65. 4. *when they see a few Rags hang up in Westminster-Hall*: the standards captured at Blenheim were hung up here in the following year. This unworthy sneer shows that Swift had no conception of the real origin of the war. It may be right to belittle military glory where it is sought by aggression, and the moralist may well ask Tamerlaine, Xerxes, or Alexander the Great whether the conquests they attempted or effected could be justified, when set against the ruin and misery they had caused. But resistance offered to the aggressor stands on a quite different footing. The man who can think of the Greeks at Marathon, the Swiss at Granson, William of Orange in Holland, or King Albert in Belgium without feeling proud of humanity, is hardly a person to be envied.

11. *Funds, raised by the Landed Men*: this cannot mean that the loans were made by the landed classes in England, for that was not the case; Swift himself says they came from the 'monied men'. If he means that all wealth ultimately comes from the land, he is merely uttering a truism in very ambiguous language.

19. *by which the Publick is defrauded of almost half*: i. e. only about half the amount borrowed was covered by the taxes appropriated to pay the interest. But as the balance of the interest was obtained by fresh borrowings, it is not easy to see where the 'fraud' comes in.

23. *this false Credit sink*: in modern parlance, Consols went down when Harley became Prime Minister. Cf. note to p. 51. 8. Swift's satisfaction was not shared by Harley, who in 1710

published under his own name an *Essay upon Public Credit*, which is now known to have been written by Defoe. In this he deprecated any fall in the Funds, and argued that the nation's credit rested on the stability of the throne and the integrity of Parliament, not on the ministry. The City, however, remained obstinately unconverted; and it was not till Harley authorized the foundation of the South Sea Company in the following year that the Funds rose. This Company agreed, in return for the exclusive right to trade with the west coast of America, to make a loan of between nine and ten millions to the government. Of this sum nearly eight millions were needed to clear off the arrears of pay in the army and navy.

33. *I dare engage* &c.: the subtlety of this is beyond me. A campaign might be a source of profit to the monied men, or to Marlborough, so long as the nation paid for it; but it is not easy to see how they could make it pay when they had to 'furnish it out at their own charges'.

PAGE 66. 5. *I have already observed*: see above, p. 63. 5. *Funds of Interest* means, of course, funds from which the interest could be paid.

30. *The first Overtures from France*: which resulted in Prior's mission to Versailles; see Introduction, p. xxviii.

PAGE 67. 1. *We know the Dutch* &c.: put more plainly and bluntly this amounts to saying that Marlborough and Godolphin, who were making large sums out of the war, were bribed with money and threatened with peace by the Dutch, to make them fall in with Dutch interests. 'Motives', in italics, may generally in Swift's writings be taken as a euphemism for bribery.

25. *whether Civil or Natural*: whether in the body politic, or in the human body. 'Expedient' seems to be used here in a bad sense, for a 'make-shift', not a radical remedy; but I can find no parallel.

33. *strong Delusion*: from 2 Thessalonians ii. 11, 'God shall send them strong delusion, that they should believe a lie'.

PAGE 68. 9. *Cautionary Towns*: by the Treaty of Utrecht, in articles of almost inconceivable verbosity, Louis and Philip renounce all claim for the latter or his heirs to the throne of France. But these provisions were ratified by an oath, and not by the more stable guarantee of a surrender of towns to be held as a pledge.

13. *The present King of France* &c.: Louis XIV died in September 1715. His heir apparent, Louis Duke of Burgundy, Philip's elder brother, had died early in 1712, together with his eldest son, leaving only a two-year-old infant, afterwards Louis XV, between Philip of Spain and the French throne.

23. *These at least are Probabilities*: later they became facts. Philip Duke of Orleans, who became Regent of France on the death of Louis XIV, entirely altered the foreign policy of that

country and, partly from political sagacity, partly from personal hostility towards his cousin the King of Spain, entered into an alliance in 1717 with England and Holland to depress Spain; this alliance was joined by the Emperor in the following year, and a two years' war resulted in reducing Spain to a position of inferiority from which she never afterwards recovered.

29. *We have been Fighting* &c.: here again Swift shows an extraordinary blindness to the principles which demanded the declaration of war. Had he said 'for the last five years', he would have had an arguable, if not convincing, case, for the victories at Blenheim, Ramillies, and Turin had shown Louis the impossibility of establishing that European Empire of which he had dreamed.

PAGE 69. 5. *above two Years ago*: see the terms offered by Louis at the Hague in 1709, and at Gertruydenberg in 1710, Introduction, pp. xxiii, xxvi. The alteration of the terms was probably due to the recognition on both sides of the difficulty of ejecting Philip from Spain. But Swift has no ground for saying that in two years' time England would have had to accept worse terms. France was almost exhausted, and if Marlborough had been continued in command—the general 'who never fought a battle which he did not win, or besieged a town which he did not take'—she would in all probability have been brought to her knees. Whether such action would have been generous or even prudent is another matter. England was fighting not for revenge, but for security; and that she had amply obtained already.

22. *I have heard a Man*: according to a note of Sheridan's this was Lord Halifax. Charles Montague not only originated the National Debt (see note to p. 9. 14), but two years later initiated the scheme for establishing the Bank of England. As Chancellor of the Exchequer he remedied the depreciation in the coinage, and instituted the use of exchequer bills when metallic currency ran short. He became Lord Treasurer on Godolphin's resignation of that post in 1696, but when Anne got rid of her Whig ministers in 1701, Montague retired to the House of Lords as Baron Halifax. Three attempts were made in the reign of Queen Anne to convict him of malpractices, but they all failed; and though he remained out of office till the Queen's death, he was appointed First Lord of the Treasury by George I in 1714, and at the same time given an earldom. If Sheridan's note is right, the statement that he held 'a good Employment (i.e. government appointment) for Life' is incorrect.

26. *who lay the heavy Burthens*, &c.: cf. Matthew xxiii. 4.

PAGE 70. 5. *after the Battle of Ramellies* &c.: see note to p. 50. 30.

15. *Livres*: the livre was an old French money of account, approximately equal to the modern franc. This sum would therefore amount to about £16,000,000 sterling.

23. *Privateers*: the Channel swarmed with French privateers which waited for the disappearance of English warships and then attacked any merchant vessels they could see. At times they even cut vessels out of English harbours. Defoe estimates the loss suffered from French privateers in the first two or three years of the earlier war at over fifteen million pounds. As their usual port of refuge from English warships was Dunkirk, England insisted at the Treaty of Utrecht that the fortifications of that town should be destroyed.

34. *For an absolute Government* &c.: this broad generalization, which was no doubt another of Harley's 'small additions' made for the second edition, would not be easy to establish. The wars of the Swiss against Charles the Bold, and of the Dutch against Philip II, are certainly instances to the contrary. It may, however, be said that democracies are as a rule less eager to engage in war than absolute monarchies.

PAGE 71. 12. *Bouchain is taken*: see note to p. 35. 2.

13. *a Clutter*: a hubbub, 'a fuss'; this attractive word, which was a favourite one with Swift, is rarely met with to-day.

21. *that War of ten Years*: the war of the Allies against France which lasted from 1688 to 1697 and was ended by the Treaty of Ryswick; see Introduction, p. xiii.

35. *a close Country*: i.e. one in which the towns come close together. Belgium before the present war was the most densely populated country in Europe.

PAGE 72. 3. *in the common Forms*: by the usual procedure.

6. *to be at the Charge*: to pay dearly enough for it.

24. *The Northern War*: in the course of the almost continuous wars of the seventeenth century Sweden had gained considerable territory from her neighbours; and on the accession of Charles XII in 1697 a league was formed against her by Russia, Denmark, and Augustus II, King of Poland and Elector of Saxony. The last of these had a hereditary quarrel with the Kings of Sweden, for his ancestors had occupied the throne of that country till the year 1600. On the declaration of war Charles appealed for help to England, Holland, and the Electors of Brandenburg and Hanover. The first two powers replied by sending a fleet to bombard Copenhagen, while Charles invested it by land. After eleven days' siege the King of Denmark came to terms and signed the Treaty of Travendahl (Aug. 1700), the terms of which were guaranteed by England and Holland. Charles then turned his arms against the Russians, whom he defeated at Narva (Nov. 1700); next against Augustus, whom he drove from Riga, and pursued into Poland, forcing him to retire into Saxony (July 1704). He replaced him on the throne by Stanislaus Leszczynski, a Polish nobleman whom he had recommended to the diet for election. He then followed Augustus into Saxony and at Altranstädt (1706) compelled him to consent to his own

deposition and to acknowledge Stanislaus ; he however permitted him to retain the title of king. Cf. above, p. 17. 23. The rest of the meteoric career of Charles XII, 'who left a name at which the world grew pale', cannot be followed in this note. It is enough to mention that after Charles's defeat at Pultawa (Poltava) in 1709, Stanislaus was forced to quit Poland and Augustus II returned to the throne. The daughter of Stanislaus became the wife of Louis XV in 1725, and eleven years later he was himself put in peaceable possession of the duchies of Lorraine and Bar and permitted to retain the empty title of King of Poland till his death.

31. *Travendall*: see last note.

PAGE 73. 5. *confirmed by a subsequent one*: this was the treaty made at the Hague, Jan. 11 (O.S.), 1700, between William III, Charles XII of Sweden, and the States General. It was signed by Nicholas, Baron de Lilienroot, for the King of Sweden; Sir Joseph Williamson, for England; and eight deputies for the Dutch.

12. *the Empire, whereof he is a Member*: by the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) Sweden was confirmed in possession of the Duchies of Bremen, Verden, Western Pomerania, and other territories in Germany, and was also recognized as a state of the Empire.

PAGE 74. 1. *King Augustus made the Campaign in Flanders*: after the treaty of Altranstädt Augustus served as a volunteer in the Netherlands on the side of the Allies. On hearing of Charles's defeat at Pultawa (June 1709) he repudiated the treaty and seated himself again on the throne of Poland.

9. *An Act of Guaranty*: in March 1710 the Swedish Senate concluded a compact of neutrality with the three great Allies, but Charles, who was then a refugee in Turkey, refused to accept it, as he wished to come to blows with his old enemy Augustus, as well as with Peter the Great.

16. *If the King of Sueden returns*: after his defeat at Pultawa Charles XII fled wounded into Turkish territory and remained there three years, trying to rouse the Turks against Russia. The story of his residence there and his final departure is as eventful as the rest of his history, but it does not concern the war of the Allies. He was killed in 1718 while invading Norway.

20. *the Corps of the Neutrality*: the whole body of those powers which agreed to stand neutral in the quarrel about Poland. The word 'corps' was in the early part of the eighteenth century pronounced like the English 'corpse'.

27. *Support of the Protestant Interest*: the Treaty of Westphalia had guaranteed religious freedom to the Protestants in Germany, but this freedom had been largely lost in the mazes of later diplomacy. Charles XII always posed as the champion of the Protestants, and in 1707 approached England as to an alliance

to restore freedom of worship in Germany, but Marlborough thought the scheme too dangerous.

PAGE 76. 1. *three or four Lines in the 21st Page*: see note to p. 30. 23.

13. *I have just seen a Paper* &c.: in an age of pamphlets it was of course impossible for the *Conduct of the Allies* to go unanswered. The most prominent reply was that of Dr. Hare, Chaplain to the Duke of Marlborough, who retorted with *The Allies and the Late Ministry Defended against France and the Present Friends of France*, a work in four parts, each published at a shilling, three of which are dated 1711 and the fourth the following year. As a rejoinder it is very unconvincing, the real points made by Swift being generally ignored and all the author's guns being directed upon minor issues. The only relief to its dreariness is provided by the vehemence of the author's style, for invective plays a much larger part in the pamphlets than argument. Still, the work must have had a certain vogue, for the first part ran to three editions. In spite of Swift's 'faithful promise' to reply, as given in the fourth edition, no notice is taken of the pamphlets in any of the subsequent editions; though this might well be because he had failed to find any 'objections of moment' in them. He, however, drew attention to one of Hare's perversions in his *Remarks on the Barrier Treaty*, see note to p. 26. 25.

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